David Glantz examines the Soviet study of war, the re-emergence of the operation level, the evolution of the Soviet theory of operations in depth before 1941, and its application in the European theatre and the Far East between 1941 and 1945.

Naveh (history and Russian and eastern European studies, Tel Aviv U.) offers an interpretation of the field of military knowledge between strategy and tactics, operational art. He traces its evolution into a full-fledged theory through the landmarks of 19th-century thought and operational ignorance, the Blitzkrieg concept, the Soviet Deep Operation theory of the 1920s and 1930s, and the crystallization of the American Airland Battle theory in the 1970s and 1980s. Distributed in the US by ISBS. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Two weeks after the Americans, British, and Canadians invaded Western Europe on D-Day, June 6, 1944, the Soviet Union launched Operation Bagration on the Eastern Front, its massive attempt to clear German forces from Belarus. In one of the largest military campaigns of all time, involving 2 million Soviets and 800,000 Germans, the Red Army advanced 170 miles in two weeks and destroyed German Army Group Center. Using recently declassified Soviet documents as well as German and Soviet unit histories, Dunn recounts this landmark operation of World War II.

This study of Soviet military strategy is based upon the relationship between the army and politicians as well as Soviet writings on the subject of military strategy. Thanks to the policy of glasnost, it incorporates Soviet materials hitherto unavailable in the West. It should not be considered simply as a retrospective account of what was; it forms at least part of the context for what will be in the future.