For the first time since the design of the first nuclear submarine, the U.S. Navy has no nuclear submarine design program under way, which raises the possibility that design capability could be lost. Such a loss could result in higher costs and delays when the next submarine design is undertaken, as well as risks to system performance and safety. The authors estimate and compare the costs and delays of letting design capability erode vs. those of alternative means of managing the workload and workforce over the gap in design demand and beyond. The authors recommend that the Navy consider stret.

Sustainable Nuclear Power provides non-nuclear engineers, scientists and energy planners with the necessary information to understand and utilize the major advances in the field. The book demonstrates that nuclear fission technology has the abundance and attainability to provide centuries of safe power with minimal greenhouse gas generation. It also addresses the safety and disposal issues that have plagued the development of the nuclear power industry and scared planners and policy makers as well as the general public for more than two decades. In addition, the authors provide a Companion website, http://books.elsevier.com/companions, which gives access to government reports and case studies *No need for a background in nuclear science! This book guides engineers, scientists and energy professionals through a concise and easy-to-understand overview of key safety and sustainability issues affecting their work. *Details the very latest information about today's safest and most energy-efficient reactor designs and reprocessing procedures. *Brings to light the fears and hesitation of using nuclear energy and explains that technologies and procedures for safe production and processing are available today.

The Government white paper (Cm 6994, ISBN 9780101699426) recommended the renewal of the Trident system, and wanted a decision made in 2007 as delay would imperil the UK's security. This report analyses the white paper's findings and conclusions, and explores the key issues and questions which should be addressed in the debate on the future of the deterrent. The Committee reports some disagreement with the Government's timetable for procurement of new submarines. The reduction in the total number of warheads is welcomed, but as the number deployed on submarines is not to change the Committee is uncertain of the operational significance of this measure. The Committee would also like clarification of the nature and geographical scope of what the Government considers the UK's "vital interests" for which the nuclear deterrent exists. There appears to be no legal consensus that the proposals are consistent with all of the UK's international obligations, in particular the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, so political considerations will govern the renewal decision. Detailed estimates of the costs are vital to inform the debate. The Committee acknowledges the Government's efforts at openness on this matter.

The period covered by this book was one of radical change for the U.S. Navy. When the modern navy first considered buying a submarine in 1887, it was a coast defense force confined to the Western Hemisphere. The United States became a world power just as its new submarines offered a way of defending its most distant possession, the Philippines, without tying down an expensive fleet. World War I found U.S. submarines in an unexpected role, countering German U-boats in British waters. Then the situation changed again with unexpected speed.