These essays from the journal International Security cover aspects of past and present naval technologies and explore current disputes over American naval doctrine. Four of the contributions--those by Linton Brooks, John Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, and Joshua Epstein--describe the case for and against the Reagan administration's controversial Maritime Strategy, which has formed the basis for the administration's buildup to a six-hundred-ship navy. Other articles describe Soviet naval doctrine, assess the risk of nuclear war at sea, and outline the evolution of major naval technologies and doctrines. Part I: Naval Strategy Planning a Navy: The Risks of Conventional Wisdom R. James Woolsey Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy Linton F. Brooks A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe John J. Mearsheimer Horizontal Escalation: Sour Notes of a Recurrent Theme Joshua M. Epstein Naval Power and Soviet Global Strategy Michael MccGwire Part II: Naval Technology Technology and the Evolution of Naval Warfare Karl Lautenschlager Will Strategic Submarines Be Vulnerable? Richard L. Garwin The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901=2001 Karl Lautenschlager Stopping the Sea-Based Counterforce Threat Harold A. Feiveson and John Duffield Part III: Naval Operations--Controlling the Risks Nuclear War at Sea Desmond Ball Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank Barry R. Posen A Quiet Success for Arms Control: Preventing Incidents at Sea Sean M. Lynn-Jones Originally published in 1988. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

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This unique book examines the role of anti-submarine warfare in the new U.S. Navy maritime strategy. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has called for the development of a new Maritime Strategy. Critical to this new strategy is the need for robust Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities across the entire ASW spectrum. Without such capabilities, the U.S. Navy will not be able to meet its current or future global challenges. Possessing technologically advanced ASW capabilities and having well trained professionals will ensure that the Navy has the continued ability to provide global access to U.S. joint and allied fighting forces anywhere in the world. An analysis of past maritime strategies with their ASW components, will reveal some common threads; dominance of the seas, ensuring global freedom of access to the seas, and the ability to project power from those seas. The requirement to control the seas and ensure access to them will not change. The Navy's past maritime strategies have always promoted this concept. Anti-Submarine Warfare should play a major role in our new Maritime Strategy in order to maintain these capabilities. Chapter 1 * Introduction * Importance of the Topic * Chapter 2 * The Progression of U.S. Maritime Strategy * 1917-1977 * Maritime Strategy (1984) * Deterrence and Forward Deployment * "From the Sea" and "Forward.. .From the Sea" * Sea Power 21 * Chapter 3 * Emerging and Proliferated Technologies * SSK Capability Trends of Threat Countries * AIP, Weapon Systems, Sensors * Littoral Operations * Chapter 4 * Combating Emerging Technologies * U.S. Acquired ASW Technologies * LCS, MH-60S/R * UUVs, Virginia class SSN * Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) * Chapter 5 * Recommendations * Chapter 6 * Conclusion * Works Cited * Notes

The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has called for the development of a new Maritime Strategy. Critical to this new strategy is the need for robust Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities across the entire ASW spectrum. Without such capabilities, the U.S. Navy will not be able to meet its current or future global challenges. Possessing technologically advanced ASW capabilities and having well trained professionals will ensure that the Navy has the continued ability to provide global access to U.S. joint and allied fighting forces anywhere in the world. An analysis of past maritime strategies with their ASW components, will reveal some common threads; dominance of the seas, ensuring global freedom of access to the seas, and the ability to project power from those seas. The requirement to control the seas and ensure access to them will not change. The Navy's past maritime strategies have always promoted this concept. Anti-Submarine Warfare should play a major role in our new Maritime Strategy in order to maintain these capabilities.