Interest in reviving strategic culture as a field of study results from the inadequacy of traditional analytical approaches and calls to develop a new framework to guide policymaking in the post-9/11 security environment. The book considers 10 case studies of WMD decision-making, profiling culture in terms of geography, shared narratives, group relationships, threat perception, ideology, religion, economics, leadership style, and more. Strategic culture can help us more accurately evaluate intelligence regarding dangers emanating from other cultures and improve our strategic communications. A strategic cultural perspective makes us appreciate the requirements for promoting U.S. global responsibilities in a multi-cultural context, negotiate across cultures more effectively, and forecast the implications of cultural change for strategic planning purposes.

This book describes strategic culture and its value as a methodological approach to the study of International Relations. In particular, the book uses strategic culture to illuminate a number of case studies on countries that have made decisions regarding the acquisition, proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction.

This paper combines three separate threads of analysis on culture and violent nonstate actors as a launching pad to spur further research into this critical arena of culture and security. Jim Smith lays out a series of templates for guiding analysis of culture and violent nonstate actors. Mark Long applies cultural analysis of radical Islam and alQaida in discussing the influences involved in the core al Qaida group's WMD decisions. Tom Johnson, in examining a tribal insurgent psychological campaign in Afghanistan, demonstrates that behavioral influences can be manipulated for significant effect in countering our efforts to gain stability and legitimacy for the Afghan government. James M. Smith, PhD, is the Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies and Professor, Military Strategic Studies at the US Air Force Academy.Jerry Mark Long, PhD, is Associate Professor and Director, Middle East Studies, Honors College, Baylor University. Thomas H. Johnson is Research Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Interest in reviving strategic culture as a field of study results from the inadequacy of traditional analytical approaches and calls to develop a new framework to guide policymaking in the post-9/11 security environment. The book considers 10 case studies of WMD decision-making, profiling culture in terms of geography, shared narratives, group relationships, threat perception, ideology, religion, economics, leadership style, and more. Strategic culture can help us more accurately evaluate intelligence regarding dangers emanating from other cultures and improve our strategic communications. A strategic cultural perspective makes us appreciate the requirements for promoting U.S. global responsibilities in a multi-cultural context, negotiate across cultures more effectively, and forecast the implications of cultural change for strategic planning purposes.

Nearly 40 years after the concept of finite deterrence was popularized by the Johnson administration, nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) thinking appears to be in decline. The United States has rejected the notion that threatening population centers with nuclear attacks is a legitimate way to assure deterrence. Most recently, it withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an agreement based on MAD. American opposition to MAD also is reflected in the Bush administration's desire to develop smaller, more accurate nuclear weapons that would reduce the number of innocent civilians killed in a nuclear strike. Still, MAD is influential in a number of ways. First, other countries, like China, have not abandoned the idea that holding their adversaries' cities at risk is necessary to assure their own strategic security. Nor have U.S. and allied security officials and experts fully abandoned the idea. At a minimum, acquiring nuclear weapons is still viewed as being sensible to face off a hostile neighbor that might strike one's own cities. Thus, our diplomats have been warning China that Japan would be under tremendous pressure to go nuclear if North Korea persisted in acquiring a few crude weapons of its own. Similarly, Israeli officials have long argued, without criticism, that they would not be second in acquiring nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Indeed, given that Israelis surrounded by enemies that would not hesitate to destroy its population if they could, Washington finds Israel's retention of a significant nuclear capability totally "understandable."

Evolving threats of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attack make it imperative to find ways to support global efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism. This book contains papers presented at the NATO Advanced Study Institute (ASI) on CBRN security culture, held in Yerevan, Armenia, in June 2014. The conference was timely in bringing together the various aspects of security culture in the different substantive areas from a CBRN perspective, focusing efforts to advance CBRN security culture in the everyday work of those who must deal with these ever present threats. The primary aim of the conference was to promote the concept of a CBRN security culture which recognizes synergy across the individual disciplines. As a first step in the practical application of this synergistic view, the conference introduced assessment methodologies that could be refined and customized to enhance the role of the human factor in CBRN security. This, we hope, will enable countries to fulfill their international obligations and implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. The book reflects the presentations and deliberations of workshop participants and will be of interest to governments, international organizations, researchers and practitioners whose work involves the human dimension of the security of CBRN materials.