Many liberal political philosophers hold that the state should not impose or even promote any particular conception of the good life or human flourishing. It should not, for instance, enact laws and policies designed to elevate citizens' tastes, to refine their sensibilities or to perfect their characters. Instead, the state should restrict itself to maintaining a fair framework of rights and opportunities within which all citizens can pursue their own beliefs about what constitutes a good life. Against this backdrop, Collis Tahzib develops a version of perfectionist political philosophy. Whereas previous perfectionists have argued that the promotion of flourishing ways of life is permissible or legitimate, Tahzib casts perfectionism as a doctrine of justice. On this view, the implementation of laws and policies designed to promote sound ideals of the good life—ideals such as moral, intellectual and artistic excellence—is not merely a legitimate complement to justice but an essential constituent of justice. Over the years, perfectionism has faced various objections: that it is premised on values and judgements that are controversial within modern pluralistic societies; that it is unduly restrictive of freedom or autonomy; that it treats citizens as if they are children, unable to run their own lives; that it expresses the meddlesome mentality of a village busybody; that it mistakenly assumes that there are objective truths about human flourishing; and that it risks the abuse of power by incompetent, overzealous or corrupt state officials. These ideas represent some of the deepest, most vibrant and most powerful strains in liberal thought. In defending perfectionism against these charges, the arguments in A Perfectionist Theory of Justice make a novel and important contribution to longstanding debates about the philosophical foundations of liberalism.

At the end of the Cold War, international law scholars engaged in furious debate over whether principles of democratic legitimacy had entered international law. Many argued that a 'democratic entitlement' was emerging. Others were skeptical that international practice in democracy promotion was either consistent or sufficiently widespread and many found the idea of democratic entitlement dangerous. Those debates, while ongoing, have not been comprehensively revisited in almost twenty years. Together with an original introduction, this volume collects the leading scholarship of the past two decades on these and other questions. It focuses particular attention on the normative consequences of the recent 'democratic recession' in many regions of the world.

Explores self-deception and its consequences for political decision-making.

Selected papers from the annual meeting of the Conference.