This comprehensive analytical biography is the definitive work on the life and writings of history's most significant counterinsurgency doctrinaire, David Galula, elucidating the context for his reflections and examining the present and future applicability of his treatise for scholars and practitioners alike. The product of years of extensive research made possible by exclusive access to Galula's personal papers as well as first-hand accounts from colleagues, family members, and friends, this book traces Galula's life from early childhood until death, describing his upbringing, education, and military career in the tumultuous historical context of his era. The author—a former counterinsurgency practitioner himself—pays particular attention to how the Chinese Revolution and the Algerian War affected Galula's views, and identifies Galula's mentors and the schools of thought within the French military that greatly influenced his writings. A conclusion illuminates the contemporary and likely future validity of his works. In the epilogue, the author speaks to Galula's influence over modern military thought and U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. This book is essential reading for individuals with an interest in counterinsurgency, Galula's writings, or Galula himself, such as military officers and civilian administrators undertaking counterinsurgency courses and training.

While the involvement of the United States in counterinsurgency has a long history, it had faded in importance in the years following the end of the Cold War. When American forces first confronted it in Iraq, they were not fully prepared. Since then, the U.S. military and other government agencies have expended much effort to refine their counterinsurgency capabilities. But have they done enough?

This field manual establishes doctrine for military operations in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. It is based on lessons learned from previous counterinsurgencies and contemporary operations. It is also based on existing interim doctrine and doctrine recently developed. Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 40 years ago. This manual is designed to reverse that trend. It is also designed to merge traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of a new international arena shaped by technological advances, globalization, and the spread of extremist ideologies--some of them claiming the authority of a religious faith. This is a comprehensive manual that details every aspect of a successful COIN operation from intelligence to leadership to diplomacy. It also includes several useful appendices that provide important supplementary material.

The rise and fall of the Cold War coincided with the universalization and consolidation of the modern nation-state as the key unit of the wider international system. A key characteristic of the post-Cold War era, in which the US has emerged as the sole superpower, is the growing number of collapsing or collapsed states. A growing number of states are, or have become, mired in conflict or civil war, the antecedents of which are often to be found in the late-colonial and Cold War era. At the same time, US foreign policy (and the actions of other organizations such as the United Nations) may well be compounding state failure in the context of the post-9/11 Global War on Terror (GWOT) or what is also increasingly referred to as the ‘Long War’. The Long War is often represented as a ‘new’ era in warfare and geopolitics. This book acknowledges that the Long War is new in important respects, but it also emphasizes that the Long War bears many similarities to the Cold War. A key similarity is the way in which insurgency and counterinsurgency were and continue to be seen primarily in the context of inter-state rivalry in which the critical local or regional dynamics of revolution and counter-revolution are marginalized or neglected. In this context American policy-makers and their allies have again erroneously applied a ‘grand strategy’ that suits the imperatives of conventional military and geo-political thinking rather than engaging with what are a much more variegated array of problems facing the changing global order. This book provides a collection of well-integrated studies that shed light on the history and future of insurgency, counterinsurgency and collapsing states in the context of the Long War. This book was previously published as a special issue of Third World Quarterly.

At its heart, a counterinsurgency is an armed struggle for the support of the population. Support can be achieved or lost through information engagement, strong representative government, access to goods and services, fear, or violence. This armed struggle also involves eliminating insurgents who threaten the safety and security of the population. However, military units alone cannot defeat an insurgency. Most of the work involves discovering and solving the population's underlying issues, that is, the root causes of their dissatisfaction. Tactics In Counterinsurgency provides the reader with the tactical leadership skills necessary to handle these diverse issues.

This manual gives the US Army a common language, concept, and purpose to fight and achieve success in a counterinsurgency. COIN is a complex subset of warfare that encompasses all military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency at the company, battalion, and brigade levels. To do this, the manual merges traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of the current operational environment.

This book looks at several troop categories based on primary function and analyzes the ratio between these categories to develop a general historical ratio. This ratio is called the Tooth-to-Tail Ratio. McGrath's study finds that this ratio, among types of deployed US forces, has steadily declined since World War II, just as the nature of warfare itself has changed. At the same time, the percentage of deployed forces devoted to logistics functions and to base and life support functions have increased, especially with the advent of the large-scale of use of civilian contractors. This work provides a unique analysis of the size and composition of military forces as found in historical patterns. Extensively illustrated with charts, diagrams, and tables. (Originally published by the Combat Studies Institute Press)