Moral Relativism and Reasons for Action
Title | Moral Relativism and Reasons for Action PDF eBook |
Author | Robert Streiffer |
Publisher | Routledge |
Pages | 162 |
Release | 2020-07-20 |
Genre | Philosophy |
ISBN | 1000080250 |
Originally published in 2003, this book examines moral relativism and the author discusses the main arguments for Appraiser Relativism and Agent Relativism. The final chapter of the book discusses the implication of some recent developments in metaethics and develops a theory of reasons for action based on the way in which an action can be good as an alternative to the desire-based, agent-centred account critiqued in the earlier chapters.
Reason Relativism And God
Title | Reason Relativism And God PDF eBook |
Author | Joseph Runzo |
Publisher | Springer |
Pages | 298 |
Release | 1986-05-19 |
Genre | Philosophy |
ISBN | 134918215X |
Foundations for Moral Relativism
Title | Foundations for Moral Relativism PDF eBook |
Author | J. David Velleman |
Publisher | Open Book Publishers |
Pages | 158 |
Release | 2015-11-23 |
Genre | Philosophy |
ISBN | 1783740329 |
In this new edition of Foundations for Moral Relativism a distinguished moral philosopher tames a bugbear of current debate about cultural difference. J. David Velleman shows that different communities can indeed be subject to incompatible moralities, because their local mores are rationally binding. At the same time, he explains why the mores of different communities, even when incompatible, are still variations on the same moral themes. The book thus maps out a universe of many moral worlds without, as Velleman puts it, "moral black holes”. The six self-standing chapters discuss such diverse topics as online avatars and virtual worlds, lying in Russian and truth-telling in Quechua, the pleasure of solitude and the fear of absurdity. Accessibly written, this book presupposes no prior training in philosophy.
Relativism and the Foundations of Philosophy
Title | Relativism and the Foundations of Philosophy PDF eBook |
Author | Steven D. Hales |
Publisher | MIT Press |
Pages | 227 |
Release | 2009-08-21 |
Genre | Philosophy |
ISBN | 0262263130 |
A defense of the view that philosophical propositions are true in some perspectives and false in others, arguing that the rationalist, intuition-driven method of acquiring basic beliefs favored by analytic philosophy is not epistemically superior to such alternate belief-acquiring methods as religious revelation and the ritual use of hallucinogens. The grand and sweeping claims of many relativists might seem to amount to the argument that everything is relative—except the thesis of relativism. In this book, Steven Hales defends relativism, but in a more circumscribed form that applies specifically to philosophical propositions. His claim is that philosophical propositions are relatively true—true in some perspectives and false in others. Hales defends this argument first by examining rational intuition as the method by which philosophers come to have the beliefs they do. Analytic rationalism, he claims, has a foundational reliance on rational intuition as a method of acquiring basic beliefs. He then argues that there are other methods that people use to gain beliefs about philosophical topics that are strikingly analogous to rational intuition and examines two of these: Christian revelation and the ritual use of hallucinogens. Hales argues that rational intuition is not epistemically superior to either of these alternative methods. There are only three possible outcomes: we have no philosophical knowledge (skepticism); there are no philosophical propositions (naturalism); or there are knowable philosophical propositions, but our knowledge of them is relative to doxastic perspective. Hales defends relativism against the charge that it is self-refuting and answers a variety of objections to this account of relativism. Finally, he examines the most sweeping objection to relativism: that philosophical propositions are not merely relatively true, because there are no philosophical propositions—all propositions are ultimately empirical, as the naturalists contend. Hales's somewhat disturbing conclusion—that intuition-driven philosophy does produce knowledge, but not absolute knowledge—is sure to inspire debate among philosophers.
Relativism and Religion
Title | Relativism and Religion PDF eBook |
Author | Carlo Invernizzi Accetti |
Publisher | Columbia University Press |
Pages | 288 |
Release | 2015-11-10 |
Genre | Philosophy |
ISBN | 023154037X |
Moral relativism is deeply troubling for those who believe that, without a set of moral absolutes, democratic societies will devolve into tyranny or totalitarianism. Engaging directly with this claim, Carlo Invernizzi Accetti traces the roots of contemporary anti-relativist fears to the antimodern rhetoric of the Catholic Church and then rescues a form of philosophical relativism for modern, pluralist societies, arguing that this viewpoint provides the firmest foundation for an allegiance to democracy. In his analyses of the relationship between religious arguments and political authority and the implications of philosophical relativism for democratic theory, Accetti makes a far-ranging contribution to contemporary debates over the revival of religion in politics and the conceptual grounds for a commitment to democracy. He presents the first comprehensive genealogy of anti-relativist discourse and reclaims for English-speaking readers the overlooked work of Hans Kelsen on the connection between relativism and democracy. By engaging with contemporary attempts to replace the religious foundation of democratic values with a neo-Kantian conception of reason, Accetti also makes a powerful case for relativism as the best basis for a civic ethos that integrates different perspectives into democratic politics.
Fear of Knowledge
Title | Fear of Knowledge PDF eBook |
Author | Paul Boghossian |
Publisher | Clarendon Press |
Pages | 160 |
Release | 2007-10-11 |
Genre | Philosophy |
ISBN | 0191622753 |
The academic world has been plagued in recent years by scepticism about truth and knowledge. Paul Boghossian, in his long-awaited first book, sweeps away relativist claims that there is no such thing as objective truth or knowledge, but only truth or knowledge from a particular perspective. He demonstrates clearly that such claims don't even make sense. Boghossian focuses on three different ways of reading the claim that knowledge is socially constructed - one as a thesis about truth and two about justification. And he rejects all three. The intuitive, common-sense view is that there is a way things are that is independent of human opinion, and that we are capable of arriving at belief about how things are that is objectively reasonable, binding on anyone capable of appreciating the relevant evidence regardless of their social or cultural perspective. Difficult as these notions may be, it is a mistake to think that recent philosophy has uncovered powerful reasons for rejecting them. This short, lucid, witty book shows that philosophy provides rock-solid support for common sense against the relativists; it will prove provocative reading throughout the discipline and beyond.
A Refutation of Moral Relativism
Title | A Refutation of Moral Relativism PDF eBook |
Author | Peter Kreeft |
Publisher | Ignatius Press |
Pages | 188 |
Release | 2009-12-04 |
Genre | Religion |
ISBN | 1681490188 |
No issue is more fateful for civilization than moral relativism. History knows not one example of a successful society which repudiated moral absolutes. Yet most attacks on relativism have been either pragmatic (looking at its social consequences) or exhorting (preaching rather than proving), and philosophers' arguments against it have been specialized, technical, and scholarly. In his typical unique writing style, Peter Kreeft lets an attractive, honest, and funny relativist interview a "Muslim fundamentalist" absolutist so as not to stack the dice personally for absolutism. In an engaging series of personal interviews, every conceivable argument the "sassy Black feminist" reporter Libby gives against absolutism is simply and clearly refuted, and none of the many arguments for moral absolutism is refuted.