A fascinating insight into US and Coalition Special Forces operating in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and Mali. Within weeks of 9/11, United States Special Operations Forces were dropping into Afghanistan to lead the war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. For over a decade, special forces have been fighting a hidden war in Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Somalia, Mali and Afghanistan, facing off against a range of insurgents from organisations like al Qaeda, al Shabaab, Boko Haram and the Taliban. Leigh Neville draws on recently declassified material and first-hand-accounts from his SOF contacts to lift the veil of secrecy from these operations, giving an unprecedented blow-by-blow description of major Special Forces operations, culminating in SEAL Team 6's Operation Neptune Spear and the killing of Osama bin Laden. Detailing the special equipment, tactics, machinery and training that these Special Operatives received and used this impressive volume shows how the world's elite soldiers fought against overwhelming odds around the world.

James D. Kiras shows how a number of different special operations, in conjunction with more conventional military actions, achieve and sustain strategic effect(s) over time. In particular, he argues that the root of effective special operations lies in understanding the relationship existing between moral and material attrition at the strategic level. He also presents a theoretical framework for understanding how special operations achieve strategic effects using a unique synthesis of strategic theory and case studies. This study shows how the key to understanding how special operations reside in the concept of strategic attrition and in the moral and material nature of strategy. It also highlights major figures such as Carl von Clausewitz, Hans Delbrück, and Mao Zedong, who understood these complexities and were experts in eroding an enemy’s will to fight. These and other examples provide a superb explanation of the complexities of modern strategy and the place of special operations in a war of attrition. This book will be of great interest to all students and scholars with an interest in special forces and of strategic and military studies in general.

A high-ranking general's gripping insider account of the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how it all went wrong. Over a thirty-five-year career, Daniel Bolger rose through the army infantry to become a three-star general, commanding in both theaters of the U.S. campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. He participated in meetings with top-level military and civilian players, where strategy was made and managed. At the same time, he regularly carried a rifle alongside rank-and-file soldiers in combat actions, unusual for a general. Now, as a witness to all levels of military command, Bolger offers a unique assessment of these wars, from 9/11 to the final withdrawal from the region. Writing with hard-won experience and unflinching honesty, Bolger makes the firm case that in Iraq and in Afghanistan, we lost -- but we didn't have to. Intelligence was garbled. Key decision makers were blinded by spreadsheets or theories. And, at the root of our failure, we never really understood our enemy. Why We Lost is a timely, forceful, and compulsively readable account of these wars from a fresh and authoritative perspective.

"The purpose of this book is to share Army special operations soldier stories with the general American public to show them what various elements accomplished during the war to drive the Taliban from power and to destroy al-Qaeda and Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan as part of the global war on terrorism. The purpose of the book is not to resolve Army special operations doctrinal issues, to clarify or update military definitions, or to be the 'definitive' history of the continuing unconventional war in Afghanistan. The purpose is to demonstrate how the war to drive the Taliban from power, help the Afghan people, and assist the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) rebuild the country afterward was successfully accomplished by majors, captains, warrant officers, and sergeants on tactical teams and aircrews at the lowest levels ... This historical project is not intended to be the definitive study of the war in Afghanistan. It is a 'snapshot' of the war from 11 September 2001 until the middle of May 2002"--Page xv.

FULL COLOR publications with many photographs and maps. First published in 2006.

Written by a reserve officer who spent a tour in the Philippines producing a classified history for US Special Operations Command, this first-ever publicly available history of OEF-P provides both a detailed accounting of the operation's successes and a model for trainers and advisers providing assistance to host-nation security forces around the globe. Stentiford emphasizes that what made OEF-P a success was an adherence to time-honored principles of counterinsurgency: insisting that host-nation forces take the lead and conducting operations with a minimal footprint that bought the essential time for the mission to succeed. Success in the Shadows is both a fitting tribute to the operators who performed this vital mission and a primer for those who will be called upon to do so in the future.

By Charles H. Briscoe, et al. Tells the story of Iraqi Freedom, the second Army Special Operations (ASO) campaign in America's Global War on Terrorism. Shows how the ASO supported a US-led conventional air and ground offensive to collapse the regime of Saddam Hussein and capture Baghdad. Includes bibliographical references.