Through an in-depth analysis of the Chilean labour market, social welfare, and state reforms, this book reveals the manner in which neoliberal reform in Chile has undermined the urban poor's incentives and ability to hold public officials accountable, negatively affecting the quality of Chilean democracy.

The critical issues concerning the development of a substantial and enduring democracy in Chile are those of strengthening civil society, democratizing the permanent institutions of the state, and building an economy geared to effectively satisfy human needs. In this book, the authors offer a critique of the Chilean transition and of the Aylwin electoral regime, analyzing the linkage between political compromises made prior to the civilians’ assumption of power and the choice of socioeconomic policy in the post-electoral period. They argue that the decisive factor underlying the Chilean transition is the contrast between the legal-political changes and socioeconomic and institutional continuities, a contrast that perpetuates the vast inequalities of wealth and power generated under Pinochet’s sixteen-year-old military dictatorship. They also challenge the myth of the “Chilean miracle ̳the purported success of neoliberal policies in promoting sustained growth and social justice—and therefore in laying the basis for long-term social harmony and enduring political stability.

This book provides an in-depth analysis of neo-liberal and progressive economic reforms and policies implemented in Chile since the Pinochet dictatorship. The core thesis of the book is that there is not just 'one Chilean economic model', but that several have been in force since the coup of 1973.

Chile emerged from military rule in the 1990s as a leader of free market economic reform and democratic stability, and other countries now look to it for lessons in policy design, sequencing, and timing. Explanations for economic change in Chile generally focus on strong authoritarianism under General Augusto Pinochet and the insulation of policymakers from the influence of social groups, especially business and landowners. In this book Eduardo Silva argues that such a view underplays the role of entrepreneurs and landowners in Chile's neoliberal transformation and, hence, their potential effect on economic reform elsewhere. He shows how shifting coalitions of businesspeople and landowners with varying power resources influenced policy formulation and affected policy outcomes. He then examines the consequences of coalitional shifts for Chile's transition to democracy, arguing that the absence of a multiclass opposition that included captialists facilitated a political transition based on the authoritarian constitution of 1980 and inhibited its alternative. This situation helped to define the current style of consensual politics that, with respect to the question of social equity, has deepened a neoliberal model of welfare statism, rather than advanced a social democratic one.

In 1990, after almost 17 years of military rule, Chile became the only Latin American country where a democratic regime coexists with free market policies which actually work. The book explores this paradox, and it examines the prospects for future economic growth with income redistribution under free market rules and democratic politics. The author examines amongst other things, short-term policymaking, education, health, the labour market, women, the middle sectors, privatisation, market imperfections, the state, non-government organisations, external trade, the financial sector and the external debt.

This book argues that - in terms of institutional design, the allocation of power and privilege, and the lived experiences of citizens - democracy often does not restart the political game after displacing authoritarianism. Democratic institutions are frequently designed by the outgoing authoritarian regime to shield incumbent elites from the rule of law and give them an unfair advantage over politics and the economy after democratization. Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy systematically documents and analyzes the constitutional tools that outgoing authoritarian elites use to accomplish these ends, such as electoral system design, legislative appointments, federalism, legal immunities, constitutional tribunal design, and supermajority thresholds for change. The study provides wide-ranging evidence for these claims using data that spans the globe and dates from 1800 to the present. Albertus and Menaldo also conduct detailed case studies of Chile and Sweden. In doing so, they explain why some democracies successfully overhaul their elite-biased constitutions for more egalitarian social contracts.

This book examines the relationship between free markets and democracy. It demonstrates how the implementation of even very painful free-market economic reforms in Chile and Mexico have helped to consolidate democratic politics without engendering a backlash against either reform or democratization. This national-level compatibility between free markets and democracy, however, is founded on their rural incompatibility. In the countryside, free-market reforms socially isolate peasants to such a degree that they become unable to organize independently, and are vulnerable to the pressures of local economic elites. This helps to create an electoral coalition behind free-market reforms that is critically based in some of the market's biggest victims: the peasantry. The book concludes that the comparatively stable free-market democracy in Latin America hinges critically on its defects in the countryside; conservative, free-market elites may consent to open politics only if they have a rural electoral redoubt.