How do people remember financial crisis? Do these memories affect how policy-makers and the public respond to crises, or is the past used in different ways by different actors? This volume examines a range of cases of financial crisis where either the past has been remembered, forgotten, used, or dismissed to try to begin to answer these questions.

The chapters in this book reflect on people's relationships with past financial crises - from public opinion to business leaders and policy makers. In connection with financial crises, Remembering and Learning from Financial Crises addresses three fundamental questions: first, are financial crises remembered, and if so how? Second, have lessons been drawn from past financial crises? And third, have past experiences been used in order to make practical decisions when confronted with a new crisis? These questions are of course related, yet they have been approached from different historical perspectives, using methodologies borrowed from different academic disciplines. One of the objectives of this book is to explore how these approaches can complement each other in order to better understand the relationships between remembering and learning from financial crises and how the past is used by financial institutions. It thus recognises financial crisis as a recurring phenomenon and addresses the impact that this has in a range of public and policy contexts.

The chapters in this book reflect on people's relationships with past financial crises - from public opinion to business leaders and policy makers. In connection with financial crises, Remembering and Learning from Financial Crises addresses three fundamental questions: first, are financial crises remembered, and if so how? Second, have lessons been drawn from past financial crises? And third, have past experiences been used in order to make practical decisions when confronted with a new crisis? These questions are of course related, yet they have been approached from different historical perspectives, using methodologies borrowed from different academic disciplines. One of the objectives of this book is to explore how these approaches can complement each other in order to better understand the relationships between remembering and learning from financial crises and how the past is used by financial institutions. It thus recognises financial crisis as a recurring phenomenon and addresses the impact that this has in a range of public and policy contexts.

"Before reading The Panic of 1907, the year 1907 seemed like a long time ago and a different world. The authors, however, bring this story alive in a fast-moving book, and the reader sees how events of that time are very relevant for today's financial world. In spite of all of our advances, including a stronger monetary system and modern tools for managing risk, Bruner and Carr help us understand that we are not immune to a future crisis." —Dwight B. Crane, Baker Foundation Professor, Harvard Business School "Bruner and Carr provide a thorough, masterly, and highly readable account of the 1907 crisis and its management by the great private banker J. P. Morgan. Congress heeded the lessons of 1907, launching the Federal Reserve System in 1913 to prevent banking panics and foster financial stability. We still have financial problems. But because of 1907 and Morgan, a century later we have a respected central bank as well as greater confidence in our money and our banks than our great-grandparents had in theirs." —Richard Sylla, Henry Kaufman Professor of the History of Financial Institutions and Markets, and Professor of Economics, Stern School of Business, New York University "A fascinating portrayal of the events and personalities of the crisis and panic of 1907. Lessons learned and parallels to the present have great relevance. Crises and panics are as much a part of our future as our past." —John Strangfeld, Vice Chairman, Prudential Financial "Who would have thought that a hundred years after the Panic of 1907 so much remained to be written about it? Bruner and Carr break significant new ground because they are willing to do the heavy lifting of combing through massive archival material to identify and weave together important facts. Their book will be of interest not only to banking theorists and financial historians, but also to business school and economics students, for its rare ability to teach so clearly why and how a panic unfolds." —Charles Calomiris, Henry Kaufman Professor of Financial Institutions, Columbia University, Graduate School of Business

If you’ve got money in the bank, chances are you’ve never seriously worried about not being able to withdraw it. But there was a time in the United States, an era that ended just over a hundred years ago, when bank customers had to pay close attention to the solvency of the banking system, knowing they might have to rush to retrieve their savings before the bank collapsed. During the National Banking Era (1863–1913), before the establishment of the Federal Reserve, widespread banking panics were indeed rather common. Yet these pre-Fed banking panics, as Gary B. Gorton and Ellis W. Tallman show, bear striking similarities to our recent financial crisis. Fighting Financial Crises thus turns to the past to better understand our uncertain present, investigating how panics during the National Banking Era played out and how they were eventually quelled and prevented. The authors then consider the Fed’s and the SEC’s reactions to the recent crisis, building an informative new perspective on how the modern economy works.

A Brookings Institution Press and World Bank Group publication Throughout the 1990s, numerous financial crises rocked the world financial sector. The Asian bubble burst, for example; Argentina and Brazil suffered currency crises; and the post-Soviet economy bottomed out in Russia. In Financial Crises, a distinguished group of economists and policy analysts examine and draw lessons from attempts to recover from past crises. They also consider some potential hazards facing the world economy in the 21st century and discuss ways to avoid them and minimize the severity of any future downturn. This important new volume emerges from the seventh annual conference on emerging markets finance, cosponsored and organized by the World Bank and the Brookings Institution. In the book, noted experts address the following questions: How effective were post-crisis policies in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and East and Central Asia? Where do international financial markets stand ten years after the worldwide debt crisis? How can the provision of financial services resume vigorously, yet safely? What are the viable policy options for reducing systemic financial vulnerability? What will the next emerging-market financial crisis look like? Will lessons learned from past experiences help to avoid future disasters? How can nations reform their pension systems to deal with retirement challenges in the 21st century?

Much has been written on the financial crisis of 2008 – the most severe economic downturn since the Great Depression – analysing its causes and the risks for the future of the global economy. This book takes an alternative approach which focuses on the legacy of the global financial crisis, what is remembered and what lessons have been drawn from it. This volume provides perspectives on this legacy from a variety of contributors including central bankers, regulators, politicians, academics, and journalists. They offer insight into what remains of the crisis in terms of public and industry awareness, changes to the post-2008 financial architecture, lessons from the national experiences of highly exposed small economies, and considers this legacy in terms of oversight by regulatory regimes. These diverse perspectives are drawn together here to ask how we can ensure that these lessons will be transmitted to the new generation of global financiers.