This report forms the Committee's response to Sir David Normington's consultation on reforming the regulation of public appointments, and looks at further issues relating to the recruitment and pay of public appointees. The Committee welcomes the broad thrust of Sir David Normington's proposed reforms, including the proposal to streamline the existing Code for Public Appointments and to adopt a lighter touch in regulating the public appointments process. It particularly supports his commitment to broadening genuine diversity in public appointments. The Public Appointments Commissioner, however, should be given a new remit to review Departmental appraisal systems, to ensure that underperformance by appointees is consistently addressed and that appointees who are not up to the mark are not reappointed. The Committee also supports the establishment of a government Centre of Excellence for public appointments, which would have the expertise to widen the pool of candidates applying for vacancies. Given their cost to the taxpayer, the Government should reduce the use of recruitment consultants for appointments to public bodies. Substantial savings could be made through utilising and developing the capabilities of existing human resources units in Government Departments and through the establishment of a Centre of Excellence. There is concern that the post of manager of top talent in Whitehall (Director General for Civil Service Capability) has effectively been abolished and its functions dispersed. This post should be re-established.

This Report welcomes and responds to the Government's proposal to involve select committees in public appointments by inviting committees to hold non-binding pre-appointment hearings with nominees for key positions. The Report clarifies the purpose of these hearings: to expose nominees to parliamentary and public scrutiny before the final ministerial decision on the appointment, to increase the likelihood that those appointed will be effective in their accountability to Parliament and the public. The Report also establishes criteria to determine which posts should be subject to these hearings, and identifies major auditors, ombudsmen, regulators and inspectors, as well as those responsible for the appointments system itself; along with appointments normally made on merit but where Ministers have chosen not to follow the usual processes. Finally, the Report responds to concerns about involving select committees in public appointments, including several raised by the Commissioner for Public Appointments, and proposes ways of managing the risks identified, largely through a framework of clear protocols to be agreed between the Government and the Liaison Committee, and also by monitoring and reviewing the effect of the hearings on public appointments over time.

This report considers the experience of some three years of holding 'pre-appointment' hearings by select committees to examine the 'preferred candidate' for certain public appointments before that appointment is confirmed. Whilst the committee considers the experiment a success they do recommend a number of changes. They propose a three tier list: Posts in the first tier are those considered to be of sufficient constitutional significance as to require a process which is effectively a joint appointment by Government and the House of Commons. Posts in the second tier are those which the committee proposes should be subject to an enhanced an improved version of the current process, and which should be subject to an 'effective veto' by the House of Commons or its committees. For posts in the third tier, pre-appointment hearings should be at the discretion of committees.

The Plum Book is published by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and House Committee on Oversight and Reform alternately after each Presidential election. The Plum Book is used to identify Presidential appointed and other positions within the Federal Government. The publication lists over 9,000 Federal civil service leadership and support positions in the legislative and executive branches of the Federal Government that may be subject to noncompetitive appointment. The duties of many such positions may involve advocacy of Administration policies and programs and the incumbents usually have a close and confidential working relationship with the agency head or other key officials. The Plum Book was first published in 1952 during the Eisenhower administration. When President Eisenhower took office, the Republican Party requested a list of government positions that President Eisenhower could fill. The next edition of the Plum Book appeared in 1960 and has since been published every four years, just after the Presidential election.

The controversy around the Government's handling of flooding last winter showed that arm's-length Government is confused and opaque. Organisational forms and names are inconsistent. Most public bodies answer to Ministers but some are directly accountable to Parliament. There is no agreement on how many types of body exist. There are overlaps and blurring between categories. Accountability arrangements and reforms so far have been ad hoc. The Government has reviewed non-departmental public bodies, but it should review all forms of arm's-length Government, including executive agencies and non-ministerial departments. The Government should establish a clear taxonomy of public bodies: constitutional bodies, independent public interest bodies, departmental sponsored bodies, and executive agencies. All public bodies should sit in one of the categories, so that it is clear how each is to be governed and sponsored. This is essential in order to clarify who is accountable for what. This would promote understanding of what is expected of relationships and explain the rationale for locating functions in particular organisational forms. Up to date, plain English statements of statuses, roles and relationships are needed even if the underlying arrangements are complicated. This is far from the reality in many cases, particularly in the NHS. With a budget of £95.6 billion NHS England is now by far the largest public body in England and its accountability should not be in any doubt, but it is still evolving. There is insufficient understanding across Government about how arms-length Government should work.

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, many questioned whether the large number of political appointees in the Federal Emergency Management Agency contributed to the agency's poor handling of the catastrophe, ultimately costing hundreds of lives and causing immeasurable pain and suffering. The Politics of Presidential Appointments examines in depth how and why presidents use political appointees and how their choices impact government performance--for better or worse. One way presidents can influence the permanent bureaucracy is by filling key posts with people who are sympathetic to their policy goals. But if the president's appointees lack competence and an agency fails in its mission--as with Katrina--the president is accused of employing his friends and allies to the detriment of the public. Through case studies and cutting-edge analysis, David Lewis takes a fascinating look at presidential appointments dating back to the 1960s to learn which jobs went to appointees, which agencies were more likely to have appointees, how the use of appointees varied by administration, and how it affected agency performance. He argues that presidents politicize even when it hurts performance--and often with support from Congress--because they need agencies to be responsive to presidential direction. He shows how agency missions and personnel--and whether they line up with the president's vision--determine which agencies presidents target with appointees, and he sheds new light on the important role patronage plays in appointment decisions.