This collection of essays surveys the full range of challenges that territorial conflicts pose for constitution-making processes and constitutional design. It provides seventeen in-depth case studies of countries going through periods of intense constitutional engagement in a variety of contexts: small distinct territories, bi-communal countries, highly diverse countries with many politically salient regions, and countries where territorial politics is important but secondary to other bases for political mobilization. Specific examples are drawn from Iraq, Kenya, Cyprus, Nigeria, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the UK (Scotland), Ukraine, Bolivia, India, Spain, Yemen, Nepal, Ethiopia, Indonesia (Aceh), the Philippines (Mindanao), and Bosnia-Herzegovina. While the volume draws significant normative conclusions, it is based on a realist view of the complexity of territorial and other political cleavages (the country's "political geometry"), and the power configurations that lead into periods of constitutional engagement. Thematic chapters on constitution-making processes and constitutional design draw original conclusions from the comparative analysis of the case studies and relate these to the existing literature, both in political science and comparative constitutional law. This volume is essential reading for scholars of federalism, consociational power-sharing arrangements, asymmetrical devolution, and devolution more generally. The combination of in-depth case studies and broad thematic analysis allows for analytical and normative conclusions that will be of major relevance to practitioners and advisors engaged in constitutional design.

This collection of essays surveys the full range of challenges that territorial conflicts pose for constitution-making processes and constitutional design. It provides seventeen in-depth case studies of countries going through periods of intense constitutional engagement in a variety of contexts: small distinct territories, bi-communal countries, highly diverse countries with many politically salient regions, and countries where territorial politics is important but secondary to other bases for political mobilization. Specific examples are drawn from Iraq, Kenya, Cyprus, Nigeria, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the UK (Scotland), Ukraine, Bolivia, India, Spain, Yemen, Nepal, Ethiopia, Indonesia (Aceh), the Philippines (Mindanao), and Bosnia-Herzegovina. While the volume draws significant normative conclusions, it is based on a realist view of the complexity of territorial and other political cleavages (the country's "political geometry"), and the power configurations that lead into periods of constitutional engagement. Thematic chapters on constitution-making processes and constitutional design draw original conclusions from the comparative analysis of the case studies and relate these to the existing literature, both in political science and comparative constitutional law. This volume is essential reading for scholars of federalism, consociational power-sharing arrangements, asymmetrical devolution, and devolution more generally. The combination of in-depth case studies and broad thematic analysis allows for analytical and normative conclusions that will be of major relevance to practitioners and advisors engaged in constitutional design.

Countries often amend their constitutions or enact new ones following major political events, such as the founding of newly independent states, the fall of an authoritarian regime or the end of violent conflict. Significant constitutional reform at a crucial moment is often a high-stakes process because a constitution regulates access to public power and resources among different groups. While disagreements over divisive topics are likely and even inherent to constitution-making, they may also result in a serious deadlock when stakeholders are unable to reach agreement. A prolonged deadlock can delay or even derail the whole reform process. In this context, it may be advisable to create incentives that can help parties to the negotiations overcome divergence and resolve deadlocks should they occur. This Constitution Brief focuses on strategies and mechanisms for breaking a deadlock in constitutional negotiations conducted in an environment of competitive democratic politics.

The essays in this collection were first presented at an October 1991 conference on comparative constitutionalism under the auspices of the Jacob Burns Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, and the Cardozo-New School Project on Constitutionalism. Essays are organized in sections on the rebirth of constitutionalism, the legitimation of constitution making, the identity of the constitutional subject, the struggle between identity and difference, and the role of property rights. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Taking a comparative approach, this book considers the ways in which political regimes have changed since the Arab Spring. It addresses a series of questions about political change in the context of the revolutions, upheavals and protests that have taken place in North Africa and the Arab Middle East since December 2010, and looks at the various processes have been underway in the region: democratisation (Tunisia), failed democratic transitions (Egypt, Libya and Yemen), political liberalisation (Morocco) and increased authoritarianism (Bahrain, Kuwait, Syria). In other countries, in contrast to these changes, the authoritarian regimes remain intact (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Arab United Emirates.

Constitution making is a topic of increasing scholarly and practical interest. Focusing on a set of important case studies, yet also featuring classic articles on the subject, this volume is a critical assembly of theoretical literature. Ensuring wide geographic and historical coverage, and including an original introduction by the editors, this collection provides an essential overview of the myriad of circumstances in which constitutions can be made.

This publication is designed to assist United Nations staff who provide human rights advice to States, which undertake to amend an existing constitution or write a new one. It should also be of use to States that undertake constitutional reform, including political leaders, policymakers, legislators and those entrusted to draft constitutional amendments or a new constitution. Further this publication should also facilitate advocacy efforts by civil society to ensure that human rights are properly reflected in constitutional amendments or new constitutions. Finally, this publication, along with the international human rights instruments, should not only provide a standard to measure whether constitutional amendments or a new constitution has appropriately reflected human rights and fundamental freedoms, but also assist in evaluating whether the processes used in constitutional reform are consistent with international procedural norms"--Introduction, page 1.