This Festschrift was published in honor of Joshua Guttman on the occasion of his 66.66 birthday. The impact of his work is reflected in the 23 contributions enclosed in this volume. Joshua’s most influential and enduring contribution to the field has been the development of the strand space formalism for analyzing cryptographic protocols. It is one of several “symbolic approaches” to security protocol analysis in which the underlying details of cryptographic primitives are abstracted away, allowing a focus on potential flaws in the communication patterns between participants. His attention to the underlying logic of strand spaces has also allowed him to merge domain-specific reasoning about protocols with general purpose, first-order logical theories. The identification of clear principles in a domain paves the way to automated reasoning, and Joshua has been a leader in the development and distribution of several tools for security analysis.

Protocols for authentication and key establishment are the foundation for security of communications. The range and diversity of these protocols is immense, while the properties and vulnerabilities of different protocols can vary greatly. This is the first comprehensive and integrated treatment of these protocols. It allows researchers and practitioners to quickly access a protocol for their needs and become aware of existing protocols which have been broken in the literature. As well as a clear and uniform presentation of the protocols this book includes a description of all the main attack types and classifies most protocols in terms of their properties and resource requirements. It also includes tutorial material suitable for graduate students.

This Festschrift was published in honor of Andre Scedrov on the occasion of his 65th birthday. The 11 technical papers and 3 short papers included in this volume show the many transformative discoveries made by Andre Scedrov in the areas of linear logic and structural proof theory; formal reasoning for networked systems; and foundations of information security emphasizing cryptographic protocols. These papers are authored by researchers around the world, including North America, Russia, Europe, and Japan, that have been directly or indirectly impacted by Andre Scedrov. The chapter “A Small Remark on Hilbert's Finitist View of Divisibility and Kanovich-Okada-Scedrov's Logical Analysis of Real-Time Systems” is available open access under a CC BY 4.0 license at link.springer.com.

This volume contains the proceedings of the14thInternationalConferenceon RewritingTechniquesandApplications (RTA2003). It was held June 9-11, 2003 in Valencia, Spain, as part of RDP, theFederatedConferenceonRewriting,- ductionandProgramming, together with the International Conference on Typed Lambda Calculi and Applications (TLCA2003), the International Workshop on First-order Theorem Proving (FTP2003), the annual meeting of the IFIP Working Group 1.6 on Term Rewriting, the International Workshop on Rule- Based Programming (RULE2003), the International Workshop on Uni?cation (UNIF2003), the International Workshop on Functional and (Constraint) Logic Programming (WFLP2003), the International Workshop on Reduction Stra- gies in Rewriting and Programming (WRS2003), and the International Wo- shop on Termination (WST2003). RTA is the major forum for the presentation of research on all aspects of rewr- ing. Previous RTA conferences were held in Dijon (1985), Bordeaux (1987), Chapel Hill (1989), Como (1991), Montreal (1993), Kaiserslautern (1995), New Brunswick, NJ (1996), Sitges, Barcelona (1997), Tsukuba (1998), Trento (1999), Norwich (2000), Utrecht (2001), and Copenhagen (2002). This year, there were 61 submissions of which 57 regular research papers and 4 system descriptions, with authors from institutions in France (19.6 authors of submitted papers, of which 11.3 were accepted), USA (6.5 of 9), UK (3.5 of 4.5), Japan(3of6),Germany(2.5 of 4),TheNetherlands(2.2 of 5.2),Spain(1.5 of 4), Austria (1 of 1), Israel (0.5 of 2.5), Portugal (0 of 1), Algeria (0 of 1), Denmark (0 of 1), Canada (0 of 1), Brazil (0 of 0.6), and Poland (0 of 0.5).

Greetings. These are the proceedings of the 11th in our series of International Workshops on Security Protocols. Our theme this time was “Where have all the Protocols gone?” Once upon a time security protocols lived mainly in the network and transport layers. Now they increasingly hide in applications, or in specialised hardware. Does this trend lead to better security architectures, or is it an indication that we are addressing the wrong problems? The intention of the workshops is to provide a forum where incompletely workedoutideascanstimulatediscussion,openupnewlinesofinvestigation,and suggestmoreproblems. The positionpaperspublished herehavebeen revisedby the authors in the light of their participation in the workshop. In addition, we publish edited transcripts of some of the discussions, to give our readers access to some of the roads ahead not (yet) taken. We hope that these revised position papers and edited transcripts will give you at least one interesting idea of your own to explore. Please do write and tell us what it was. Our purpose in publishing these proceedings is to produce a conceptual map which will be of enduring interest, rather than to be merely topical. This is perhaps just as well, given the delay in production. This year we moved to new computer-based recording technology, and of course it failed completely.

"Cryptographic Protocol: Security Analysis Based on Trusted Freshness" mainly discusses how to analyze and design cryptographic protocols based on the idea of system engineering and that of the trusted freshness component. A novel freshness principle based on the trusted freshness component is presented; this principle is the basis for an efficient and easy method for analyzing the security of cryptographic protocols. The reasoning results of the new approach, when compared with the security conditions, can either establish the correctness of a cryptographic protocol when the protocol is in fact correct, or identify the absence of the security properties, which leads the structure to construct attacks directly. Furthermore, based on the freshness principle, a belief multiset formalism is presented. This formalism’s efficiency, rigorousness, and the possibility of its automation are also presented. The book is intended for researchers, engineers, and graduate students in the fields of communication, computer science and cryptography, and will be especially useful for engineers who need to analyze cryptographic protocols in the real world. Dr. Ling Dong is a senior engineer in the network construction and information security field. Dr. Kefei Chen is a Professor at the Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University.

This Festschrift volume is published in honor of Catherine A. Meadows and contains essays presented at the Catherine Meadows Festschrift Symposium held in Fredericksburg, VA, USA, in May 2019. Catherine A. Meadows has been a pioneer in developing symbolic formal verification methods and tools. Her NRL Protocol Analyzer, a tool and methodology that embodies symbolic model checking techniques, has been fruitfully applied to the analysis of many protocols and protocol standards and has had an enormous influence in the field. She also developed a new temporal logic to specify protocol properties, as well as new methods for analyzing various kinds of properties beyond secrecy such as authentication and resilience under Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and has made important contributions in other areas such as wireless protocol security, intrusion detection, and the relationship between computational and symbolic approaches to cryptography. This volume contains 14 contributions authored by researchers from Europe and North America. They reflect on the long-term evolution and future prospects of research in cryptographic protocol specification and verification.