The Red Sea basin lies within a region syllogized variously as the 'arc of instability, ' the 'crescent of crises' and the 'crumbling triangle.' Regardless of the metaphor utilized, this volatile cul-de-sac pulses with instability. The pattern of Soviet strategy that emerges for the Red Sea basin indicates not a grand design, but rather an attempt to manage regional instability in accordance with Russian national interests. Destabilizing events provide Moscow with targets of opportunity which are selectively exploited to achieve foreign policy goals. These goals are strategic, political and economic in nature. Naval diplomacy implemented by the maturing Soviet Navy comprises an essential and, at times, decisive element of the overall strategy for the Red Sea basin. Frequently, the Soviet military assistance program, assiduously cultivated in the region, provides the exploitive vehicle with which to capitalize on targets of opportunity generated by the persistent patterns of instability. Moscow's strategy for the Red Sea basin is supported by the major components of the Soviet bureaucracy: defense and heavy industries, armed forces, fishing and maritime fleets and ideological agencies. It is unlikely to change in the aftermath of the Brezhnev succession. (Author).

Two of Great Britain's leading maritime specialists take a comprehensive, analytical look at the development, purposes, and importance of the Soviet Navy.

Since the late 1970s the Red Sea has become extremely important both in international politics and regional affairs. This situation came about because of the growing Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa and Saudi efforts to have the Red Sea treated as an ‘Arab Lake’. This book, first published in 1985, examines the development of the Red Sea as a significant problem in superpower relations and assesses its relative importance in the context of other conflicts in the Gulf and elsewhere in the Third World. It analyses Soviet interests in the Red Sea area and examines its record in seeking to intervene in the domestic politics of the region. The book also discusses the degree of regional stability in the Red Sea both in terms of inter-Arab relations and Afro-Arab regulations. This issue is considered against the background of the security of the Nile valley. In conclusion the book argues that Saudi Arabia’s regional policies aimed at enhancing internal and external security have proved destabilizing and in a way even adventurous. By fermenting Somali nationalism Saudi Arabia hoped to push the Soviets out of the Red Sea. In fact this policy reinforced the Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa. Similarly, Saudi Arabia’s regular interference in the domestic affairs of North Yemen may well prove extremely counter-productive. The book argues that the West’s preoccupation with the region would lessen considerably if Saudi Arabia and Egypt would promote policies of cooperation, rather than destabilization at both inter-Arab and Afro-Arab levels.

The Red Sea is one of the worlds most important trade routes, a theater of power struggle among local, regional and global powers. Military and political developments continue to impact on the geostrategic landscape of the region in the context of its trade thoroughfare for Europe, China, Japan and India; freedom of navigation is a strategic interest for Egypt, and essential for Israels economic ties with Asia. Superpower confrontation is inevitable. China, the US, France, Japan and Saudi Arabia have military bases in Djibouti. US strategy seeks to curb Chinese economic influence and Russian political interference in the region through diplomacy and investment. And at the centre of US alliances is the war on terror still prevalent in the Middle East and East Africa: Islamic terror groups Al Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya; Al Qaeda of the Arab Peninsula in Yemen; and the Islamic State in Egypt. The civil war in Yemen has become the arena for Iran and Saudi Arabias struggle for regional hegemony. Saudi Arabias Sunni Arab coalition have been fighting Iranian-backed Shiite Houthi rebels to a stalemate (December 2018). In 2016 Egypt ceded Saudi Arabia the Tiran and Sanafir Islands, the narrow sea passages between the Sinai and Arabian peninsulas, giving control of the entire length of the Red Sea. This, and other perceived positive geostrategic developments, have to be offset by the nuclearization of the Red Sea basin (directed in part by Russian foreign policy) and the dangers of multiple country military deployments in the hubs of radical Islam and terrorism potential. A stable future for the region cannot be taken for granted. And as alliances shift and change, so will Israels foreign policy and strategic partnerships have to adjust.