The problems arising from the existence of asymmetric information in public decision making have been widely explored by economists. Most of the traditional analysis of public sector activities has been reviewed to take accountofthe possible distortions arising from an asymmetric distribution of relevant information among the actors of the public decision-making process. A normative approach has been developed to design incentive schemes which tackle adverse selection and moral hazard problems within public organisations: our understanding of these problems is now much better, and some of the mechanisms designed have had important practical implications. While this analysis is still under way in many fields of public economics, as the papers by Jones and Zanola, and Trimarchi witness, a debate is ongoing on the possible theoretical limitations ofthis approach and on its actual relevance for public sector activities. This book encompasses different contributions to these issues, on both theoretical and practical areas, which were firstly presented at a conference in Catania. The innermost problem in the current discussion arises from the fact that this normative analysis is firmly rooted in the complete contracting framework, with the consequence that, despite the analytical complexities of most models, their results rely on very simplified assumptions. Most complexities of the organisation of public sector, and more generally, of writing "contracts", are therefore swept away.

The paper analyzes the effects of informational asymmetries on the market structure of the banking industry in a multi-period model of spatial competition. All lenders face uncertainty with regard to borrowers’ creditworthiness, but, in the process of lending, incumbent banks gather proprietary information about their clients, acquiring an advantage over potential entrants. These informational asymmetries are an important determinant of the industry structure and may represent a barrier to entry for new banks. The paper shows that, in contrast with traditional models of horizontal differentiation, the steady-state equilibrium is characterized by a finite number of banks even in the absence of fixed costs.

This volume explores the scientific frontiers and leading edges of research across the fields of anthropology, economics, political science, psychology, sociology, history, business, education, geography, law, and psychiatry, as well as the newer, more specialized areas of artificial intelligence, child development, cognitive science, communications, demography, linguistics, and management and decision science. It includes recommendations concerning new resources, facilities, and programs that may be needed over the next several years to ensure rapid progress and provide a high level of returns to basic research.

Argues that public finance--the study of the government's role in economics--should incorporate principles from behavior economics and other branches of psychology.

The second edition of this exhaustive work (ECIIE) comprehensively covers the broad spectrum of topics relating to the process of creativity and innovation, from a wide variety of perspectives (e.g., economics, management, psychology, anthropology, policy, technology, education, the arts) and modes (individual, organization, industry, nation, region). This edition includes some 400 topical entries, definitions of key terms and concepts and review essays, from a global array of more than 250 researchers, business executives, policymakers, and artists, illuminating the many facets of creativity and innovation and highlighting their relationships to such universal concepts as knowledge management, economic opportunity, and sustainability. Entries feature description of key concepts and definition of terms, full-color illustrations, case examples, future directions for research and application, synonyms and cross-references and bibliographic references.

Investigates to what extent business can get what it wants politically as firms and trade associations have a better understanding of the likely effects of policy than politicians and because their decisions partly determine these effects.