European Convention on Human Rights – Article 10 – Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. In the context of an effective democracy and respect for human rights mentioned in the Preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights, freedom of expression is not only important in its own right, but it also plays a central part in the protection of other rights under the Convention. Without a broad guarantee of the right to freedom of expression protected by independent and impartial courts, there is no free country, there is no democracy. This general proposition is undeniable. This handbook is a practical tool for legal professionals from Council of Europe member states who wish to strengthen their skills in applying the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in their daily work.

The volume revisits memory laws as a phenomenon of global law, transitional justice, historical narratives and claims for historical truth. It will appeal to those interested in the conflict between legal governance of memory with values of democratic citizenship, political pluralism, and fundamental rights.

The denial of the Holocaust has no more credibility than the assertion that the earth is flat. Yet there are those who insist that the death of six million Jews in Nazi concentration camps is nothing but a hoax perpetrated by a powerful Zionist conspiracy. Sixty years ago, such notions were the province of pseudohistorians who argued that Hitler never meant to kill the Jews, and that only a few hundred thousand died in the camps from disease; they also argued that the Allied bombings of Dresden and other cities were worse than any Nazi offense, and that the Germans were the “true victims” of World War II. For years, those who made such claims were dismissed as harmless cranks operating on the lunatic fringe. But as time goes on, they have begun to gain a hearing in respectable arenas, and now, in the first full-scale history of Holocaust denial, Deborah Lipstadt shows how—despite tens of thousands of living witnesses and vast amounts of documentary evidence—this irrational idea not only has continued to gain adherents but has become an international movement, with organized chapters, “independent” research centers, and official publications that promote a “revisionist” view of recent history. Lipstadt shows how Holocaust denial thrives in the current atmosphere of value-relativism, and argues that this chilling attack on the factual record not only threatens Jews but undermines the very tenets of objective scholarship that support our faith in historical knowledge. Thus the movement has an unsuspected power to dramatically alter the way that truth and meaning are transmitted from one generation to another.

This book conceptualizes the 'prohibition of advocacy of religious hatred' from the perspectives of international and comparative law.

In Genocide Denials and the Law, Ludovic Hennebel and Thomas Hochmann offer a thorough study of the relationship between law and genocide denial from the perspectives of specialists from six countries. This controversial topic provokes strong international reactions involving emotion caused by denial along with concerns about freedom of speech. The authors offer an in-depth study of the various legal issues raised by the denial of crimes against humanity, presenting arguments both in favor of and in opposition to prohibition of this expression. They do not adopt a pro or contra position, but include chapters written by proponents and opponents of a legal prohibition on genocide denial. Hennebel and Hochmann fill a void in academic publications by comparatively examining this issue with a collection of original essays. They tackle this diverse topic comprehensively, addressing not only the theoretical and philosophical aspects of denial, but also the specific problems faced by judges who implement anti-denial laws. Genocide Denials and the Law will provoke discussion of many theoretical questions regarding free speech, including the relationship between freedom of expression and truth, hate, memory, and history.

This book examines the criminalisation of denials of genocide and of other mass atrocities in Europe and discusses the implications of protecting institutional historical memory through criminal law. The analysis highlights the tensions with free speech, investigating the relationship between criminal law and historical memory. The book paves the way for a broader discussion about fake news, ‘post-truth’ scenarios, and free expression in a digital world. The author underscores the need to protect well-founded factual records from the dangers of misinformation. Historical denialism and the related jurisprudence represent a key step in exploring this complex field. The book combines an interdisciplinary approach with criminal law methodology. It is primarily aimed at academics, practitioners and others who wish to deepen their understanding of historical denialism, remembrance laws, ‘speech crimes’ and freedom of expression. Emanuela Fronza is Senior Research Fellow in Criminal Law and Lecturer in International and European Criminal Law at the School of Law, University of Bologna. She is a Principal Investigator within the EU research consortium Memory Laws in European and Comparative Perspectives funded by HERA (Humanities in the European Research Area).

History is no longer the exclusive domain of historians, but is now often used as a tool for politics. It is not without reason that the term “state historical policy” has been coined, which must be a kind of aberration for those who believed that the role of history is to objectively determine the course of events. The fact is, however, that the distortion of historical facts, the concealment of crimes is now part of the “information war”. Therefore, new acts of public international law, EU law and national law are introduced in order to combat public condonation, denial or gross trivialisation of the core international crimes which are certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia. States have to determine for themselves how they understand “denial” or “gross trivialization”, which may lead to abuse. In many cases, when introducing criminal law provisions, States wish to decree historical truth, to establish once and for all the general facts and determine who was the victim, and who was the perpetrator. This does not have to be the result of bad will, but of a desire to exclude the possibility of nuance, which could turn into dangerous trivialisation. The aim of this publication is to specify the reasons for holding accountable for denial of international crimes, indicate legal obligations in this respect, look at the Polish case, both in terms of criminal provisions (partly repealed) and standards of a civil law nature, and compare the Polish regulation with the legal systems of other states, which were chosen because of the region (Central and Eastern Europe) or due to having current problems with denial of crimes or doubts about prosecution on this account.