Glen Segell

Concerns over Iran’s nuclear programme, North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship and, in the past, Iraq’s apparent pursuit of WMD have captured the world’s attention, and dominated the agenda of the American foreign policy establishment. But, what led policymakers and the US military to emphasise the threat of rogue states at the end of the Cold War? Going behind the vivid language of the ‘axis of evil’ and portrayals of undeterrable and reckless rogue states, this work demonstrates how the rogue state doctrine satisfied both domestic and international goals in the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, underpinning efforts to maintain US leadership and hegemony. It offers a clear picture of the policymaking process, taking a broad, historical approach that places the actions of US officials towards Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya and Cuba in a wider context. Through an understanding of the long-standing influences on the US approach we are better able to appreciate why, for instance, regime change dominated the post-9/11 agenda and led to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Explaining in detail how the tackling of rogue states became a central aim of US foreign policy, Miles examines whether there was continuity between the Clinton and Bush approach. He moves on to highlight the influence of Congress on the implementation of US policies and the difficulties the US faced in ‘selling’ its approach to allies and adapting its hard-line strategies to reflect developments within the targeted states. By considering the impulses and drivers behind the development of the rogue states approach, this work will extend the scope of existing work in the field and will be of interest to scholars and policymakers alike.

Rogue States: The Rule of Force in the World Affairs.

An analysis of the policies of preemption and regime change as well as an examination of US policy options for dealing with each country in the "axis of evil." In January 2002, President George W. Bush declared Iran, Iraq, and North Korea constituents of an "axis of evil." US strategy toward each of these countries has clearly varied since, yet similar issues and policy options have emerged for US relations with all three. Reshaping Rogue States seeks to improve our understanding of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as well as of current and future policy options to combat the threats these nations pose. The book's comprehensive analysis of preemption and regime change debates the circumstances under which each policy might be justified or legal under international law. Prominent strategists and policymakers consider alternatives to preemption—including prevention, counterproliferation, and cooperative security—and draw conclusions from efforts to bring about regime change in the past. Reshaping Rogue States also reviews the differing policy challenges presented by each so-called axis member. Specifically, it considers how the United States might strike a balance with North Korea through multilateral negotiations; the changes within Iran that call for changes in US policy; and the dilemmas the United States faces in post-Saddam Iraq, including continuing insurgency, instability, and the feasibility of democracy.

President Clinton and other U.S. officials have warned that "rogue states" pose a major threat to international peace in the post-Cold War era. But what exactly is a rogue state? Does the concept foster a sound approach to foreign policy, or is it, in the end, no more than a counterproductive political epithet? Robert Litwak traces the origins and development of rogue state policy and then assesses its efficacy through detailed case studies of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. He shows that the policy is politically selective, inhibits the ability of U.S. policymakers to adapt to changed conditions, and has been rejected by the United States' major allies. Litwak concludes that by lumping and demonizing a disparate group of countries, the rogue state approach obscures understanding and distorts policymaking. In place of a generic and constricting strategy, he argues for the development of "differentiated" strategies of containment, tailored to the particular circumstances within individual states.

Analyzes the success of the Reformed in the middle and southern states The success of the Reformed of the middle and southern states at shaping a distinctly American ideology of the relationship of religion and government was truly amazing. Unlike their New England counterparts, many of whom continued to enjoy some sort of establishment well into the nineteenth century, these Reformed entered the national experience with a backlog of experience in religious diversity and practical disestablishment, and even, in the South, as religious dissenters. They would have preferred a religious establishment that would have essentially recognized the validity of their understanding of Christianity. It was perhaps their own rigidity that caused them to fail in that attempt, especially in Virginia. But for such a rigid people, and they were rigid, they demonstrated a remarkable flexibility. When it became apparent that the American legal settlement would be one in which the state disengaged from the support of religion, the Reformed of the middle and southern states welcomed it and declared it to be the solution that would be most conducive to the spread and ultimate domination of Reformed Christianity. Unlike twentieth-century liberals, the Reformed interpreted disestablishment as the legal and official recognition of the twin Reformation doctrines of the priesthood of all believers and the absolute and unquestioned authority of the Christian Scriptures. And, to a very large degree, it was their definition, rather than the thinking of Jefferson and Madison, that captured the imagination of the American people and became the dominant popular opinion in the land. But perhaps of even greater significance, the Reformed of the middle and southern states forged an ideology that ultimately based American national prosperity on national adherence to Reformed Christianity. Under the tutelage of John Witherspoon and Samuel Stanhope Smith, the Reformed captured the Enlightenment and brought it into the service of Reformed Christianity, altering traditional Calvinism in the process. Witherspoon and Smith, declaring that the truth of the law of nations could be devised by observation and reason alone, propounded a doctrine of natural law and political science that substantially reinforced the Calvinistic doctrine of providence in an era of skepticism and enlightenment. All history, they argued, proved beyond any reasonable doubt that those nations that adhered to the moral principles taught by Christianity had prospered and those that had taken a contrary route had fallen into ruin. The Reformed preachers of whatever denomination picked up this message and proclaimed it throughout the land. The United States, if it were to prosper, was required to be a Christian nation.

Numerous books have attempted to assess the generational threat from Jihadist-inspired terrorism but few offer any positive advice on solutions. Islamist terrorism is today a fact of life and its potency is vividly illustrated by outrages in otherwise secure Western democracies not to mention overt ISIL aggression in the Middle East and many African States. Without a far better understanding of the Islamic religion, its beliefs, value, hierarchy (or lack of) and different sects, countering the existential threat will be greatly hindered, not to say nearly impossible. In this thoughtful book the author, who combines scholarship with gritty on-the-ground experience, examines numerous options to counter the insidious threat that faces not only Western civilization but the wider world. These range from the extremes such as deportation and internment, through the multifaceted combined actions against hate preachers, intensified intelligence work and border security to comprehensive and inclusive joint action programs. This is an important and timely book on what is today the greatest security threat, written by an acknowledged expert.