Scenario planning should be one of the Pentagon's most important tools for developing strategy for an uncertain future. However, the formalized joint scenario planning process to support strategy and force development-Support for Strategic Analysis-has faced many challenges over the past 2 decades, and has ultimately proven less influential than intended on strategic decision-making. Explaining why is the main purpose of this monograph. It argues that scenario analysis has been most effective in supporting capability and program development, while it has fallen short in shaping strategy and force structure. The reasons for this are numerous and are rooted in intrinsic, structural characteristics of decision-making in large organizations. The monograph concludes with several recommendations for rejuvenating scenario planning in the Pentagon.

Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction adapts Clausewitz's framework to highlight the dynamic relationship between the main elements of strategy: purpose, method, and means. Drawing on historical examples, Antulio J. Echevarria discusses the major types of military strategy and how emerging technologies are affecting them. This second edition has been updated to include an expanded chapter on manipulation through cyberwarfare and new further reading.

This book describes how future Army forces, as part of joint, interorganizational, and multinational efforts, operate to accomplish campaign objectives and protect U.S. national interests. It describes the Army's contribution to globally integrated operations, and addresses the need for Army forces to provide foundational capabilities for the Joint Force and to project power onto land and from land across the air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. The Army Operating Concept guides future force development through the identification of first order capabilities that the Army must possess to accomplish missions in support of policy goals and objectives.

In 1997 the Army asked that RAND Arroyo Center assist in the reengineering of The Army Plan (TAP). The Army also reinstituted strategic planning and the product was the Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG), which provides strategic guidance to TAP. Planning and programming in the Army are centralized within the Department of the Army's headquarters. This document discusses the Arroyo Center's work on TAP.