Stating categorically that the U.S. military attack against Libya on April 15, 1986, did not occur in a vacuum, this well-documented book gives an account of the context in which it did occur. Tracing the attack's origins, emphasis is placed on Qaddafi's domestic and foreign policies as well as his personality and motivations. The history of U.S.-Libyan relations from the Nixon administration to the collision course under the Reagan administration is covered together with the quiescent approach of the Western European allies. Davis presents a thorough discussion of the Rome and Vienna massacres and The March 1986 clash in the Gulf of Sidra. The closing chapters treat the final days leading to the attack: the LaBelle Discotheque bombing, the U.S. decision to attack, preparations, the military operation itself, and its aftermath and consequences. According to the author, the U.S. military attack on Libya marked the culmination of America's frustration over years of terrorist attacks without reprisal. Davis traces the origins of the attack from the beginning years of Qaddafi's rule up to the April 15th raid. The book's detailed account demonstrates that Libya was not an arbitrarily selected target but rather a logical one. Students and scholars of political science and military studies, or anyone interested in the events surrounding the attack on Libya will find this concisely written and well documented book a source of great interest.

By the time of Barack Obama's inauguration as the 44th president of the United States, he had already developed an ambitious foreign policy vision. By his own account, he sought to bend the arc of history toward greater justice, freedom, and peace; within a year he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, largely for that promise. In Bending History, Martin Indyk, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Michael O’Hanlon measure Obama not only against the record of his predecessors and the immediate challenges of the day, but also against his own soaring rhetoric and inspiring goals. Bending History assesses the considerable accomplishments as well as the failures and seeks to explain what has happened. Obama's best work has been on major and pressing foreign policy challenges—counterterrorism policy, including the daring raid that eliminated Osama bin Laden; the "reset" with Russia; managing the increasingly significant relationship with China; and handling the rogue states of Iran and North Korea. Policy on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, however, has reflected serious flaws in both strategy and execution. Afghanistan policy has been plagued by inconsistent messaging and teamwork. On important "softer" security issues—from energy and climate policy to problems in Africa and Mexico—the record is mixed. As for his early aspiration to reshape the international order, according greater roles and responsibilities to rising powers, Obama's efforts have been well-conceived but of limited effectiveness. On issues of secondary importance, Obama has been disciplined in avoiding fruitless disputes (as with Chavez in Venezuela and Castro in Cuba) and insisting that others take the lead (as with Qaddafi in Libya). Notwithstanding several missteps, he has generally managed well the complex challenges of the Arab awakenings, striving to strike the right balance between U.S. values and interests. The authors see Obama's foreign policy to date as a triumph of discipline and realism over ideology. He has been neither the transformative beacon his devotees have wanted, nor the weak apologist for America that his critics allege. They conclude that his grand strategy for promoting American interests in a tumultuous world may only now be emerging, and may yet be curtailed by conflict with Iran. Most of all, they argue that he or his successor will have to embrace U.S. economic renewal as the core foreign policy and national security challenge of the future.

Long before the overt war in Afghanistan and the covert war against al-Qaida, U.S. forces struck at one of the world’s hotbeds of terrorism. On 15 April 1986, in the dead of night, American strike aircraft roared into the heart of Muammar Qaddafi's Libya, attacking carefully selected targets and nearly killing the “brother leader” himself. Codenamed Operation El Dorado Canyon, the raid was in direct response to Qaddafi's support of a terrorist act against U.S. service personnel stationed in Europe and was a result of President Ronald Reagan's pledge to respond to terrorism with “swift and effective retribution.” Stanik, a retired naval officer and Middle East scholar, provides a detailed account of the raid as well as an in-depth analysis of its causes and effects. He also describes three other hostile encounters between U.S. and Libyan forces during Reagan's presidency and details U.S. covert operations. From a bombing in West Berlin, to terrorism in the skies over Lockerbie, Scotland, and from the halls of power in Washington to airbases in England and on the decks of American warships in the Mediterranean, Stanik weaves an international thriller that is relevant to current events.

Examines twenty years of French military interventions in Chad and Hissène Habré's rise to power between 1960 and 1982.