Does history provide lessons for foreign policy makers today? Macdonald combines cognitive psychology theories about analogical reasoning, international relations theories about military intervention, and original archival research to analyze the role of historical information in foreign policy decision making. He looks at the role of historical analogies in Anglo-American decision making during foreign policy crises involving the possible use of force in regional contingencies during a crucial period in the 1950s when the West faced an emerging Soviet threat. This study analyzes the influence of situational and individual variables in a comparison of more than ten leaders from two nations facing four different crises. Rolling the Iron Dice describes the often significant effect of historical analogies on perceptions of the adversary and of allies, time constraints, policy options and risks, as well as the justification of policy in four crises: the 1950 Korean invasion; the 1951-53 Iranian oil nationalization incident; the 1956 Suez crisis; and the 1958 crisis in Lebanon and Jordan. Contrary to both the slippery slope and the escalation models of military intervention, Macdonald argues that leaders decide extremely early in a crisis, often on the basis of an historical analogy, but also based on perceptions of the rationality of an adversary, whether to use military force. Their decision does not change unless the adversary capitulates to every demand.

Killed in action at the bloody Battle of Shiloh, Confederate general Albert Sidney Johnston stands as the highest-ranking American military officer to die in combat. His unexpected demise had cascading negative consequences for the South’s war effort, as his absence created a void in adequate leadership in the years that followed. In The Iron Dice of Battle, noted Civil War historian Timothy B. Smith reexamines Johnston’s life and death, offering remarkable insights into this often-contradictory figure. As a commander, Johnston frequently faced larger and better-armed Union forces, dramatically shaping his battlefield decisions and convincing him that victory could only be attained by taking strategic risks while fighting. The final wager came while leading his army at Shiloh in April 1862. During a desperate gambit to turn the tide of battle, Johnston charged to the front of the Confederate line to direct his troops and fell mortally wounded after sustaining enemy fire. The first work to survey the general’s career in detail in nearly sixty years, The Iron Dice of Battle builds on recent scholarship to provide a new and incisive assessment of Johnston’s life, his Confederate command, and the effect his death had on the course of the Civil War in the West.

Annotation Analyzes of the influence of historical analogies on Anglo-American decision making during four regional crises of the 1950s that involved the possible use of force: Korea, Iran, Suez, and Lebanon/Jordan.

These essays by nuclear policy experts provide “a speculative but serious and well-informed journey through a variety of scenarios and contingencies” (Foreign Affairs). Recent decades have seen a slow but steady increase in nuclear armed states, and in the seemingly less constrained policy goals of some of the newer “rogue” states in the international system. The authors of On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century argue that a time may come when one of these states makes the conscious decision that using a nuclear weapon against the United States, its allies, or forward deployed forces in the context of a crisis or a regional conventional conflict may be in its interests. They assert that we are unprepared for these types of limited nuclear wars and that it is urgent we rethink the theory, policy, and implementation of force related to our approaches to this type of engagement. Together they critique Cold War doctrine on limited nuclear war and consider a number of the key concepts that should govern our approach to limited nuclear conflict in the future. These include identifying the factors likely to lead to limited nuclear war; examining the geopolitics of future conflict scenarios that might lead to small-scale nuclear use; and assessing strategies for crisis management and escalation control. Finally, they consider a range of strategies and operational concepts for countering, controlling, or containing limited nuclear war. “A series of trenchant essays that deconstruct a critical national security challenge that most of us wish did not exist. Assembling a star-studded cast of scholars, analysts, and policy practitioners, Larsen and Kartchner have produced some of the most important new thinking on an old topic.” —H-Diplo

This volume covers a fascinating period in the history of the German army, a time in which machine guns, airplanes, and weapons of mass destruction were first developed and used. Eric Brose traces the industrial development of machinery and its application to infantry, cavalry, and artillery tactics. He examines the modernity versus anti-modernity debate that raged after the Franco-Prussian war, arguing that the residue of years of resistance to technological change seriously undermined the German army during World War I.

Given on January 5, 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine Address forever changed America’s relationship with the Middle East. In the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, President Dwight D. Eisenhower boldly declared that the United States would henceforth serve as the region’s “protector of freedom” against Communist aggression. Eighteen months later the president invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine, landing troops in Lebanon and setting an enduring precedent for U.S. intervention in the Middle East. How did Eisenhower justify this intervention to an American public wary of foreign entanglements? Why did he boldly issue the doctrine that bears his name? And, most important, how has Eisenhower’s rhetoric continued to influence American policy and perception of the Middle East? Randall Fowler answers these questions and more in More Than a Doctrine. With the expansion of America’s global influence and the executive branch’s power, presidential rhetoric has become an increasingly important tool in U.S. foreign policy—nowhere more so than in the Middle East. By examining Eisenhower’s rhetoric, More Than a Doctrine explores how the argumentative origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine Address continue to impact us today.