In today's environment of rapidly evolving conflicts, the Army's goal is to have units that have the combat power of heavy units but that can be transported anywhere in the world in a matter of days. To address concerns about the armored vehicle fleet's aging and the difficulties involved in transporting it as well as to equip the Army more suitably to conduct operations overseas on short notice using forces based in the United States the service created the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program in 2000. A major modernization effort, the program is designed in part to develop and purchase vehicles to replace those now in the heavy forces; the new vehicles would be much lighter, thereby easing the deployment of units equipped with them. In the analysis presented in this report, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) examined the current status of the Army's fleet of armored vehicles and assessed the speed of deployment of the service's heavy forces. It also evaluated the FCS program, considering the program's costs as well as its advantages and disadvantages and comparing it with several alternative plans for modernizing the Army's heavy forces.

The U.S. Army's Future Combat Systems program aimed to field an ambitious system of systems, with novel technologies integrated via an advanced wireless network. The largest and most ambitious planned acquisition program in the Army's history, it was cancelled in 2009, and some of its efforts transitioned to follow-on programs. This report documents the program's complex history and draws lessons from its experiences.

To become a more responsive and dominant combat force, the U.S. Army is changing its strategy from bigger and stronger weapons to faster and more agile ones. The Future Combat Systems (FCS) -- which the Army calls the ¿greatest technology and integration challenge ever undertaken¿ -- is expected to meet the Army¿s transformational objectives. For FCS¿ first developmental increment, the Army has set aside a 5-1/2-year timetable from program start (May 2003) until the initial production decision (Nov. 2008). This testimony is about FCS¿ key features, whether the program carries any risks, and, if so, whether there are alternatives for developing FCS capabilities with fewer risks. Illustrations.

A CBO study. Assesses the competitiveness of nuclear power compared to other sources of new capacity to generate electricity.