This interdisciplinary work addresses the question, What role should psychological conceptualization play for thinkers who believe that the brain is the organ of the mind? It offers readers something unique both by systematically comparing the writings of eliminativist philosophers of mind with the writings of the most committed proponents of biological psychiatry, and by critically scrutinizing their shared “anti-anthropomorphism” from the standpoint of a diagnostician and therapist. Contradicitng the contemporary assumption that common sense psychology has already been proven futile, and we are just waiting for an adequate scientifically-based replacement, this book provides explicit philosophical and psychological arguments showing why, if they did not already have both cognitive and psychodynamic psychologies, philosophers and scientists would have to invent them to better understand brains. (Series A)

Biological psychiatry has dominated psychiatric thinking for the past 40 years, but the knowledge base of the discipline has increased substantially more recently, particularly with advances in genetics and neuroimaging. The third edition of Biological Psychiatry has been thoroughly updated taking into account these developments. As in the earlier editions of the book, there are comprehensive reviews and explanations of the latest advances in neurochemistry, neuroanatomy, genetics and brain imaging— descriptions not only of methodologies but also of the application of these in clinical settings. It is within this context that there is a considerable emphasis in the book on brain–behaviour relationships both within and without the clinical setting. This edition has been enhanced by the inclusion of new chapters, one on anxiety and another on motivation and the addictions. The chapter that relates to treatments has been extended to include the latest information on brain stimulation techniques. The overall book is well illustrated in order to help with an understanding of the text. For the third edition, Professor Michael Trimble has been joined by Professor Mark George as co-author. These are two of the world's leading biological psychiatrists who both have considerable clinical as well as research experience which they have brought to the book. Unlike multiauthored texts, it has a continuity running through it which aids understanding and prevents repetition. This book is strongly recommended for all practising psychiatrists and trainees wishing for an up-to-date, authoritative, easy to digest and acessible review of the latest advances and conceptualizations in the field. It will also appeal to neurologists interested in neuropsychiatry and biological psychiatry or the psychiatric aspects of neurological disorders, as well as other practising clinicians (psychologists, social workers, nurses) in the mental health field.

An exploration of what it means to think about psychiatric disorders as “real,” “true,” and “objective” and the implications for classification and diagnosis. In psychiatry, few question the legitimacy of asking whether a given psychiatric disorder is real; similarly, in psychology, scholars debate the reality of such theoretical entities as general intelligence, superegos, and personality traits. And yet in both disciplines, little thought is given to what is meant by the rather abstract philosophical concept of “real.” Indeed, certain psychiatric disorders have passed from real to imaginary (as in the case of multiple personality disorder) and from imaginary to real (as in the case of post-traumatic stress disorder). In this book, Peter Zachar considers such terms as “real” and “reality”—invoked in psychiatry but often obscure and remote from their instances—as abstract philosophical concepts. He then examines the implications of his approach for psychiatric classification and psychopathology. Proposing what he calls a scientifically inspired pragmatism, Zachar considers such topics as the essentialist bias, diagnostic literalism, and the concepts of natural kind and social construct. Turning explicitly to psychiatric topics, he proposes a new model for the domain of psychiatric disorders, the imperfect community model, which avoids both relativism and essentialism. He uses this model to understand such recent controversies as the attempt to eliminate narcissistic personality disorder from the DSM-5. Returning to such concepts as real, true, and objective, Zachar argues that not only should we use these metaphysical concepts to think philosophically about other concepts, we should think philosophically about them.

There has been an ongoing debate about the capabilities and limits of the bio-natural sciences as sources and the methodological measure in the philosophy of psychiatry for quite some time now. Still, many problems remain unsolved, at least partly for the following reasons: The opposing parties do not tend to speak with each other, exchange their arguments and try to increase mutual understanding. Rather, one gets the impression that they often remain in their "trenches", busy with confirming each others' opinions and developing their positions in isolation. This leads to several shortcomings: (1) Good arguments and insights from both sides of the debate get less attention they deserve. (2) The further improvement of each position becomes harder without criticism, genuinely motivated by the opposing standpoint. (3) The debate is not going to stop, at least not in the way it would finish after a suggested solution finds broad support; (4) Related to this, insisting on the ultimate aptnessof one side is just plainly wrong in almost every case. Since undeniably, most philosophical positions usually have a grain of truth hidden in them. In sum, many controversies persist with regard to the appropriate methodological, epistemological, and even ontological level for psychiatric explanation and therapies. In a conference which took place in December last year, we tried to contribute to a better understanding about what really is at issue in the philosophy of psychiatry. We asked for a common basis for several sides, for points of divergence and for the practical impact of different solutions on everyday work in psychiatry. Since psychiatry as a whole is a subject that is to wide to be covered in a single meeting, we focused on the following four core topics: 1. Competing accounts of psychiatric biologism, reductionism, and physicalism. 2. Mental disease and brain disease in the light of current neuroscientific and epigenetic findings. 3. Normative suppositions for different accounts of mental disease. 4. Normative implications of different accounts of mental disease. These topics, which have been vigorously as well as fruitfully discussed at our conference, will (ideally) be, too, in the center of our contribution to Frontiers. More precisely, we think of arranging a "research topic" which assembles the issues of the conference. At this point, it seems promising to us to group three or four Target Articles (TA) and let them get criticized by a couple of commentaries from different angles to give the issue a much broader and detailed perspective.

Biological Psychiatry: A Review of Recent Advances describes the developments in biological psychiatry. This book discusses the theories in the complex field of human disease, particularly psychiatric disease. Organized into six chapters, this book begins with an overview of the etiology and genetic basis of schizophrenia. This text then examines the various physiological and biochemical variables in schizophrenics. Other chapters consider the two types of depression, namely, reactive and endogenous. This book discusses as well the criteria of what symptom complexes constitute a particular psychiatric disease. The role of the brain in the control of learning, memory, behavior, and emotion is also reviewed. The final chapter deals with the psychoanalytic theory, which consists of a complex of theories of three various types. This book is a valuable resource for psychiatrists and physicians. Research workers in the various disciplines of neurobiology that encroach upon psychiatry will also find this book useful.

Philosophy and psychiatry share many topics and problems. For example, the "solutions" of the psychiatry of the philosophical body-soul problem have direct effects on the self-image of the discipline. Despite these obvious overlappings, and unlike the English-speaking countries, interdisciplinary research on "philosophical psychopathology" has been scarce in Germany. The current anthology closes these gaps, because the authors - renowned experts as well as young scientists, whose new approaches open promising perspectives - come from both disciplines. The individual contributions deal with philosophical debates as they arise within the context of psychiatric theory and practice.

A Textbook of Biological Psychiatry integrates the basic science concerning brain mechanisms of psychiatric disorders alongside surveys of present standard clinical treatment. Organized in a coherent and easy to follow structure, chapters expand across different levels of analysis, from basic mechanisms to clinical practice. This comprehensive reference provides an integrative treatment of the biochemistry of neurotransmission, behavioral pharmacology, and clinical aspects of psychiatric problems including depression, manic-depression, and mood disorders. Other chapters address the biological mechanisms and treatment of depression, anxiety, panic, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and addictions. The editor concludes with a perspective on the future of the field and prospects for understanding and effectively treating mood and anxiety disorders.