Must there be a single right interpretation of a particular cultural entity? In his book Michael Krausz considers this question in such representative cultural practices as music, visual art, history, and cross-cultural understanding. Krausz advances two main theses. First, he argues, the notion that there must be a single right interpretation in cultural practices—the "singularist" view—is misplaced. Without acceding to an interpretive anarchism, he embraces the "multiplist" view that cultural practices characteristically allow a multiplicity of ideally admissible interpretations. In his discussion Krausz critically outlines the maneuvers available to both singularists and multiplists. Second, Krausz notes that singularists characteristically construe their objects-of-interpretation along realist lines, and multiplists along constructionist lines. But, he argues, these associations are not necessary: the singularist condition is not guaranteed by realism, nor the multiplist by constructionism. Krausz holds that the question of interpretive ideals is detachable from the dispute between realists and constructionists. Addressing topics of intense concern within mainstream analytic philosophy and in many other areas of cultural investigation, Rightness and Reasons will be rewarding reading for aestheticians, musicologists, art historians, literary theorists, historiographers, and anthropologists.

Rightness as Fairness provides a uniquely fruitful method of 'principled fair negotiation' for resolving applied moral and political issues that requires merging principled debate with real-world negotiation.

This is the first book to answer the question: Does the motive of an action ever make a difference to whether that action is morally right or wrong? Sverdlik's answer is yes. He analyses the nature of motives and their relation to normative judgements and intentions, and argues that consequentialism gives the best account of these matters.

This title was first published in 2003. Leading contemporary essays on interpretation are assembled in this volume, which offsets them against a small number of "classical" works from earlier periods. It has long been recognized that textual sources (constitutions, statutes, precedents, commentaries) are central to developed systems of law and that interpretation of such texts is one highly important element in adjudication, legal practice and legal scholarship. Scholars have also contended that the totality of legal activity is "interpretive" in a wider sense and debates about objectivity have raged. The reasons for this development are here critically scrutinized.

Reason and Value collects fifteen brand-new papers by leading contemporary philosophers on themes from the moral philosophy of Joseph Raz. The subtlety and power of Raz's reflections on ethical topics - including especially his explorations of the connections between practical reason and the theory of value - make his writings a fertile source for anyone working in this area. The volume honours Raz's accomplishments in the area of ethical theorizing, and will contribute to an enhanced appreciation of the significance of his work for the subject.

This title was first published in 2000: Robert S. Summers is a distinguished legal theorist whose work has had significant influence in Europe as well as the United States. The study of form and substance in law, the theme of this collection, marks many of his most distinctive contributions to law and legal philosophy over four decades.

Utilitarianism is the idea that ethics is ultimately about what makes people's lives go better. While utilitarian ideas remain highly influential in politics and culture, they are subject to many well-developed philosophical criticisms, such as the claim that utilitarianism requires too much of us and the view that it does not respect individuals' rights. The theory is widely thought by philosophers to be the least plausible form of consequentialism, hampered by its excessive simplicity. In Taking Utilitarianism Seriously, Christopher Woodard argues that it is not defeated by the standard objections. He presents a new and rich version of utilitarianism that can answer all six commons objections plausibly and, in doing so, launches a state-of-the-art defence of the utilitarian tradition, which has greater resources than its critics have often assumed. Far from being excessively simple, utilitarianism is able to account for much of the complexity and nuance of everyday ethical thought. And rather than being quickly dismissed, utilitarian approaches to moral and political philosophy are due for renewed development and discussion.