This book provides a comprehensive survey of Soviet economic development from 1917 to 1965 in the context of the pre-revolutionary economy. In these years the Soviet Union negotiated the first stages of modern industrialisation and then, after the defeat of Nazi Germany and its allies, emerged as one of the two world superpowers. This was also the first attempt to construct a planned socialist order. These developments resulted in great economic achievements at great human cost. Using the results of recent Russian and Western research, Professor Davies discusses the inherent faults and strengths of the system, and pays particular attention to the major controversies. Was the Russian Revolution doomed to failure from the outset? Could the mixed economy of the 1920s have led to a democratic socialist economy? What was the influence of Soviet economic development on the rest of the world?

Comparison of the service sector in the USSR and abroad - maintains that the small share of the service sector in the soviet economy is due chiefly to the socialist economic system and to its economic growth strategy, covers theoretical aspects, industrial aspects, the industrial structure, service labour force, the service gap in commerce, etc., and relies primarily on data for the period up to 1968. Bibliography, references and statistical tables.

Why did the Soviet economic system fall apart? Did the economy simply overreach itself through military spending? Was it the centrally-planned character of Soviet socialism that was at fault? Or did a potentially viable mechanism come apart in Gorbachev's clumsy hands? Does its failure mean that true socialism is never economically viable? The economic dimension is at the very heart of the Russian story in the twentieth century. Economic issues were the cornerstone of soviet ideology and the soviet system, and economic issues brought the whole system crashing down in 1989-91. This book is a record of what happened, and it is also an analysis of the failure of Soviet economics as a concept.

Study in historical perspective of developments in economic policy in the USSR - covers economic structures and economic administration prior to and during the 1st world war, the position during the 50 years of the communist regime, political leadership of the country, the collective economy, industrialization, political problems, economic growth, etc. Bibliography pp. 389 to 391, and statistical tables.

This survey of modern Soviet economic growth is based almost exclusively on Western works and does not include direct references to Soviet scholarly work. It is directed to the general public of economists, and therefore contains a section on sources of economic information about the Soviet Union and several subsections, such as the one describing the basics of the operation of the Soviet system, that are only indirectly related to the main issue. Contents: Introduction; Availability and Reliability of Information; The Growth Record; Structural Changes; The Socialist System and its Growth Strategy; R & D and Technological Change; The R & D Sector; Why did Growth Rates Decline?; Production Function Estimates; Evaluation and Conclusion-or, can The Trend be Reversed? (KR).

This book sheds light on ​the Soviet economic system, which claimed the eventual abolition of money, collapsed following a monetary turmoil. It argues that the cause of the economic collapse was embedded in the design of the economic system. The Soviet economic system restricted the market, but continued to use fiat money. Consequently, it faced the question for which no feasible answer seemed to exist: how to manage fiat money without data and information generated by the market? Using Soviet data newly available from the archives, the book evaluates the performance of the components of monetary management mechanism, discovers the continuous accumulation of open and secret government debts, and quantitatively analyzes the relationship between economic growth and the money supply to support the argument. The book concludes that the Soviet economic collapse marked the end of the long history of Soviet monetary mismanagement.

For half a century the Soviet economy was inefficient but stable. In the late 1980s, to the surprise of nearly everyone, it suddenly collapsed. Why did this happen? And what role did Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's economic reforms play in the country's dissolution? In this groundbreaking study, Chris Miller shows that Gorbachev and his allies tried to learn from the great success story of transitions from socialism to capitalism, Deng Xiaoping's China. Why, then, were efforts to revitalize Soviet socialism so much less successful than in China? Making use of never-before-studied documents from the Soviet politburo and other archives, Miller argues that the difference between the Soviet Union and China--and the ultimate cause of the Soviet collapse--was not economics but politics. The Soviet government was divided by bitter conflict, and Gorbachev, the ostensible Soviet autocrat, was unable to outmaneuver the interest groups that were threatened by his economic reforms. Miller's analysis settles long-standing debates about the politics and economics of perestroika, transforming our understanding of the causes of the Soviet Union's rapid demise.