The notion that an individual accused of a crime is presumed innocent until proven guilty is one of the cornerstones of the American criminal justice system. However, the presumption of innocence creates a number of practical and theoretical issues, particularly regarding pre-trial and post-trial processes. In Taming the Presumption of Innocence, Richard L. Lippke argues that the presumption of innocence should be contained to the criminal trial. Beyond the realm of the trial, legal professionals, investigators, and the general public should carry out their respective roles in the criminal justice process without making any presumptions about guilt or innocence whatsoever. Rather than eschewing the significance of the presumption of innocence, the book defends its role within its proper context, the criminal trial. According to Lippke, other aspects of the criminal justice system such as investigation, lawmaking, and treatment of ex-offenders should be conducted in such a way that reflects the fallibility and unpredictability of the system without involving the issue of presumed guilt or innocence. Lippke dispels the idea that the presumption of innocence can be used to remedy some of the current issues in the practice of criminal justice, and instead proposes engaging in deeper, more substantive reforms of the American criminal justice system. The first monograph dedicated exclusively to the presumption of innocence, Taming the Presumption of Innocence will be an ideal text for students and scholars of criminology, criminal justice, and legal theory.

Taming the Presumption of Innocence provides a comprehensive account of the presumption of innocence in criminal law and procedure. It maintains that the presumption is a vital component of the proof structure of criminal trials.

This book explains the historical significance and introduction of the presumption of innocence into common law legal systems. It explains that the presumption should be seen as reflecting notions of moral comfort around judgment of others. Specifically, when one is asked to make a judgment about the guilt or otherwise of a person accused of wrongdoing, the default position should be to do nothing. This reflects the very serious consequences of what we do when we decide someone is guilty of wrongdoing and is not a step to be taken lightly. Traditionally, decision makers have only taken it when they are morally comfortable with that decision. It then documents how legislators in a range of common law jurisdictions have undermined the presumption of innocence, through measures such as reverse onus provisions, allowing or requiring inferences to be made against an accused, redefining offenses and defenses in novel ways to minimize the burden on the prosecutor, and by dressing proceedings as civil when they are in substance criminal. Courts have too easily acceded to such measures, in the process permitting accused persons to be convicted although there is reasonable doubt as to their guilt, and where they are not guilty of sufficiently blameworthy conduct to attract criminal sanction. It finds that the courts must be prepared to re-assert the prime importance of the presumption of innocence, only permitting criminal sanctions to be imposed where they are morally certain that the accused did that of which they have been accused, and morally comfortable that the conduct being addressed is worthy of the kind of criminal sanction which prosecutors seek to impose. Courts must be morally comfortable about the finding of guilt, and the imposition of the criminal penalty in a given case. They have lost sight of this moral underpinning to criminal law process and substance, and it must be regained.

This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the presumption of innocence from both a practical and theoretical point of view. Throughout the book a framework for the presumption of innocence is developed. The book approaches the right to presumption of innocence from an international human rights perspective using specific examples drawn from international criminal law. The result is a framework for understanding the right that is grounded in human rights law. This framework can then be applied across different national and international systems. When applied, it can help determine when the presumption of innocence is being infringed upon, eroded, violated, and ensure that the presumption of innocence is protected. The book is an essential resource for students, academics and practitioners working in the areas of human rights, criminal law, international criminal law, and evidence. The themes also have a more general application to national jurisdictions and legal theory.

Roberts and Zuckerman's Criminal Evidence is the eagerly-anticipated third of edition of the market-leading text on criminal evidence, fully revised to take account of developments in legislation, case-law, policy debates, and academic commentary during the decade since the previous edition was published.With an explicit focus on the rules and principles of criminal trial procedure, Roberts and Zuckerman's Criminal Evidence develops a coherent account of evidence law which is doctrinally detailed, securely grounded in a normative theoretical framework, and sensitive to the institutional and socio-legal factors shaping criminal litigation in practice. The book is designed to be accessible to the beginner, informative to the criminal court judge or legal practitioner, and thought-provoking to the advanced student and scholar: a textbook and monograph rolled into one.The book also provides an ideal disciplinary map and work of reference to introduce non-lawyers (including forensic scientists and other expert witnesses) to the foundational assumptions and technical intricacies of criminal trial procedure in England and Wales, and will be an invaluable resource for courts, lawyers and scholars in other jurisdictions seeking comparative insight and understanding of evidentiary regulation in the common law tradition.

Can we rely solely on statistics when we judge what is true and just? This book takes a holistic approach to addressing this question. It considers the legal trial as its paradigmatic case study before analysing a wide range of different cases, including profiling, the use of algorithms to predict students' grades, and the authorisation of automated cars. The book suggests that when we make judgements about the truth or about justice, approximations are not good enough. Truth and justice are uncompromising. They must be so, because the value that underlies them both is respect; and respect takes no compromise. Thus, in the search for truth as in the search for justice, a body of evidence that imposes a statistical compromise will not do. Only evidence that in principle allows reaching the truth and doing justice is good evidence. Once such evidence has been traced, the burden is on us to make good use of the evidence and reach truth and justice. We might or might not succeed, but once we have done our best on evidence that allows success, our judgements are justified; and as such, they can resolve conflicts over the truth and over justice.

Proving International Crimes elucidates how international criminal tribunals have tackled the immense and complex task of proving international crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The challenges posed by the scale and scope of these crimes and the distance in time and space between their commission and their prosecution are well-known. Nevertheless, investigators, lawyers, scholars, and policy makers often look to the law and practice of international criminal tribunals to establish what standards need to be met in the collection, preservation, presentation, and analysis of evidence to prove international crimes. In offering a comprehensive account of the law and practice of evidence before international criminal courts and tribunals to date, as well as recommendations for future practice, this book aims to inform domestic, regional, and international accountability processes for crimes going forward. This book demonstrates that, owing to the flexibility built in to the legal and procedural frameworks of international criminal courts and tribunals, the law of international criminal evidence is often unpredictable and uncertain. To this end, McDermott argues for the development of a coherent epistemic framework driven by two guiding principles: rectitude of decision and the highest standards of fairness.