In the first two months of 1958 President Eisenhower ordered the creation of a new department at the Pentagon, the Advanced Research Projects Agency, or ARPA. One of the first tasks appointed to ARPA was to choose which branch of the military would handle the countrys space program. Almost arbitrarily ARPA chose the Air Force. This decision stood for just a few months before the President announced the formation of NASA, but it became clear to the heads of the U.S. Army that they were running second in a two horse race. The Pentagon would only be allowed into space if they could persuade the President that there was a military need to be there. Almost immediately the Air Force and the Army produced their rival visions for operating off-world. The Army team led by Generals Medaris and Trudeau turned to Wernher von Braun whose team presented a long-term plan based around their new one-million pound rocket the Juno V; but the Air Force went all-out and showed its plans for strategic domination by building a moon base. In March 1959 the Army responded with its own vision for a moon base which they called Project Horizon. The plan was conceived and presented to the President in June 1959 and was immediately recognised as a useful beginning for a civilian moon base, and so the report was reduced from 800 pages to 400 pages and given to NASA. Now, exactly sixty years later, three of the four volumes of the original military report are available here. Volume III still remains classified as SECRET. Reproduced from the actual copy of Horizon which was used to create the edited Civilian version. This version includes the original colour graphics.Bonus: In 1966 the Army was still working on its plans for space combat and some of those plans are included here as a bonus to Project Horizon.

"[Seize the high ground is a] narrative history of the Army's aerospace experience from the 1950s to the present. The focus is on ballistic missile defense, from the early NIKE-HERCULES missile program through the SAFEGUARD acquisition site allowed by the 1972 ABM Treaty to the more advanced 'Star Wars' concepts studies toward the end of the century. [What is] covered is not only the technological response to the threat but the organizational and tactical development of the commands and units responsible for the defense mission"--CMH website.

The bestselling author of The Limits of Power critically examines the Washington consensus on national security and why it must change For the last half century, as administrations have come and gone, the fundamental assumptions about America's military policy have remained unchanged: American security requires the United States (and us alone) to maintain a permanent armed presence around the globe, to prepare our forces for military operations in far-flung regions, and to be ready to intervene anywhere at any time. In the Obama era, just as in the Bush years, these beliefs remain unquestioned gospel. In Washington Rules, a vivid, incisive analysis, Andrew J. Bacevich succinctly presents the origins of this consensus, forged at a moment when American power was at its height. He exposes the preconceptions, biases, and habits that underlie our pervasive faith in military might, especially the notion that overwhelming superiority will oblige others to accommodate America's needs and desires—whether for cheap oil, cheap credit, or cheap consumer goods. And he challenges the usefulness of our militarism as it has become both unaffordable and increasingly dangerous. Though our politicians deny it, American global might is faltering. This is the moment, Bacevich argues, to reconsider the principles which shape American policy in the world—to acknowledge that fixing Afghanistan should not take precedence over fixing Detroit. Replacing this Washington consensus is crucial to America's future, and may yet offer the key to the country's salvation.