Regardless of technological and doctrinal advances, final mastery of any battlefield ultimately depends upon the tight-knit group of soldiers trained to direct fire, move, take ground and hold it. This book examines the infantry combat methods of World War II. It draws on the training manuals of the time and first-hand accounts of frontline action and covers the organization and tactics of squad, platoon, company and battalion. It identifies the differences between German, American, British and Japanese approaches and demonstrates how these evolved in the face of changes in the battlefield environment. Motorized infantry tactics are also covered together with each army's responses to the continuously growing challenge and shifting patterns of anti-tank combat and combined operations with armor.

Despite all technological advances, final mastery of any battlefield depends upon the tight-knit group of footsoldiers trained to manoeuvre, shoot and dig in. This first of a two-part study examines the methods by which the Western infantry of World War II - the German, British and US armies - actually brought their firepower to bear. Drawing upon period training manuals for the evolving theory, and on personal memoirs for the individual practice, this first book covers the organization and tactics of the squad of ten or a dozen men, and the platoon of three or four squads. The text is illustrated with contemporary photographs and diagrams, and with colour plates bringing to life the movement of soldiers on the battlefield.

In a continuation of the tactics mini-series, this book analyzes the physical tactics of the close-quarter fighting that took place in ruined cities during World War II. Street-to-street fighting in cities was not a new development, but the bombed-out shells of cities and advances in weaponry meant that World War II took such strategies to a new level of savagery and violence. Packed with eye-witness accounts, tutorials from original training manuals, maps, and full-colour artwork, this is an eye-opening insight into the tactics and experiences of infantry fighting their way through ruined cities in the face of heavy casualty rates and vicious resistance.

This wide-ranging military study examines WWII infantry tactics and operations on both sides through the battlefields of Europe. The dirty and dangerous frontlines of World War II belonged to the men who fought in the infantry. Yet the history of infantry tactics is too rarely studied and often misunderstood. Stephen Bull corrects this oversight with an in-depth account of infantry theory and combat experience, covering the British, German, and American Armies in the European theater of operations. Bull’s close analysis of the rules of engagement, the tactical manuals, the training, and the equipment is balanced by vivid descriptions of the tactics as they were tested in action. These operational examples show how infantry tactics on all sides developed as the war progressed, and they give a telling insight into the realities of infantry warfare.

The battlefield interaction between infantry and tanks was central to combat on most fronts in World War II. The first 'Blitzkrieg' campaigns saw the tank achieve a new dominance. New infantry tactics and weapons – some of them desperately dangerous – had to be adopted, while the armies raced to develop more powerful anti-tank guns and new light weapons. By 1945, a new generation of revolutionary shoulder-fired AT weapons was in widespread use. This book explains in detail the shifting patterns of anti-tank combat, illustrated with photographs, diagrams and colour plates showing how weapons were actually employed on the battlefield.

Historians have portrayed British participation in World War I as a series of tragic debacles, with lines of men mown down by machine guns, with untried new military technology, and incompetent generals who threw their troops into improvised and unsuccessful attacks. In this book a renowned military historian studies the evolution of British infantry tactics during the war and challenges this interpretation, showing that while the British army's plans and technologies failed persistently during the improvised first half of the war, the army gradually improved its technique, technology, and, eventually, its' self-assurance. By the time of its successful sustained offensive in the fall of 1918, says Paddy Griffith, the British army was demonstrating a battlefield skill and mobility that would rarely be surpassed even during World War II. Evaluating the great gap that exists between theory and practice, between textbook and bullet-swept mudfield, Griffith argues that many battles were carefully planned to exploit advanced tactics and to avoid casualties, but that breakthrough was simply impossible under the conditions of the time. According to Griffith, the British were already masters of "storm troop tactics" by the end of 1916, and in several important respects were further ahead than the Germans would be even in 1918. In fields such as the timing and orchestration of all-arms assaults, predicted artillery fire, "Commando-style" trench raiding, the use of light machine guns, or the barrage fire of heavy machine guns, the British led the world. Although British generals were not military geniuses, says Griffith, they should at least be credited for effectively inventing much of the twentieth-century's art of war.