Examining the record of contractors essential to the conduct of recent conflicts around the world, this book looks at the evolution of US reliance on contract support as well as the various types of contractors such as consultants, service providers, and security firms.

This book explores the use of deadly force by private security companies during the Iraq War. The work focuses on and compares the activities of the US companies Blackwater and Dyncorp. Despite sharing several important characteristics, such as working for the same client (the US State Department) during the same time period, the employees of Blackwater fired their weapons far more often, and killed and seriously injured far more people in Iraq than their counterparts in DynCorp. In order to explain this disparity, the book undertakes the most comprehensive analysis ever attempted on the use of violence by the employees of these firms. Based on extensive empirical research, it offers a credible explanation for this difference: Blackwater maintained a relatively bellicose military culture that placed strong emphasis on norms encouraging its personnel to exercise personal initiative, proactive use of force, and an exclusive approach to security, which, together, motivated its personnel to use violence quite freely against anyone they suspected of posing a threat. Specifically, Blackwater’s military culture motivated its personnel to fire upon suspected threats more quickly, at greater distances, and with a greater quantity of bullets, and to more readily abandon the people they shot at when compared to DynCorp’s personnel, who maintained a military culture that encouraged far less violent behaviour. Utilizing the Private Security Company Violent Incident Dataset (PSCVID), created by the author in 2012, the book draws upon data on hundreds of violent incidents involving private security personnel in Iraq to identify trends in the behaviour exhibited by the employees of different firms. Based on this rich and original empirical data, the book provides the definitive study of contemporary private security personnel in the Iraq War. This book will be of much interest to students of the Iraq War, Private Security Companies, Military Studies, War and Conflict Studies and IR in general.

This book addresses the ambiguities of the growing use of private security contractors and provides guidance as to how our expectations about regulating this expanding ‘service’ industry will have to be adjusted. In the warzones of Iraq and Afghanistan many of those who carry weapons are not legally combatants, nor are they protected civilians. They are contracted by governments, businesses, and NGOs to provide armed security. Often mistaken as members of armed forces, they are instead part of a new protean proxy force that works alongside the military in a multitude of shifting roles, and overseen by a matrix of contracts and regulations. This book analyzes the growing industry of these private military and security companies (PMSCs) used in warzones and other high risk areas. PMSCs are the result of a unique combination of circumstances, including a change in the idea of soldiering, insurance industry analyses that require security contractors, and a need for governments to distance themselves from potentially criminal conduct. The book argues that PMSCs are a unique type of organization, combining attributes from worlds of the military, business, and humanitarian organizations. This makes them particularly resistant to oversight. The legal status of these companies and those they employ is also hard to ascertain, which weakens the multiple regulatory tools available. PMSCs also fall between the cracks in ethical debates about their use, seeming to be both justifiable and objectionable. This transformation in military operations is a seemingly irreversible product of more general changes in the relationship between the individual citizen and the state. This book will be of much interest to students of private security companies, war and conflict studies, security studies and IR in general. Kateri Carmola is the Christian A. Johnson Professor of Political Science at Middlebury College in Vermont. She received her Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley.

This new work features the fresh thinking of twenty-eight leading authors from a variety of military and national security disciplines. Following an introduction by Lt. Gen. James Dubik, Commander I Corps, U.S. Army, and an opening essay titled "State of the Question" by Dr. Colin Gray, the anthology first considers the general question of "An American Way of War?" Sections on operational art, with writers addressing the issues in both conventional and small wars; stability and reconstruction; and intelligence complete the volume. Among the well-known contributors are Fred Kagan, Ralph Peters, Harlan Ullman, and Milan Vego. This collection of essays is the outcome of a seminar series sponsored by the Office of Force Transformation and the U.S. Navy to examine the future of warfare and the underlying principles of war and to educate future military strategists and leaders on these principles. Footnotes, index, and a bibliographic essay make the work a useful tool for students of war and general readers alike.

The Small Wars of the United States, 1899–2009 is the complete bibliography of works on US military intervention and irregular warfare around the world, as well as efforts to quell insurgencies on behalf of American allies. The text covers conflicts from 1898 to present, with detailed annotations of selected sources. In this second edition, Benjamin R. Beede revises his seminal work, bringing it completely up to date, including entries on the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. An invaluable research tool, The Small Wars of the United States, 1899–2009 is a critical resource for students and scholars studying US military history.

An insightful and expert assessment examines how best to end—and avert—wars. How do we avoid war? To arrive at an answer, master analyst Richard Weitz explores the ways nations, international organizations, and individuals have sought to bring order to an inherently disorderly phenomenon—potential and actual violent conflict among organized political entities. Specifically, War and Governance: International Security in a Changing World Order analyzes a number of critical issues such as whether regional security institutions have distinct advantages and liabilities in promoting international security, as compared with universal organizations like the United Nations. Other important questions are addressed, as well. How will international organizations, such as the UN, EU, and NATO, change the nature of war in the 21st century—and be changed by it? What role might less formal institutions and nongovernmental organizations play in peacemaking? Will the nation-state remain the most important international security actor? The book ends with a gap analysis that identifies incongruities between international needs and capabilities—and suggests ways to overcome them.

This book investigates the connection between tightening mobilization constraints and the use of PMSCs in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Drawing on neoclassical realism and institutionalist theory, it conceptualizes democracies’ use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) as an attempt to circumvent the tightening constraints on the mobilization of military power. The use of private military contractors is less subjected to parliamentary restrictions and less visible to public opinion than the deployment of soldiers. Rather than cheaper in financial terms, PMSCs are therefore politically cost-effective, as they enable decision-makers to minimize the institutional obstacles on conducting military operations and the electoral costs attached thereto. The need to reduce the ex ante hurdles and the ex post costs of military deployments fills the blind spots of alternative explanations for the use of PMSCs based on effectiveness, ideology, and organizational interests.