In recent decades, concerns have been expressed about two related labor force problems in the federal civil service: (1) insufficient turnover among mid- and late-career personnel and (2) the loss of key senior personnel to retirement as soon as they become eligible (generally, age 55). Lack of turnover can clog the promotion pipeline, preventing the hiring or advancement of better-trained or more-skilled individuals. The premature loss of senior personnel can impose significant direct and indirect costs: it is often difficult and time-consuming to find qualified replacements. Some observers have attributed these problems in large part to the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS), which was thought to create "golden handcuffs" by significantly reducing the value of retirement benefits of those leaving prior to their first age of eligibility. These observers hypothesized that the new, redesigned system called the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS), introduced in 1987, would correct these problematic separation and retirement patterns.

In 1987 a new retirement system, called the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS), was introduced for federal civil service personnel. Some observers have hypothesized that FERS would alter the retirement and separation outcomes produced by FERS' predecessor, the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS). This report compares the retirement and separation incentives embedded in FERS versus those in CSRS to see whether the incentives embedded in FERS are consistent with these hypotheses. It also examines which system is more generous in terms of providing greater expected net lifetime earnings and retirement wealth. To compare the systems, the authors compute expected net wealth associated with different separation and retirement ages for a representative individual. The authors also conduct sensitivity analyses to see how their comparisons differ under alternative assumptions. Finally, the authors use data on Department of Defense civil service personnel from fiscal year 1983 through fiscal year 1996 to examine empirically how separation rates differ for early and mid-career personnel under FERS and under CSRS.

Estimates the effects of three worksforce-shaping policies among DoD workers covered by the Civil Service Retirement System.

Responding to policy analysis needs of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy (DASD(CPP)), RAND is currently conducting a series of studies on civilian personnel management issues. This study, which is part of that larger RAND effort, examines the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS) and the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) to determine what incentives each includes for turnover and retirement. In addition, it compares actual separation out comes under FERS with those under CSRS for early and mid-career DoD civil service personnel. The study should be of interest to policymakers and researchers concerned with the personnel outcomes produced by these two large federal compensation systems.

In 2003, the National Commission on the Public Service, chaired by Paul Volcker, issued a report detailing problems within the federal government today and recommending changes in its organization, leadership, and operations. This book suggests practical ways to implement the recommendations and defines a research agenda for the future. Thirteen essays address the primary problem areas identified by the Volcker Commission, and the commission report itself is included.

Drawing on a large body of research, this RAND Arroyo report, part of a series, provides an examination of the role of military compensation as a strategic human resource tool, how well it fulfills that role, and how it could be improved.