By gradually reducing the number of subsidized foods, and by focusing subsidies on foods consumed more by the poor than by the rich (like coarse baladi bread) Egyptian policymakers have found a way to self-target food subsidies to the urban poor. Yet because the rural poor do not consume as much baladi bread, this system is not as well-targeted to the rural poor.

By gradually reducing the ...

World Bank Discussion Paper No. 336. Discusses the influence of targeted credited intervention programs among participants and non-participants living in program areas and compares them with poverty situations of households in non-program areas. The data are randomly drawn from 1,800 households in Bangladesh from both areas. The analysis shows that it takes about five years for participants to rise above the poverty line and eight years to graduate from program eligibility.

If Malawi’s fertilizer subsidy program aims to increase food security in the country, it should strive to target the most productive farmers. Subsidy levels can be set to self-target this group of farmers. This would maximize output achieved with subsidized fertilizer and eliminate the need for costly and error-prone top-down targeting. Maximizing the productive capacity of the AIP In a previous policy note, we argued that by setting the farmer contribution to fertilizer subsidized under that Affordable Inputs Programme (AIP) so that farmer demand matches what the program can supply, the government can maximize the total amount of fertilizer available for distribution under the program (Banda et al.,2022). In this note, we argue that a second advantage of this pricing strategy is that it ensures that each subsidized bag of fertilizer has the largest possible yield response, thus maximizing the additional amount of food produced through the program.

This text provides guidance to policymakers on how to design and implement sound price-subsidy reforms. It draws on the experience of price-subsidy reform in 28 countries. The authors discuss economic and political considerations and make several recommendations concerning the speed of reform and social protection mechanisms. They discuss how the social impact of reform can be limited by establishing cost-effective and well-targeted temporary social protection mechanisms, and how governments can reduce the risk of political disruption by distributing the initial burden of reform fairly and by clearly explaining the costs and benefits to the public.