NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRODUCT -- OVERSTOCK SALE - Significantly reduced list price This book tells the mostly forgotten story of the accelerating mental health problems that arose among the troops sent to fight in South Vietnam, especially the morale, discipline, and heroin crisis that ultimately characterized the second half of the war. This situation was unprecedented in U.S. military history and dangerous, and reflected the fact that during the war America underwent its most divisive period since the Civil War and, as a result, the war became bitterly controversial. The author is a career Army psychiatrist who led a psychiatric unit in Vietnam. In the years following his return, he was dismayed to discover that the Army had conducted no formal review of this alarming situation, including from the standpoint of military psychiatry, and had lost or destroyed all of the pertinent clinical records. In addition to permitting a study of the psychological wounds and their treatment in Vietnam, these records would have been priceless in the treatment of the legions of veterans who presented serious adjustment problems and Post-traumatic Stress Disorder. As a consequence, Dr Camp has been relentless in combing the professional, civilian, and surviving military literature--including unpublished documents--to construct a compelling narrative documenting the successes and failures of Army psychiatry and the Army leadership in Vietnam in responding to these psychiatric and behavioral challenges. The result is a book that is both scholarly and intensely personal, includes vivid case material and anecdotes from colleagues who also served there, and is replete with illustrations and correspondence. It presents the story of Vietnam in a fresh manner--through the psychiatrist's eyes, and sensibilities.

in South Vietnam and taking the first steps toward bringing the war to the enemy. The compelling story by George L. MacGarrigle begins in October 1966, when General William C. Westmoreland believed that he had the arms and men to take the initiative from the enemy and that significant progress would be made on all fronts over the next twelve months. Aware of American intentions, North Vietnam undertook a prolonged war of attrition and stepped up the infiltration of its own troops into the South. While the insurgency in the South remained the cornerstone of Communist strategy, it was increasingly overshadowed by main-force military operations. These circumstances, according to MacGarrigle, set the stage for intensified combat. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units retained the advantage, fighting only when it suited their purposes and retreating with impunity into inviolate sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia.

This is the fourth volume in an operational and chronological series covering the U.S. Marine Corps’ participation in the Vietnam War. This volume details the change in focus of the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), which fought in South Vietnam’s northernmost corps area, I Corps. This volume, like its predecessors, concentrates on the ground war in I Corps and III MAF’s perspective of the Vietnam War as an entity. It also covers the Marine Corps participation in the advisory effort, the operations of the two Special Landing Forces of the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet, and the services of Marines with the staff of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. There are additional chapters on supporting arms and logistics, and a discussion of the Marine role in Vietnam in relation to the overall American effort.