In The Shadow of the Past, Gregory D. Miller examines the role that reputation plays in international politics, emphasizing the importance of reliability-confidence that, based on past political actions, a country will make good on its promises-in the formation of military alliances. Challenging recent scholarship that focuses on the importance of credibility-a state's reputation for following through on its threats-Miller finds that reliable states have much greater freedom in forming alliances than those that invest resources in building military force but then use it inconsistently. To explore the formation and maintenance of alliances based on reputation, Miller draws on insights from both political science and business theory to track the evolution of great power relations before the First World War. He starts with the British decision to abandon "splendid isolation" in 1900 and examines three crises--the First Moroccan Crisis (1905-6), the Bosnia-Herzegovina Crisis (1908-9), and the Agadir Crisis (1911)-leading up to the war. He determines that states with a reputation for being a reliable ally have an easier time finding other reliable allies, and have greater autonomy within their alliances, than do states with a reputation for unreliability. Further, a history of reliability carries long-term benefits, as states tend not to lose allies even when their reputation declines.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was the first formal agreement of its type reached by a Western 'great' power with a non-Caucasian nation in the modern era. As such, it represented an important milestone diplomatically, strategically and culturally. This book brings together many leading experts who examine the different aspects of the Alliance in its different stages before, during and after the First World War, who explore the reasons for its success and for its end, and who reach a number of interesting and innovative conclusions on the agreement's ultimate importance.

During the years before the First World War, the realignment of world powers resulted in agreements concluded in 1904 and 1907 between Britain, France, Russia and Japan. John Albert White terms this a Quadruple Entente, a more accurate and complete description than the more commonly used Triple Entente, which omits Japan. His more inclusive view leaves undisturbed the conception of Europe as the centre of political gravity, but at the same time calls proper attention to the enhanced role which Japan had won through her victories in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars and by her careful management of her entry into the larger family of nations. This wider perspective on the crucial pre-war years shows how, in its political context as well as its geographical terrain and its general impact, the First World War was a world war in every sense.

This is an important reassessment of British and Italian grand strategies during the First World War. Stefano Marcuzzi sheds new light on a hitherto overlooked but central aspect of Britain and Italy's war experiences: the uneasy and only partial overlap between Britain's strategy for imperial defence and Italy's ambition for imperial expansion. Taking Anglo-Italian bilateral relations as a special lens through which to understand the workings of the Entente in World War I, he reveals how the ups-and-downs of that relationship influenced and shaped Allied grand strategy. Marcuzzi considers three main issues – war aims, war strategy and peace-making – and examines how, under the pressure of divergent interests and wartime events, the Anglo-Italian 'traditional friendship' turned increasingly into competition by the end of the war, casting a shadow on Anglo-Italian relations both at the Peace Conference and in the interwar period.