Charles Callan Tansill, America's diplomatic historian, convincingly argues that Franklin Roosevelt wished to involve the United States in World War II. When his efforts appeared to come to naught, Roosevelt provoked Japan into an attack on American territory, and so doing enter the war through the "back door".

Behandler baggrunden for USA's indtræden i 2. verdenskrig.

When Franklin D. Roosevelt became president in March 1933, he initially devoted most of his attention to finding a solution to the Great Depression. But the pull of war and the results of FDR's foreign policy ultimately had a deeper and more transformative impact on U.S. history. The Triumph of Internationalism offers a fresh, concise analysis and narrative of FDR's foreign policy from 1933 to America's entry into World War II in 1941. David Schmitz covers the attempts to solve the international economic crisis of the Great Depression, the Good Neighbor Policy in Latin America, the U.S. response to war in Europe and the Pacific, and other topics of this turbulent era. Schmitz describes Roosevelt as an internationalist who set out to promote U.S. interests abroad short of direct intervention. He tried to make amends for past transgressions with the nation's southern neighbors, eventually attempted to open and promote international trade to foster economic growth, and pursued containment policies intended to halt both the Japanese threat in the Pacific through deterrence and German aggression in Europe through economic appeasement. When his policies regarding the Axis powers failed, he began educating the American public about the dangers of Axis hegemony and rearming the nation for war. This effort required a profound shift in the American mind-set, given the prevailing isolationism, the disillusionment with America's involvement in World War I, and the preoccupation with domestic problems. A less powerful president would likely have failed, or perhaps not even attempted, to alter the prevailing public opinion. FDR revived American internationalism and reshaped the public's understanding of the national interest and defense. Roosevelt's policies and the outcome of World War II made the United States a superpower without equal.

Unedited speeches and messages, compiled and collated by Douglas Lurton.

Elected an unprecedented four times to the presidency, Franklin D. Roosevelt led the United States through some of the most dramatic and trying foreign and domestic episodes in its history. Coming to power in the throws of a crippling depression, Roosevelt quickly found himself having to juggle the need for tremendous domestic revitalization in a world menaced by burgeoning aggressor states. In Debating Franklin D. Roosevelt's Foreign Policies, noted historians Justus D. Doenecke and Mark A. Stoler offer differing perspectives on the Roosevelt years, finding disparate meanings from common data. Finding Roosevelt astute at choosing the most effective option of those available, Stoler generally defends FDR's policies against their traditional critics. Conversely, Doenecke emphasizes a dangerous shallowness and superficiality in FDR's approach to foreign affairs, particularly in his first two terms. The contrary viewpoints of the authors, supplemented by carefully chosen documents, provide an ideal introduction allowing readers to examine the issues and draw their own conclusions about Franklin Roosevelt's foreign policy.

Conceived by Charles Beard as a sequel to his provocative study of American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War outraged a nation, permanently damaging Beard's status as America's most influential historian.Beard's main argument is that both Democratic and Republican leaders, but Roosevelt above all, worked quietly in 1940 and 1941 to insinuate the United States into the Second World War. Basing his work on available congressional records and administrative reports, Beard concludes that FDR's image as a neutral, peace-loving leader was a smokescreen, behind which he planned for war against Germany and Japan even well before the attack on Pearl Harbor.Beard contends that the distinction between aiding allies in Europe like Great Britain and maintaining strict neutrality with respect to nations like Germany and Japan was untenable. Beard does not argue that all nations were alike, or that some did and others did not merit American support, but rather that Roosevelt chose to aid Great Britain secretly and unconstitutionally rather than making the case to the American public. President Roosevelt shifted from a policy of neutrality to one of armed intervention, but he did so without surrendering the appearance, the fiction of neutrality. This core argument makes the work no less explosive in 2003 than it was when first issued in 1948.