For the first time since the design of the first nuclear submarine, the U.S. Navy has no nuclear submarine design program under way, which raises the possibility that design capability could be lost. Such a loss could result in higher costs and delays when the next submarine design is undertaken, as well as risks to system performance and safety. The authors estimate and compare the costs and delays of letting design capability erode vs. those of alternative means of managing the workload and workforce over the gap in design demand and beyond. The authors recommend that the Navy consider stret.

The U.S. submarine eet currently numbers more than 50 fast attack submarines (SSNs) and 18 submarines built to launch ballistic missiles (SSBNs). All are nuclear powered to maximize the duration and speed of underwater operations. While the submarine eet has been decreasing in size since the end of the Cold War, it is anticipated that the U.S. Navy will sustain a force of several dozen boats into the foreseeable future. Submarines are almost continually being built to replace older ones that must be retired. As is the case with surface ships, submarines are built in classes sets of boats constructed to a common design. Designing a new class of nuclear submarines is a very large and complex endeavor, lasting 15 years or longer and requiring 15,000 to 20,000 man-years at the prime shipyard contractor alone.

The U.S. submarine eet currently numbers more than 50 fast attack submarines (SSNs) and 18 submarines built to launch ballistic missiles (SSBNs). All are nuclear powered to maximize the duration and speed of underwater operations. While the submarine eet has been decreasing in size since the end of the Cold War, it is anticipated that the U.S. Navy will sustain a force of several dozen boats into the foreseeable future. Submarines are almost continually being built to replace older ones that must be retired. As is the case with surface ships, submarines are built in classes sets of boats constructed to a common design. Designing a new class of nuclear submarines is a very large and complex endeavor, lasting 15 years or longer and requiring 15,000 to 20,000 man-years at the prime shipyard contractor alone.

This research brief summarizes an analysis of workforce and workload management options to suggest ways to constrain the cost, schedule, and risk involved in the design of the U.S. Navy's next nuclear submarine class.

This research brief summarizes an analysis of workforce and workload management options to suggest ways to constrain the cost, schedule, and risk involved in the design of the U.S. Navy's next nuclear submarine class.

The complexity and uniqueness of a nuclear submarine require special skills, facilities, and oversight not supported by other shipbuilding programmes. In fact, a single shipyard, Barrow-in-Furness, designs and builds the United Kingdom's nuclear submarines, and many of the vendors that support submarine construction are sole-source providers. With such specialisation, in addition to a limited design and production demand, there is concern about whether the submarine industrial base can maintain its viability into the future. This report seeks to determine what actions should be taken to maintain nuclear submarine design capabilities and how nuclear submarine production should be scheduled for efficient use of the industrial base. Based on their findings, the authors recommend that the Ministry of Defence determine the scheduling of construction for future submarine contracts as soon as possible; plan to retain a design core of designers, engineers, and draughtsmen during periods of reduced demand; and take steps towards collaboration with other countries.