Originally published in 1975, this volume contains original reports of new models and data in the areas of propositional reasoning, syllogistic reasoning, and transitive inference in children and adults of the time. A wide range of theoretical viewpoints is represented, and an effort is made to integrate the models and empirical findings, as well as place them in a common perspective and elucidate the general issues and questions relevant to these various approaches. The study of logical reasoning was undergoing rapid expansion at the time and this volume brings together the latest thinking in the area, in such a way that the relation between Piagetian and non-Piagetian traditions are examined, as well as the connection between the study of reasoning and the area of linguistic inquiry. The discussions of metatheoretical issues, such as the notion of logical competence and separability of representation and logical processing, as regards the various models presented herein, made this volume required reading for all those interested in reasoning in children and adults at the time.

Originally published in 1975, this volume contains original reports of new models and data in the areas of propositional reasoning, syllogistic reasoning, and transitive inference in children and adults of the time. A wide range of theoretical viewpoints is represented, and an effort is made to integrate the models and empirical findings, as well as place them in a common perspective and elucidate the general issues and questions relevant to these various approaches. The study of logical reasoning was undergoing rapid expansion at the time and this volume brings together the latest thinking in the area, in such a way that the relation between Piagetian and non-Piagetian traditions are examined, as well as the connection between the study of reasoning and the area of linguistic inquiry. The discussions of metatheoretical issues, such as the notion of logical competence and separability of representation and logical processing, as regards the various models presented herein, made this volume required reading for all those interested in reasoning in children and adults at the time.

This book offers a unified theory of the major propertries of mind, including comprehension, inference, and consciousness. The author argues that we apprehend the world by building inner mental replicas of the relationships among objects and events that concern us. The mind is essentially a model-building device that can itself be modeled on a computer. The book provides a blueprint for building such a model and numberous important illustrations of how to do it.

Knowledge representation is at the very core of a radical idea for understanding intelligence. This book talks about the central concepts of knowledge representation developed over the years. It is suitable for researchers and practitioners in database management, information retrieval, object-oriented systems and artificial intelligence.

In this interdisciplinary discussion on mental models, researchers from various areas in cognitive science tackle the following questions: What is a mental model? What are the prospects and limitations in applying the mental model notion in cognitive science? How can the ideas on the nature of mental models and their mode of operation be empirically substantiated? The primary goal of the research group was to work out a definition of mental models that embraces the overall use of this construct in cognitive science as well as the more specific conceptions used in particular research domains such as cognitive linguistics. Theoretical claims about the properties of mental models were discussed and their tenability evaluated against the empirical evidence. The volume is divided into three parts. Fundamental aspects of mental models are presented in the first section, the following part contains contributions to the function of mental models in discourse processing, and finally problems of mental models in reasoning and problem solving are outlined.

This book addresses an apparent paradox in the psychology of thinking. On the one hand, human beings are a highly successful species. On the other, intelligent adults are known to exhibit numerous errors and biases in laboratory studies of reasoning and decision making. There has been much debate among both philosophers and psychologists about the implications of such studies for human rationality. The authors argue that this debate is marked by a confusion between two distinct notions: (a) personal rationality (rationality1 Evans and Over argue that people have a high degree of rationality1 but only a limited capacity for rationality2. The book re-interprets the psychological literature on reasoning and decision making, showing that many normative errors, by abstract standards, reflect the operation of processes that would normally help to achieve ordinary goals. Topics discussed include relevance effects in reasoning and decision making, the influence of prior beliefs on thinking, and the argument that apparently non-logical reasoning can reflect efficient decision making. The authors also discuss the problem of deductive competence - whether people have it, and what mechanism can account for it. As the book progresses, increasing emphasis is given to the authors' dual process theory of thinking, in which a distinction between tacit and explicit cognitive systems is developed. It is argued that much of human capacity for rationality1 is invested in tacit cognitive processes, which reflect both innate mechanisms and biologically constrained learning. However, the authors go on to argue that human beings also possess an explicit thinking system, which underlies their unique - if limited - capacity to be rational.

In the World Library of Psychologists series, international experts themselves present career-long collections of what they judge to be their finest pieces - extracts from books, key articles, salient research findings, and their major theoretical and practical contributions. Jonathan St B T Evans is amongst the foremost cognitive psychologists of his generation, having been influential in spearheading developments in the psychological study of reasoning from its very beginnings in the 1970s up to the present day. This volume of self-selected papers recognises Professor Evan’s major contribution to the psychological study of thinking and reasoning by bringing together his most influential and important works. Early selections in the book focus upon experimental studies of reasoning - matching bias in the Wason selection task, belief bias in syllogistic reasoning, and also seminal work on the understanding of conditional statements. The later selections include Evans’ work on more general forms of dual process and dual system theory, and his recent account of two minds in one brain. The volume also contains chapters which highlight Evans’ contribution to the topic of human rationality, and also his influence on the development of the "new paradigm" in the psychology of reasoning. The key developments in the psychology of reasoning are paralleled by those in Evans’s own intellectual history, and the book will therefore make essential reading for all researchers in the psychology of reasoning, and a wider audience of graduate and upper-level undergraduate students with an interest in reasoning and/or dual process theory.