In 13 specially written essays, leading philosophers explore Kantian themes in moral and political philosophy that are prominent in the work of Thomas E. Hill, Jr., such as respect and self-respect, practical reason, conscience, and duty. In conclusion Hill offers an overview of his work and responses to the preceding essays.

In thirteen specially written essays, leading philosophers explore Kantian themes in moral and political philosophy that are prominent in the work of Thomas E. Hill, Jr. The first three essays focus on respect and self-respect.; the second three on practical reason and public reason. The third section covers a set of topics in social and political philosophy, including Kantian perspectives on homicide and animals. The final set of essays discuss duty, volition, and complicity in ethics. In conclusion Hill offers an overview of his work and responses to the preceding essays.

Why should we avoid doing moral wrong? The inability of philosophy to answer this question in a compelling manner—along with the moral skepticism and ethical confusion that ensue—result, Stephen Darwall argues, from our failure to appreciate the essentially interpersonal character of moral obligation. After showing how attempts to vindicate morality have tended to change the subject—falling back on non-moral values or practical, first-person considerations—Darwall elaborates the interpersonal nature of moral obligations: their inherent link to our responsibilities to one another as members of the moral community. As Darwall defines it, the concept of moral obligation has an irreducibly second-person aspect; it presupposes our authority to make claims and demands on one another. And so too do many other central notions, including those of rights, the dignity of and respect for persons, and the very concept of person itself. The result is nothing less than a fundamental reorientation of moral theory that enables it at last to account for morality’s supreme authority—an account that Darwall carries from the realm of theory to the practical world of second-person attitudes, emotions, and actions.

Philip Pettit offers a new insight into moral psychology. He shows that attachments such as love, and certain virtues such as honesty, require not only their characteristic positive behaviours in the actual world (i.e. as things are), but preservation of those characteristic behaviours across a range of counterfactual scenarios in which things are different from how they actually are. The counterfactual 'robustness', in this sense, of these behaviours is thus partof our very conception of these attachments and these virtues. Pettit shows that attachment, virtues, and respect all conform to a similar conceptual geography. He explores the implications of thisidea for key moral issues, such as the doctrine of double effect and the distinction between doing and allowing. He articulates and argues against an assumption, which he calls 'moral behaviourism,' which permeates contemporary ethics.

The value of staying alive

This stimulating collection of essays in ethics eschews the simple exposition and refinement of abstract theories. Rather, the author focuses on everyday moral issues, often neglected by philosophers, and explores the deeper theoretical questions which they raise. Such issues are: is it wrong to tell a lie to protect someone from a painful truth? Should one commit a lesser evil to prevent another from doing something worse? Can one be both autonomous and compassionate? Other topics discussed are servility, weakness of will, suicide, obligations to oneself, snobbery, and environmental concerns. A feature of the collection is the contrast of Kantian and utilitarian answers to these problems. The essays are crisply and lucidly written and will appeal to both teachers and students of philosophy.

Despite the increasing concern for the issue of respect for persons displayed over the last decades by political philosophers, human-right thinkers, social and ethical theorists, a comprehensive treatment of the problem at stake from a historical-philosophical perspective is conspicuously absent. The present collection of essays aims to contribute to the fulfillment of this gap by offering a reconstruction of the seminal passages in the history of philosophy which testify to the evolution of the idea of respect for persons and the rich array of conceptual specifications that such an idea acquires across the centuries. By analysis of pivotal texts of ancient and modern contemporary philosophy, the volume will try to offer an articulated account of respect which, starting from its primeval connection with the search for esteem and the pursuit of human excellence, gradually evolves towards the recognition of the political status of each citizen and culminates into a true politics of human rights. Bringing together the expertise of classicists and scholars specialized in modern and contemporary philosophy, the volume is especially intended for scholars working in the fields of the history of philosophy, ethical and political theory.