This book contends that, with regard to the likelihood of confusion standard, European trademark law applies the average consumer incoherently and inconsistently. To test this proposal, it presents an analysis of the horizontal and vertical level of harmonization of the average consumer. The horizontal part focuses on similar fictions in areas of law adjacent to European trademark law (and in economics), and the average consumer in unfair competition law. The vertical part focuses on European trademark law, represented mainly by EU trademark law, and the trademark laws of the UK, Sweden, Denmark and Norway. The book provides readers with a better understanding of key aspects of European trademark law (the average consumer applied as part of the likelihood of confusion standard) and combines relevant law and practices with theoretical content and other related areas of law (and economics). Accordingly, it is an asset for policymakers and practitioners, as well as general readers with an interest in intellectual property law and theory.

This incisive Handbook offers novel theoretical and doctrinal insights alongside practical guidance on some of the most challenging issues in the field of artificial intelligence and intellectual property. Featuring all original contributions from a diverse group of international thought leaders, including top academics, judges, regulators and eminent practitioners, it offers timely perspectives and research on the relationship of AI to copyright, trademark, design, patent and trade secret law.

Since 1994 European Union (EU) case law touching on trade mark confusion has become so diverse and has grown so numerous that it is difficult to see the wood for the trees. This is the first book to give a complete synthesis of the thousands of decisions that have been handed down over the past decades, illustrated with many examples and images. Providing a highly structured and complete overview of the confusion test and all assessment criteria as determined by the General Court and Court of Justice, the authors unravel the concept of likelihood of confusion and establish a sound and thorough methodology for resolving confusion in any trade mark case. Among the practical features offered by the analysis are the following: consideration of the constituent criteria of the confusion test through a simple three-step test examining the similarity among goods and services, similarity between different trade marks and global appreciation of confusion; the identification of the ‘relevant consumer’, including from territorial and linguistic points of view; guidance on procedural aspects of the confusion test before the EU courts, as well as before the EU Intellectual Property Office and its Boards of Appeal; identifying the dominant and distinctive components of a trade mark – phonetic, visual and conceptual; the concept of similarity and the Nice Agreement; the principle of ‘partial use’; effect of the terms of sale of the goods or services; consideration of the existence of a family or series of trade marks; and consideration of the effects of coexistence on the confusion test. Numerous illustrated examples of trade marks involved in confusion cases enhance the presentation. Any practitioner dealing with trademark confusion in infringement proceedings before EU or national courts, or in opposition proceedings before national offices or the EU Intellectual Property Office, will be enabled to approach each case with full awareness of applicable criteria of assessment. This much-needed synthesis of case law will quickly become a standard work among lawyers, examiners and judges acting in trade mark matters.

Intellectual Property Law is the definitive textbook on the subject. The authors' all-embracing approach not only clearly sets out the law in relation to copyright, patents, trade marks, passing off, and confidentiality, but also takes account of a wide range of academic opinion enabling readers to explore and make informed judgements about key principles. The particularly clear and lively writing style ensures that even the most complex areas are lucid and comprehensible. Digital formats and resources The sixth edition is available for students and institutions to purchase in a variety of formats, and is supported by online resources. The e-book offers a mobile experience and convenient access along with functionality tools, navigation features and links that offer extra learning support: www.oxfordtextbook.co.uk/ebooks

Trademark law centers its analysis on consumer confusion. With some significant exceptions, the basic rule of trademark law is that a defendant's use of a mark is illegal if it confuses a substantial number of consumers and not otherwise. As a general matter, this is the right rule. Trademark law is designed to facilitate the workings of modern markets by permitting producers to accurately communicate information about the quality of their products to buyers, and therefore to encourage them to invest in making quality products in circumstances in which that quality wouldn't otherwise be apparent. If competitors can falsely mimic that information, they will confuse consumers, who won't know whether they are in fact getting a high quality product and therefore won't be willing to pay as much for that quality. I won't pay as much for an iPod if I think there is a chance it is a cheap knock-off masquerading as an iPod.The law of false advertising operates as an adjunct to trademark law. While trademark law prevents competitors from misrepresenting the source of their products by mimicking another's brand name, the law of false advertising prevents false or misleading statements about the quality of one's own or a competitor's products. Like trademark law, false advertising law is designed to protect the integrity of markets by allowing consumers to rely on statements made by sellers. Unfortunately, trademark law has taken the concept of confusion too far. Between 1930 and 1980, courts expanded the concept of confusion beyond confusion as to the source of a product to include the possibility that consumers are confused as to whether the trademark owner sponsors or is affiliated with the defendant's goods. This expansion began for plausible reasons: consumers might be confused to their detriment in a variety of circumstances in which the plaintiff and the defendant do not actually compete directly. But sponsorship and affiliation confusion has taken on a life of its own, resulting in a large number of cases in which companies or individuals are prevented from doing things that might conceivably confuse consumers, but do not confuse consumers in any way that harms their decision-making process or that the law should care about. In Part I, we offer a number of examples of “confusion” that courts have found actionable even in circumstances in which that confusion was unlikely to matter to the operation of the market. Part II explains how we arrived at this unfortunate pass.We suggest in Part III that trademark law should focus its attention on confusion that is actually relevant to purchasing decisions. We would make the source of the goods the central element of confusion analysis. It is confusion as to source that is most obviously relevant to the purposes behind trademark law. That does not mean, however, that confusion as to the relationship between plaintiff and defendant can never be actionable. Confusion as to affiliation should be actionable when consumers are likely to believe that the trademark owner stands behind or guarantees the quality of the goods the defendant sells. Even if consumers understand that individual franchisees, rather than the McDonald's Corporation, actually make their hamburgers, they are likely to expect that McDonald's stands behind whatever quality that brand represents. Finally, the fact that confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation should not generally be trademark infringement does not mean that it will never be actionable. Some statements that create confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation will be actionable as a form of false advertising. We address the scope of false advertising in Part IV. Notably, proof of a false advertising claim requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the misrepresentation is material - that it is likely to affect a product purchasing decision. Indeed, the statute specifies the sorts of misrepresentations that are forbidden. We continue the discussion in Part V, which explores some of the implications of shunting some cases into the false advertising framework, and discusses how to handle some close cases.