The nature and function of language as Man's chief vehicle of communi cation occupies a focal position in the human sciences, particularly in philosophy. The concept of 'communication' is problematic because it suggests both 'meaning' (the nature of language) and the activity of speaking (the function of language). The philosophic theory of 'speech acts' is one attempt to clarify the ambiguities of 'speech' as both the use of language to describe states of affair and the process in which that description is generated as 'communication'. The present study, Speech Act Phenomenology, is in part an exam ination of speech act theory. The theory offers an explanation for speech performance, that is, the structure of speech acts as 'relationships' and the content of speech acts as 'meaning'. The primary statement of the speech act theory that is examined is that presented by Austin. A seconda ry concern is the formulation of the theory as presented by Searle and Grice. The limitations of the speech act theory are specified by applying the theory as an explanation of 'human communication'. This conceptual examination of 'communication' suggests that the philosophic method of 'analysis' does not resolve the antinomy of language 'nature' and 'function'. Basically, the conceptual distinctions of the speech act theory (i. e. locutions, illocutions, and perlocutions) are found to be empty as a comprehensive explanation of the concept 'communication'.

Phenomenology as practised by Adolf Reinach ( 1883-191 7) in his all too brief philosophical career exemplifies all the virtues of Husserl's Logical Investigations. It is sober, concerned to be clear and deals with specific problems. It is therefore understandable that, in a philosophical climate in which Husserl's masterpiece has come to be regarded as a mere stepping stone on the way to his later Phenomeno logy, or even to the writings of a Heidegger, Reinach's contributions to exact philo sophy have been all but totally forgotten. The topics on which Reinach wrote most illuminatingly, speech acts (which he called 'social acts') and states of affairs (Sachverhalte ), as well as his realism about the external world, have come to be regarded as the preserve of other traditions of exact philosophy. Like my fellow contributors, I hope that the present volume will go some way towards correcting this unfortunate historical accident. Reinach's account of judgements and states of affairs, an account that precedes those of Russell and Wittgenstein, his 1913 treatment of speech acts, his reinter pretation of Hume and aspects of his legal philosophy are the main philosophical topics dealt with in what follows. But his analysis of deliberation as well as his work on movement and Zeno's paradoxes get only a passing mention.

Foundations of Speech Act Theory investigates the importance of speech act theory to the problem of meaning in linguistics and philosophy. The papers in this volume, written by respected philosophers and linguists, significantly advance standards of debate in this area. Beginning with a detailed introduction to the individual contributors, this collection demonstrates the relevance of speech acts to semantic theory. It includes essays unified by the assumption that current pragmatic theories are not well equipped to analyse speech acts satisfactorily, and concludes with five studies which assess the relevance of speech act theory to the understanding of philosophical problems outside the area of philosophy of language.

Merleau-Ponty’s status as a philosopher of perception is well-established, but his distinctive contributions to the philosophy and phenomenology of language have yet to be fully appreciated. Through detailed, clear, and accessible analyses of Merleau-Ponty’s views of linguistic meaning, expression, and understanding, and by tracing the evolution and development of these views throughout the course of his philosophical career, Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Language offers a global and comprehensive picture of his engagement with the philosophy of language. This book demonstrates that the phenomenology of language is essential for grasping the meaning and motivations behind some of Merleau-Ponty’s most celebrated philosophical contributions. It argues that his philosophy of language should take on a central role in our appraisal of the development and basic goals of his thought. And it suggests that the success of phenomenology’s return to the ‘things themselves’ must be judged not only by the evidence of intuition, but also by the labour of expression.

Speech Acts, Meaning and Intentions: Critical Approaches to the Philosophy of J.R. Searle (Foundations of Communication and Cognition).

This volume, edited by Lucilla Guidi and Thomas Rentsch, establishes the first systematic connection between phenomenology and performativity. On the one hand, it outlines the performativity of phenomenology by exploring its enactment and the transformation of attitude it effects; this exploration is conducted through a number of parallels between phenomenology and the ancient understanding of philosophy as an exercise and a way of life. On the other hand, the volume examines different notions of performativity from a phenomenological perspective, so as to show that a phenomenological understanding of embodied experience complements a linguistic account of performativity and can also offer a ground for bodily practices of resistance, critique, and self-transformation in our own day and age.

Françoise Dastur is well respected in France and Europe for her mastery of phenomenology as a movement and her clear and cogent explications of phenomenology in movement. These qualities are on display in this remarkable volume. Dastur guides the reader through a series of phenomenological questions—language and logic, self and other, temporality and history, finitude and mortality—that also call phenomenology itself into question, testing its limits and pushing it in new directions. Like Merleau-Ponty, Dastur sees phenomenology not as a doctrine, a catalogue of concepts and catchphrases authored by a single thinker, but as a movement in which several thinkers participate, each inflecting the movement in unique ways. In this regard, Dastur is both one of the clearest guides to phenomenology and one of its ablest practitioners.