The authors examine the application of classical deterrence theory to the space domain and argue that to build a tailored deterrence strategy for China in space, China's own objectives should be considered.

MacDonald recommends options and policies that will promote options and policies that will promote American security interests in space. He argues that the U.S. needs to take priority defensive military space measures to offset potential Chinese anti-satellite and related capabilities.

This book examines the rise of great power competition in space, including the relevant and practical space strategies for China, Russia, the United States, and other countries. The work discusses the concepts and writings of past strategists, such as Thucydides, Sun Tzu, and Clausewitz, in relation to warfare initiated in or extending into space. This analysis underscores why polities initiate war based upon an assessment of fear, honor, and interest, and explains why this will also be true of war in space. Based upon the timeless strategic writings of the past, the book uncovers the strategy of space warfare, along with the concepts of deterrence, dissuasion, and the inherent right of self-defense, and outlines strategies for great, medium, and emerging space powers. Additionally, it highlights changes needed to space strategy based upon the Law of Armed Conflict, norms of behavior, and Rules of Engagement. The work also examines advancements and emerging trends in the commercial space sector, as well as what these changes mean for the implementation of a practical space strategy. Given the rise of great power competition in space, this work presents a space strategy based upon historical experience. This book will be of much interest to students of space policy, strategic studies, and International Relations.

The proliferation of counterspace weapons across the globe often calls into question what can be done to best protect satellites from attack. This analysis from the CSIS Aerospace Security Project addresses different methods and technologies that can be used by the United States government, and others, to deter adversaries from attack. A wide range of active and passive defenses are available to protect space systems and the ground infrastructure they depend upon from different types of threats. This report captures a range of active and passive defenses that are theoretically possible and discusses the advantages and limitations of each. A group of technical space and national security experts supported the analysis by working through several plausible scenarios that explore a range of defenses that may be needed, concepts for employing different types of defenses, and how defensive actions in space may be perceived by others. These scenarios and the findings that resulted from subsequent conversations with experts are reported in the penultimate chapter of the report. Finally, the CSIS Aerospace Security Project team offers conclusions drawn from the analysis, actionable recommendations for policymakers, and additional research topics to be explored in future work.

The second half of the 20th century featured a strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. That competition avoided World War III in part because during the 1950s, scholars like Henry Kissinger, Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, and Albert Wohlstetter analyzed the fundamental nature of nuclear deterrence. Decades of arms control negotiations reinforced these early notions of stability and created a mutual understanding that allowed U.S.-Soviet competition to proceed without armed conflict. The first half of the 21st century will be dominated by the relationship between the United States and China. That relationship is likely to contain elements of both cooperation and competition. Territorial disputes such as those over Taiwan and the South China Sea will be an important feature of this competition, but both are traditional disputes, and traditional solutions suggest themselves. A more difficult set of issues relates to U.S.-Chinese competition and cooperation in three domains in which real strategic harm can be inflicted in the current era: nuclear, space, and cyber. Just as a clearer understanding of the fundamental principles of nuclear deterrence maintained adequate stability during the Cold War, a clearer understanding of the characteristics of these three domains can provide the underpinnings of strategic stability between the United States and China in the decades ahead. That is what this book is about.

With many scholars and analysts questioning the relevance of deterrence as a valid strategic concept, this volume moves beyond Cold War nuclear deterrence to show the many ways in which deterrence is applicable to contemporary security. It examines the possibility of applying deterrence theory and practice to space, to cyberspace, and against non-state actors. It also examines the role of nuclear deterrence in the twenty-first century and reaches surprising conclusions.