A comprehensive study of Soviet policies in the Middle East.

This study examines the changes in Soviet foreign policy that Mikhail Gorbachev has introduced as "new thinking." In particular, it considers the application of new thinking to the Middle East, distinguishing between continuity and change, and, particularly, the tactical as distinct from the essential nature of this change. The analysis focuses on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the role of the Palestinians, and Soviet-Syrian relations. It also discusses the evolution of the Soviet position on the Iran-Iraq war and the Soviet Union's relations with the Persian Gulf states. The author concludes that the Soviets have not entirely abandoned their interests in the Middle East, but have adopted a more flexible stance that fits in with the new thinking.

For more than three decades, the Soviet Union was a major force in the Middle East, and superpower rivalry exacerbated many of the conflicts endemic to the region. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have fundamentally altered the rules of the game in Middle East politics, producing a new fluidity in the region, new diplomatic alignments, and new opportunities for peace. The contributors place recent developments in historical and political context, analyzing changes in Soviet Middle East policy under Gorbachev as well as evaluating developments since the demise of the Soviet Union. The evolution of Moscow's policy toward the Arab states, Israel, the P.L.O., and the U.N. is given special attention. The contributors also examine the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in the new states of Central Asia and weigh the potential implications of this development for the Middle East. In addition, they discuss security issues related to the transfer of military technology from former Soviet republics to the countries of the Middle East.

Few regions of the world are as politically turbulent as the Middle East, and nowhere is the potential for superpower conflict greater. How does the Soviet Union view the Middle east conflict? Can the USSR play a constructive role in the peace process? In this volume, first published in 1990, these questions and others central to an understanding of Soviet strategy in the region are addressed. Previous analysts of Soviet-Middle Eastern relations have tended to emphasize either the cooperative or the competitive aspects of Soviet behaviour. Breslauer instead offers the multidimensional concept of ‘collaborative competition’ to describe the mixed motives, ambivalence, and sometimes conflicting perspectives that have informed Soviet strategy in the region. In such an unstable environment. this strategy of collaborative competition has in turn encouraged ‘approach-avoidance’ behaviour; for example, while the Soviets may seek to moderate their radical allies, they remain fearful that these allies, once moderated, might defect to US patronage. Under Gorbachev, the Kremlin continues to pursue this same strategy but with increased attention to improving collaboration, redefining the nature of the competition, and easing the approach-avoidance dilemma. Breslauer argues that these changes could lead to more flexible Soviet behaviour in the region. This volume combines new, in-depth research on Soviet policy with new interpretations, including insights drawn from relevant theories of international relations.

Professor Freedman provides an exhaustive account of Soviet policy in the Middle East from the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 to withdrawal from the country ten years later.

Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985 signalled the beginning of significant improvements in Soviet-Israeli relations--thoroughly examined in this carefully researched volume. Based on an analysis of Soviet behavior and interviews with Israeli and Soviet Foreign Ministry officials and PLO leaders, this study describes how eased tensions between the Soviet Union and Israel have been achieved and analyzes the Soviet Union's reasons for advancing diplomatic relations with Israel. Robert Owen Freedman follows the progress of Soviet policy from the 1985 meeting between the Soviet and Israeli ambassadors to France, to the 1987 arrival of the Soviet consular delegation in Israel, which heralded rapid improvement on the diplomatic front, to the 1989 trade agreements, cultural, academic, and athletic exchanges, and the 1990 political meetings between high ranking officials. Freedman identifies three primary goals that motivated these Soviet initiatives towards Israel: a desire to improve relations with the United States; a desire to play a major role in Middle East diplomacy; and a desire for trade with Israel. Both meticulously documented and forward-looking, the conclusions reached can stimulate discussion and provide a basis for further study for members of the academic, political, and diplomatic communities.