After the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, the leaders of Europe at the Congress of Vienna aimed to establish a new balance of power. The settlement established in 1815 ushered in the emergence of a genuinely European security culture. In this volume, leading historians offer new insights into the military cooperation, ambassadorial conferences, transnational police networks, and international commissions that helped produce stability. They delve into the lives of diplomats, ministers, police officers and bankers, and many others who were concerned with peace and security on and beyond the European continent. This volume is a crucial contribution to the debates on securitisation and security cultures emerging in response to threats to the international order.

Securing Europe takes a novel approach to Europeanization among EU member states by employing a sociological institutionalist approach. Watanabe argues that Europeanization as a process of change takes place not as a result of rationally calculating states, but as a result of the reworking of perceptual and normative frameworks.

After the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, the leaders of Europe at the Congress of Vienna aimed to establish a new balance of power. The settlement established in 1815 ushered in the emergence of a genuinely European security culture. In this volume, leading historians offer new insights into the military cooperation, ambassadorial conferences, transnational police networks, and international commissions that helped produce stability. They delve into the lives of diplomats, ministers, police officers and bankers, and many others who were concerned with peace and security on and beyond the European continent. This volume is a crucial contribution to the debates on securitisation and security cultures emerging in response to threats to the international order.

This book, first published in 1986, analyses a number of emerging, enduring and neglected issues that affected European security and the stability of the Atlantic Alliance at the end of the Cold War. It provides a comprehensive review of the major political, social and economic issues that shaped the course of European security. It offers a thorough assessment of such critical questions as European views of the US Strategic Defense Initiative, the contribution of new technologies and tactics to NATO’s conventional defence capabilities, and domestic factors that influenced security policy. It also provides original analysis of a number of issues, such as economic dimensions of security, the quest for a European defence identity, and protection of Western interests outside the NATO area. It provides a review of the nuclear question and of the German security debate in the aftermath of the initial US INF missile deployments.

What should be the security arrangements for the new Europe of the 1990s, now that the world is no longer afraid of a significant hot war beginning there? Who needs to be secure against what kinds of threats? What roles will be played by the United States and the Soviet Union, when the latter is itself in political upheaval? What place will nuclear weapons occupy--not only the weapons of the superpowers but those of the two European nuclear middle powers, the United Kingdom and France? And how will the task of making Europe secure be affected by the processes of economic integration scheduled to reach a new level in 1992? In a penetrating essay on these issues, Richard H. Ullman maintains that the era Europe is now entering will be qualitatively different from any it has known before. Questioning those who believe that future European international politics will be reminiscent of the turbulent decades before the two World Wars, he shows how and why tomorrow's patterns will radically depart from yesterday's. Some experts argue that only the bipolar structure of postwar Europe has prevented the hyper-nationalism and shifting alignments that led to earlier wars, but Ullman demonstrates fundamental differences--extending beyond the structural--between present-day Europe and the region as it was before World War II. The revolutionary events of 1989 and 1990 have left Germany and the Soviet Union with drastically changed stakes in Eastern Europe. No longer is there a German state which seeks to revise the European status quo. No longer does the Soviet regime feel that its legitimacy at home is crucially tied to the legitimacy of the regimes it installed in Eastern Europe. Both Bonn andMoscow now ask the same thing of the states that lie between them: that no threats against them should originate there. Ullman urges the creation of a new pan-European security organization to verify the absence of these and other threats. But he concludes that even without such an institution, violent conflicts will be confined to the point where they will be very unlikely to escalate into war among the major European powers.

Oswald argues that European security autonomy will lead to a more balanced transatlantic partnership, even though American military might will remain far superior. As U.S. leaders indicate a willingness to disengage from their former European protectorate, the Europeanization of Europe's own security needs—their ability to take care of their own crises—will proceed apace. An understanding of this process is key to an American foreign policy that recognizes Europe as a strategic actor in its own right, an indispensable ally with its own military and nonmilitary instruments of crisis management. At the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the postcommunist transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, the U.S.-led NATO alliance found itself without its erstwhile primary enemy. While NATO found new purpose as guarantor of stability for an increasing membership and crisis manager in Southeast Europe, the alliance's expansion also advanced its transformation from a collective defense organization into a security community. While NATO was redefining itself, the European Union created the institutional and political prerequisites for a European security and defense policy. In his analysis of Europe's emancipation from security dependence on the United States, Oswald expects the economic strength of the European bloc to translate into responsibility for regional security. Yet this is not to say that the EU is emerging as the primary challenger to U.S. hegemony. Instead, Oswald argues, European security autonomy will lead to a more balanced transatlantic partnership, even though American military might will remain far superior. As U.S. leaders indicate a willingness to disengage from their former European protectorate, the Europeanization of Europe's own security needs—their ability to take care of their own crises—will proceed apace. An understanding of this process is key to an American foreign policy that recognizes Europe as a strategic actor in its own right, an indispensable ally with its own military and nonmilitary instruments of crisis management.

The new model of intervention that emerged from Bosnia and Kosovo signalled a revolution in International Affairs. The crises in the Balkans revealed a new division of labour amongst Western states: US forces are primarily responsible for military action while European partners are more committed to Peace Support Operations and the subsequent building of 'security communities' via integration into the NATO and EU. This model has been evidenced in the post-9/11 'war on terror'. Here Moustakis and German examine the emergence and practice of this new Western model of intervention, which combines 'hard'/military and 'soft'/peace approaches, and assess its success and failures in the light of recent operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The fragile democratisation processes unfolding in the Balkans and the Caucasus offer important insights into the challenges of securing volatile regions and peripheries.