The Committee's report focuses on the planned withdrawal of combat troops at the end of 2014 and the transfer of responsibility for security to the Afghan National Security Forces. It also examines the progress towards a secure and stable Afghanistan within the wider region, including Pakistan, and the plans by the UK, NATO and other allies for a smooth transition of responsibility for security to the Afghan Government and the ANSF. Securing the future of Afghanistan requires the concerted efforts of all the Afghan people; regional neighbours, in particular Pakistan; the USA; NATO and other coalition partners. In the process of establishing a peaceful and functioning Afghanistan, the Committee calls for evidence of: (i) At least the start of an Afghan-led peace settlement with the insurgency; (ii) Open and free elections; (iii) An appropriately trained and equipped ANSF with continuing financial support; (iii) A strong judicial system which protects the human rights of all Afghans; (iv) Economic development aid to continue in support of the well being and safety of all sections of society; (v) Effective measures to tackle corruption, drug production and the drug trade. The MoD needs to work with international partners and the ANSF to identify ways of meeting significant gaps in necessary capabilities such as helicopters and close air support and medical care from 2015. The Defence Committee concludes that at the end of UK operations the best the UK will be able to do is to withdraw in good order and engage with external partners to improve Afghanistan's future prospects.

The defense debate tends to treat Afghanistan as either a revolution or a fluke: either the "Afghan Model" of special operations forces (SOF) plus precision munitions plus an indigenous ally is a widely applicable template for American defense planning, or it is a nonreplicable product of local idiosyncrasies. In fact, it is neither. The Afghan campaign of last fall and winter was actually much closer to a typical 20th century mid-intensity conflict, albeit one with unusually heavy fire support for one side. And this view has very different implications than either proponents or skeptics of the Afghan Model now claim. Afghan Model skeptics often point to Afghanistan's unusual culture of defection or the Taliban's poor skill or motivation as grounds for doubting the war's relevance to the future. Afghanistan's culture is certainly unusual, and there were many defections. The great bulk, however, occurred after the military tide had turned not before-hand. They were effects, not causes. The Afghan Taliban were surely unskilled and ill-motivated. The non-Afghan al Qaeda, however, have proven resolute and capable fighters. Their host's collapse was not attributable to any al Qaeda shortage of commitment or training. Afghan Model proponents, by contrast, credit precision weapons with annihilating enemies at a distance before they could close with our commandos or indigenous allies. Hence the model's broad utility: with SOF-directed bombs doing the real killing, even ragtag local militias will suffice as allies. All they need do is screen U.S. commandos from the occasional hostile survivor and occupy the abandoned ground thereafter. Yet the actual fighting in Afghanistan involved substantial close combat. Al Qaeda counterattackers closed, unseen, to pointblank range of friendly forces in battles at Highway 4 and Sayed Slim Kalay.

To access the maps mentioned in this book, Click Here. Despite the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan remains a country in dire need of strong international support. Only with an understanding of the conditions in both urban and rural areas will the international community be able to offer aid and remain committed to long-term development. This fascinating and clearly written book mines a rich and unique array of data, which was collected in rural areas of Afghanistan by an expert team of researchers, to analyze countrywide trends in the relationship between human security and livelihoods. The team's research and recommendations, published here for the first time, suggest that international assistance or national development strategies that ignore the long-term developmental and structural goals and sideline the moderate elements of Afghan society will be doomed to failure. The authors' deeply informed policy recommendations will help to focus further action on vital issues such as co-optation of aid by armed political groups; water scarcity; contamination and degradation of the environment; education; health care; agriculture, livestock, and land health; and justice. A valuable resource for students, policymakers, donor governments, and national and international organizations, Life and Security in Rural Afghanistan opens a rare window into the otherwise hidden lives of the people of rural Afghanistan.

This publication is the second in a series of lessons learned reports which examine how the U.S. government and Departments of Defense, State, and Justice carried out reconstruction programs in Afghanistan. In particular, the report analyzes security sector assistance (SSA) programs to create, train and advise the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) between 2002 and 2016. This publication concludes that the effort to train the ANDSF needs to continue, and provides recommendations for the SSA programs to be improved, based on lessons learned from careful analysis of real reconstruction situations in Afghanistan. The publication states that the United States was never prepared to help create Afghan police and military forces capable of protecting that country from internal and external threats. It is the hope of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), John F. Sopko, that this publication, and other SIGAR reports will create a body of work that can help provide reasonable solutions to help United States agencies and military forces improve reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Related items: Counterterrorism publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterterrorism Counterinsurgency publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterinsurgency Warfare & Military Strategy publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/warfare-military-strategy Afghanistan War publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/afghanistan-war

The Council on Foreign Relations sponsors Independent Task Forces to assess issues of current and critical importance to U.S. foreign policy and provide policymakers with concrete judgments and recommendations. Diverse in backgrounds and perspectives, Task Force members aim to reach a meaningful consensus on policy through private and non-partisan deliberations. Once launched, Task Forces are independent of CFR and solely responsible for the content of their reports. Task Force members are asked to join a consensus signifying that they endorse "the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation." Each Task Force member also has the option of putting forward an additional or a dissenting view. Members' affiliations are listed for identification purposes only and do not imply institutional endorsement. Task Force observers participate in discussions, but are not asked to join the consensus. --Book Jacket.

Because China is principally interested in preventing the destabilization of Xinjiang Province, it has broadly deferred to the United States and its Western allies who are leading military efforts, political reconciliation, and economic reconstruction in Afghanistan. Author Zhao Huasheng writes that China's interests in Afghanistan are more limited than those of the United States, and Beijing has no interest in playing a subordinate role "under the dominance of the West" either. Basically China wants the security threat contained, but is not prepared to contribute to the military effort, including opening a transit corridor on its territory. China is prepared to participate in Afghanistan's economic reconstruction, especially when it advances Chinese foreign economic interests.