The cover shows one side of a medallion commemorating the 1807 Treaty of Tilsit, ending the War of the Fourth Coalition (1806-07), signed by Alexander I of Russia (right) and Napoleon I of France - symbolic representatives of Russia and Europe. The treaty called for self-interested cooperation, in place of warfare, between the two powers. Despite the amicable embrace of the emperors, the medallion conveys the lingering wariness between the two former, and future, opponents. In this book, Danilevskii speaks of the Treaty of Tilsit with regret, as a lost opportunity for Russia to pursue its national ambitions and historical destiny: to liberate the Slavs from Habsburg and Ottoman rule and unite them under its own protective hegemony. Instead, Danilevskii says, Russia put European interests ahead of its own, triggering the invasion of 1812 and its aftermath. It continued serving European rather than Russian interests from the Congress of Vienna in 1815 through its intervention in Hungary, to prop up Habsburg rule, in 1849. For this service it was repaid with ingratitude, when the European powers united against it in the invasion of Crimea in 1853. Danilevskii's attempt at an explanation for Europe's ingratitude and hostility toward Russia, is the starting point of this book. -- from back cover.

This book analyses Russia-Europe/EU relations by exploring their practical essence and conceptualizing them in terms of the main categories of international relations research. It argues that the liberal world order, established in Cold War days, whereby international relations are underpinned by a global balance of power and a highly institutionalized framework of international relations, thereby balancing power and morality, continued after the Cold War, with high hopes in the early 1990s for a new order of security and cooperation for all Europe, including Russia. It goes on to show how the liberal world order has broken down, one manifestation of this being the new conflict between Russia and Europe in recent years, a conflict resulting from the failure of European countries/the EU to acknowledge the actual balance of military, economic and political power, the lack of limits on the policy of European countries in terms of infringing on Russia’s interests, and Russia’s consequent revision, after 1999, of its policy of co-operation. Overall, the book provides huge insight into the nature of Europe-Russia relations.

Russian-European political relations have always been problematic and one of the main reasons for this is the different perspectives on even the very basic notions and concepts of political life. With a worldwide recession, the problems as well as the opportunities in Russian-European relations are magnified. While most works on Russian-European, Russian-American and Russian-West relations focus on current policies and explain them from a standard set of explanatory variables, this book penetrates deeper into the structural and ideational differences that tend to bring about misperceptions, miscalculations, misinterpretations and misdeeds in this two-directional relationship. It applies a very broad conceptual framework to analyse differences that are as relevant for Europe and the EU as it is to Russia’s immediate neighbours and, while doing so, identifies the key factors that will dominate Russia-EU ties in the next decade.

The end of the Soviet system and the transition to the market in Russia, coupled with the inexorable rise of nationalism, has brought to the fore the centuries-old debate about Russia's relationship with Europe. In Russia and the Idea of Europe Iver Neumann discusses whether the tensions between self-referencing romantic nationalist views and Europe-orientated liberal views can ever be resolved. Drawing on a wide range of Russian sources, Neumann outlines the argument as it has unfolded over the last two hundred years, showing how Russia is caught between the attraction of an economically, politically and socially more developed Europe, and the attraction of being able to play a European -style inperial role in less-developed Asia. Neumann argues that the process of delineating a European "other" from the Russian self is an active form of Russian identity formation. The Russian debate about Europe is also a debate about what Rusia is and should be.

Russia has never been able to escape its relationship with Europe, or Europe with Russia. Geography and history have conspired to make them both neighbors and unavoidable factors in each other s daily lives. From the early 1700s until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Europe and Moscow both relied on material power to balance against any threats emerging from East and West. More recently, Europe and the EU have adopted a different strategy: make Russia non-threatening by making it European, like "us." Meanwhile, Russia s resistance to Europe s assimilationist mission is increasingly robust, fuelled by energy exports to Europe and the world. Contributors to this volume wrestle with the question of whether the European project is feasible, desirable, or even ethical.

This book contributes to the debate about a new German power in Europe with an analysis of Germany’s role in European Russia policy. It provides an up-to-date account of Germany’s “Ostpolitik” and how Germany has influenced EU-Russia relations since the Eastern enlargement in 2004 - partly along, partly against the interests and preferences of new member states. The volume combines a rich empirical analysis of Russia policy with a theory-based perspective on Germany’s power and influence in the EU. The findings demonstrate that despite Germany’s central role, exercising power within the EU is dependent on legitimacy and acceptance by other member states.

Europe today is deeply divided. Thirty years after the end of the Cold War and the celebratory moment when the wall came down, we are faced with a new Cold War. Russia-Western relations are arguably more dangerous than ever since the Cuban missile crisis. Diplomatic relations are frozen, sanctions installed, the old arms control treaties abandoned, and new nuclear weapons and carriers developed. EU Europe itself is divided. It is not just Brexit, marking the first real break-away from the Union, but also clashes within. From the yellow vests clashes with police in the heart of Paris, to so-called populist movements on the rise in the periphery and across the continent. The Visegrad countries (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic) are regularly at odds with the EU core (Brussels and the France-Germany axis) to a degree where the idea of sanctions is invoked. The Western security framework and NATO itself appears to break down, with Turkey, the NATO member with the organisations second largest military numerically, now purchasing Russian weapon systems and seeking strategic relations in Eurasia. How did it come to this and what happened with the post-Cold War dream? And what has happened to the post world war visions of European integration and security order? What are the critical processes and events that have led us unto this path? This book aims to address and explore these historical problems.