The definitive history of the Russo-Japanese war The Russians were wrong-footed from the start, fighting in Manchuria at the end of a 5,000 mile single track railway; the Japanese were a week or so from their bases. The Russian command structure was hopelessly confused, their generals old and incompetent, the Tsar cautious and uncertain. The Russian naval defeat at Tsushima was as farcical as it was complete. The Japanese had defeated a big European power, and the lessons for the West were there for all to see, had they cared to do so. From this curious war, so unsafely ignored for the most part by the military minds of the day, Richard Connaughton has woven a fascinating narrative to appeal to readers at all levels.

The definitive history of the Russo-Japanese war The Russians were wrong-footed from the start, fighting in Manchuria at the end of a 5,000 mile single track railway; the Japanese were a week or so from their bases. The Russian command structure was hopelessly confused, their generals old and incompetent, the Tsar cautious and uncertain. The Russian naval defeat at Tsushima was as farcical as it was complete. The Japanese had defeated a big European power, and the lessons for the West were there for all to see, had they cared to do so. From this curious war, so unsafely ignored for the most part by the military minds of the day, Richard Connaughton has woven a fascinating narrative to appeal to readers at all levels.

The Russo-Japanese war saw the first defeat of a major European imperialist power by an Asian country. When Japanese and Russian expansionist interests collided over Manchuria and Korea, the Tsar assumed Japan would never dare to fight. However, after years of planning, Japan launched a surprise attack on the Russian Port Arthur, on the Liaoyang Peninsula in 1904 and the war that followed saw Japan win major battles against Russia. This book explains the background and outbreak of the war, then follows the course of the fighting at Yalu River, Sha-ho, and finally Mukden, the largest battle anywhere in the world before the First World War.

The Russo-Japanese War was fought in the waters of the Yellow Sea and the Straits of Tsushima that divide Japan from Korea, and in the mountains of Manchuria, borrowed without permission from China. It was the first war to be fought with modern weapons. The Japanese had fought the Chinese at sea in 1894 and had gained a foothold in Manchuria by taking control of Port Authur. In 1895, however, Japan was forced to abandon its claims by the Russian fleet's presence in the Straits of Tsushima. Tsar Nicholas had obtained a window to the East for his empire and Japan had been humiliated. Tensions between the two countries would rise inexorably over the next decade. Around the world, no one doubted that little Japan would be no match for the mighty armies of Tsar Nicholas II. Yet Russia was in an advanced state of decay, the government corrupt and its troops inept and demoralized. Japan, meanwhile, was emerging from centuries of feudal isolation and becoming an industrial power, led by zealous nationalist warlords keen to lead the Orient to victory over the oppressive West. From the opening surprise attack on the Russian fleet at Port Authur in 1904, the Japanese out-fought and out-thought the Russians. This is a definitive account of one of the pivotal conflicts of the twentieth century whose impact was felt around the world.

“A pioneering effort to trace the evolution of military power and military strategy of tsarist Russia during the rule of the Romanov dynasty.” —Richard Pipes, Baird Professor of History, Harvard University

One of the great spectacles of modern naval history is the Imperial Japanese Navy's instrumental role in Japan's rise from an isolationist feudal kingdom to a potent military empire stridently confronting, in 1941, the world's most powerful nation. Years of painstaking research and analysis of previously untapped Japanese-language resources have produced this remarkable history of the navy's dizzying development, tactical triumphs, and humiliating defeat. Unrivaled in its breadth of coverage and attention to detail, this important new study explores the foreign and indigenous influences on the navy's thinking about naval warfare and how to plan for it. Focusing primarily on the much-neglected period between the world wars, David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, two widely esteemed historians, persuasively explain how the Japanese failed to prepare properly for the war in the Pacific despite an arguable advantage in capability.