For the first time since the design of the first nuclear submarine, the U.S. Navy has no nuclear submarine design program under way, which raises the possibility that design capability could be lost. Such a loss could result in higher costs and delays when the next submarine design is undertaken, as well as risks to system performance and safety. The authors estimate and compare the costs and delays of letting design capability erode vs. those of alternative means of managing the workload and workforce over the gap in design demand and beyond. The authors recommend that the Navy consider stret.

The period covered by this book was one of radical change for the U.S. Navy. When the modern navy first considered buying a submarine in 1887, it was a coast defense force confined to the Western Hemisphere. The United States became a world power just as its new submarines offered a way of defending its most distant possession, the Philippines, without tying down an expensive fleet. World War I found U.S. submarines in an unexpected role, countering German U-boats in British waters. Then the situation changed again with unexpected speed.

In its White Paper (published in December 2006 as Cm 6994, ISBN 0101699425) on the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent, the Government reaffirmed its commitment to maintain the submarine-based Trident weapons system. This will require the procurement of a new generation of nuclear-powered Trident submarines to replace the current fleet of Vanguard-class submarines. Following on from the Committee's earlier report on the strategic context and timetable for decision-making on the renewal of the UK's nuclear deterrent (HCP 986, session 2005-06; ISBN 0215029445), this report focuses on issues related to the UK manufacturing and skills base. These include: the level of investment needed to sustain essential infrastructure and core skills in the UK submarine construction industry; the potential consequences of a gap in the submarine building programme for the long-term viability of the domestic manufacturing and skills base; the implications of the rationalisation of the UK shipbuilding industry for the construction, maintenance and affordability of a Vanguard-class successor; and the linkage between the Government's Defence Industrial Strategy and the decision on retention, replacement or abolition of the UK's Trident system. It also examines the Government's investment programme at the Atomic Weapons Establishment and the possible impact of a new civil nuclear build programme for the retention of nuclear skills and expertise in the military sector.