Common law rules predominate in some areas of law, such as torts and contracts, and are extremely important in other areas, such as corporations. Nevertheless, it has been unclear what principles courts use—or should use—in establishing common law rules. In this lucid book, Melvin Eisenberg develops the principles that govern this process.

A less-expensive grayscale paperback version is available. Search for ISBN 9781680923018. Business Law I Essentials is a brief introductory textbook designed to meet the scope and sequence requirements of courses on Business Law or the Legal Environment of Business. The concepts are presented in a streamlined manner, and cover the key concepts necessary to establish a strong foundation in the subject. The textbook follows a traditional approach to the study of business law. Each chapter contains learning objectives, explanatory narrative and concepts, references for further reading, and end-of-chapter questions. Business Law I Essentials may need to be supplemented with additional content, cases, or related materials, and is offered as a foundational resource that focuses on the baseline concepts, issues, and approaches.

This book examines the role played by domestic and international judges in the “flexibilization” of legal systems through general principles. It features revised papers that were presented at the Annual Conference of the European-American Consortium for Legal Education, held at the University of Parma, Italy, May 2014. This volume is organized in four sections, where the topic is mainly explored from a comparative perspective, and includes case studies. The first section covers theoretical issues. It offers an analysis of principles in shaping Dworkin’s theories about international law, a reflection on the role of procedural principles in defining the role of the judiciary, a view on the role of general principles in transnational judicial communication, a study on the recognition of international law from formal criteria to substantive principles, and an inquiry from the viewpoint of neo-constitutionalism. The second section contains studies on the role of general principles in selected legal systems, including International Law, European Union Law as well as Common Law systems. The third section features an analysis of select legal principles in a comparative perspective, with a particular focus on the comparison between European and American experiences. The fourth and last section explores selected principles in given areas of law, including the misuse of the lex specialis principle in the relationship between international human rights law and international humanitarian law, the role of the judiciary in Poland as regards discrimination for sexual orientation, and the impact of the ECtHR case law on Italian criminal law with regard to the principle of legality. Overall, the book offers readers a thoughtful reflection on how the interpretation, application, and development of general principles of law by the judiciary contribute to the evolution of legal systems at both the domestic and international levels as well as further their reciprocal interactions.

This book deals with the genesis, formation and development of two fundamental aspects of English Law, common law and equity. The common law laid down the rules governing cohabitation in communities and human rights. Equity was the offspring of natural law designed to prevent and remedy injustice resulting from unconscionable conduct. English law including both common law and equity was introduced in former British Colonies and dominions. In most of them it was retained after independence. This is the principal legacy of English colonization of countries. The introduction, application and retention of English law is reflected in Cyprus, a former British colony.

In this book, legal scholars, philosophers, historians, and political scientists from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States analyze the common law through three of its classic themes: rules, reasoning, and constitutionalism. Their essays, specially commissioned for this volume, provide an opportunity for thinkers from different jurisdictions and disciplines to talk to each other and to their wider audience within and beyond the common law world. This book allows scholars and students to consider how these themes and concepts relate to one another. It will initiate and sustain a more inclusive and well-informed theoretical discussion of the common law's method, process, and structure. It will be valuable to lawyers, philosophers, political scientists, and historians interested in constitutional law, comparative law, judicial process, legal theory, law and society, legal history, separation of powers, democratic theory, political philosophy, the courts, and the relationship of the common law tradition to other legal systems of the world.

The common law, which is made by courts, consists of rules that govern relations between individuals, such as torts (the law of private wrongs) and contracts. Legal Reasoning explains and analyzes the modes of reasoning utilized by the courts in making and applying common law rules. These modes include reasoning from binding precedents (prior cases that are binding on the deciding court); reasoning from authoritative although not binding sources, such as leading treatises; reasoning from analogy; reasoning from propositions of morality, policy, and experience; making exceptions; drawing distinctions; and overruling. The book further examines and explains the roles of logic, deduction, and good judgment in legal reasoning. With accessible prose and full descriptions of illustrative cases, this book is a valuable resource for anyone who wishes to get a hands-on grasp of legal reasoning.

Kent Greenwalt's second volume on aspects of legal interpretation analyzes statutory and common law interpretation, suggesting that multiple factors are important for each, and that the relation between them influences both. The book argues against any simple "textualism," claiming that even reader understanding of statutes depends partly on perceived intent. In respect to common law interpretation, use of reasoning by analogy is defended and any simple dichotomy of "holding" and "dictum" is resisted.