[Includes 5 tables, 10 maps and 20 photos] Wars have been studied from every viewpoint from the most abstract to the intensely personal. In the case of Major Joseph C. Barto’s Task Force 2-4 Cav-”First In, Last Out”: The History of the 2d Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, During Operation Desert Storm, war is viewed from the perspective of one man’s impression of a volatile, fluid battle. Re-creating his experiences in Operation Desert Storm from pieced together notes, an extensive journal, and a variety of other sources, Barto tells the story of TF 2-4 Cav. From his position as the squadron’s executive officer and officer in charge of its tactical operations center, Barto reports the planning and execution of his squadron as it advanced across the desert in pursuit of Iraqis. The end result of Barto’s reporting is a uniquely personal view of one man’s experience during a rapidly evolving operation. Barto’s exercise is not meant to be a polished analysis but rather provides students of military history with an inside view of the operations of a cavalry squadron on a dynamic, oftentimes uncertain, battlefield.

February 1991, 6 hours before coalition forces initiated the ground assault into Iraq, one unit conducted a forward reconnaissance into unknown territory. Task Force 2-4 Cav, "First In-Last Out" The History of the 2nd Squadron, 4th Cavalry During Operation Desert Storm, 25th Anniversary Edition with a forward by Coach Mike Krzyzewski, Duke University Head Basketball Coach.

This work provides an organizational history of the maneuver brigade and case studies of its employment throughout the various wars. Apart from the text, the appendices at the end of the work provide a ready reference to all brigade organizations used in the Army since 1917 and the history of the brigade colors.

Illustrated with 60 maps, plans and diagrams Reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance are battlefield missions as old as military history itself and missions for which many armies have created specialized units to perform. In most cases, these units were trained, equipped, and used differently from the majority of an army’s fighting units. Horse cavalry performed these missions for centuries, for it had speed and mobility far in excess of main battle units. Once the horse was replaced by mechanization, however, the mobility advantage once enjoyed by the horse cavalry disappeared. Since the early 20th century, the search for the proper mix of equipment, the proper organization, and the proper employment of reconnaissance units has bedeviled armies around the world. This survey uses a diverse variety of historical cases to illustrate the enduring issues that surround the equipping, organizing, and employment of reconnaissance units. It seems that these specialized units are either too heavily or too lightly equipped and too narrowly specialized or too conventionally organized. Pre-war reconnaissance doctrines tend to undergo significant change once fighting begins, leading to post-conflict analysis that reconnaissance units were “misused” in one way or another. McGrath ends his study with an intriguing conclusion about the role that specialized reconnaissance units should have in the future that may surprise many readers.

The Road to Safwan is a complete history of the 1st Infantry Divisions cavalry unit fighting in Operation Desert Storm. Stephen A. Bourque and John W. Burdan III served in the 1st Infantry Bourque in Division Headquarters, Burdan as the Operations Officer of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry. Based on extensive interviews and primary sources, Bourque and Burdan provide the most in-depth coverage to date of a battalion-level unit in the 1991 war, showing how the unit deployed, went into combat, and adapted to changing circumstances. The authors describe how the officers and men moved from the routine of cold war training to leading the Big Red One in battle through the Iraqi defenses and against the Iraqi Republican Guard. The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry participated in the 1st Brigade attack on G-Day, the large tank battle for Objective Norfolk, the cutting of Basra Road, and the capture of Safwan Airfield, the site where General H. Norman Schwartzkopf conducted cease-fire negotiations with the Iraqis. The squadrons activities are placed squarely within the context of both division and corps activities, which illustrates the fog of war, the chain of command, and the uncertainty of information affecting command decisions. The Road to Safwan challenges the myth that technology won the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Contrary to popular view, it was a soldier's war not much different from previous conflicts in its general nature. What was different was the quality and intensity of the unit's training, which resulted, repeatedly, in successful engagements and objectives secured. It is the story of the people, not the machines, which ultimately led this squadron to the small town of Safwan.