This paper presents a new technique for grouping retail loans into homogenous risk pools, which adheres to the provisions of Basel II. We use recursive partitioning and test it on a data set of approximately 413,000 auto loans. By classifying loans according to selective predictors of default, we find that banks can achieve significant savings in terms of a lower regulatory capital requirement. Alternatively, this provides the opportunity to increase lending capacity.

The essence of this text is the application of The Basel II Framework Use Test. I will illustrate the facets of Use Test adherence with risk management tools and strategies that complement a banks pursuit of Advanced Internal Ratings Based Approach, Basel II Framework compliance. I will simultaneously pay close attention to the specific Basel II Framework, Use Test adherence measures. This book offers the practitioner a useful prescription for ensuring that their bank covers the necessary bases when pursuing its Basel II Framework implementation. It additionally puts into proper context where banks should be concerned in their pursuit of the Use Test, with specific attention to regulator, boards and executives concerns that the bank continues to operate with sound fiscal behaviour. The very foundation of a banks lending practices is the credit cycle. This book identifies both the traditional model and the newly minted Basel II model of the credit cycle. It also demonstrates practices that create sustainable business processes which optimize the risk-reward drivers of a retail banking environment. It focuses on the different operational areas of the bank and the role each plays within the Basel II credit cycle. Finally, it provides a foundation for which the credit practices present in Marketing, Underwriting, Account Management, Portfolio Management, Recoveries and Collections and Regulatory Capital setting can be justly applied. Banks must make use of The Basel II Framework estimation tools, thus confirming that they are predictive, accurate and reliable in the estimation of regulatory capital as well as in the day-to-day running of the bank. In spite of the prescriptive nature of The Basel II Framework model estimates this book will illustrate how to exploit their elemental design into profitable pursuits. While one fundamental challenge relating to Basel II Framework adherence is incorporating these tools into the Credit Cycle, another focuses on enhancing and improving existing credit practices found within the banks organizational structure in light of traditional banking shareholder drivers. This book thus simplifies this directive.

Inhaltsangabe:Abstract: The central problem and resulting question of this thesis was: 'Will Basel II make credits in the Mittelstand more expensive?' In view of the previous analysis on possible capital requirements and changes in credit conditions for German small and medium-sized enterprises, the answer to this question can be adequately answered: On average, Basel II does not make credits in the Mittelstand more expensive. Basel II has an influence on the amount of regulatory capital the banks have to hold. The costs of this scarce factor are included in the risk premium which is part of the borrower s credit rent. Therefore, the credit rent would ceteris paribus be higher if capital requirements rose. However, it has been shown that for about 90% of German companies, capital requirements will even be lower in Basel II. This is because these companies will belong to the retail segment in Basel II where there is a reduction in regulatory capital (compared to the current 8%) up to a high probability of default between 7% and 8%, which would apply to a company in default or bankruptcy. Additionally, capital requirements for small and medium-sized enterprises can be further reduced due to the extended recognition of collaterals. Basel II has introduced types of collaterals that small and medium-sized companies are more often able to deliver, namely account receivables and real estate. It can therefore be concluded that a possible future increase in average credit rent levels for German small and medium-sized enterprises must have other reasons than the banks costs for regulatory capital. Zusammenfassung: Jede Wirtschaft beruht auf einem Kreditsystem, das heißt, auf der irrtümlichen Annahme, der andere werde gepumptes Geld zurückzahlen (Kurt Tucholsky, 1931) Kreditinstitute spielen eine besondere Rolle in modernen Volkswirtschaften. Sie sind nicht nur Mittler zwischen Kreditnehmern und Einlegern, sondern stellen darüber hinaus vielfältige nicht bilanzwirksame Finanzdienstleistungen zur Verfügung. Dabei ist der professionelle Umgang mit Kredit-, Markt-, Liquiditäts- und anderen Risiken eine der wichtigsten Leistungen von Finanzintermediären. Solche Risiken dürfen jedoch nicht zu Instabilitäten im Finanzsektor führen. Über die eigene Risikovorsorge der Institute hinaus wurden deshalb besondere Aufsichtsregeln für Kreditinstitute geschaffen, unter denen die Eigenkapitalregeln eine herausragende Rolle einnehmen. Im dynamischen und [...]

The new Basel II regulation contains a number of new regulatory features. Most importantly, internal ratings will be given a central role in the evaluation of bank loans' riskiness. Another novelty is that retail credit and SME loans will receive a special treatment in recognition of the fact that the riskiness of such exposure derives to a greater extent from idiosyncratic risk and much less from common factor risk. Much of the work done on the differences between the risk properties of retail, SME and corporate credit has been based on parameterized model of credit risk. In this paper we present new quantitative evidence on the implied credit loss distributions for two Swedish banks using a non-parametric Monte Carlo re-sampling method following Carey [1998]. Our results are based on a panel data set containing both loan and internal rating data from the banks' complete business loan portfolios over the period 1997-2000. We compute the credit loss distributions that each rating system implies and compare the required economic capital implied by these loss distributions with the regulatory capital under Basel II. By exploiting the fact that a subset of all businesses in the sample is rated by both banks, we can generate loss distributions for SME, retail and corporate credit portfolios with a constant risk profile. Our findings suggest that a special treatment for retail credit and SME loans may not be justified. We also investigate if any alternative definition of SME's and retail credit would warrant different risk weight functions for these types of exposure. Our results indicate that it may be difficult to find a simple risk weight function that can account for the differences in portfolio risk properties between banks and asset types.

The recent mortgage crisis has resulted in several bank failures as the number of mortgage defaults increased. The current Basel I capital framework does not require banks to hold sufficient amounts of capital to support their mortgage lending activities. The new Basel II capital rules are intended to correct this problem. However, Basel II models could become too complex and too costly to implement, often resulting in a trade-off between complexity and model accuracy. In addition, the variation of the model, particularly how mortgage portfolios are segmented, could have a significant impact on the default and loss estimated and, thus, could affect the amount of capital that banks are required to hold. This paper finds that the calculated Basel II capital varies considerably across the default prediction model and segmentation schemes, thus providing banks with an incentive to choose an approach that results in the least required capital for them. The authors also find that a more granular segmentation model produces smaller required capital, regardless of the economic environment. In addition, while borrowers' credit risk factors are consistently superior, economic factors have also played a role in mortgage default during the financial crisis.