Has the presidentialization of British electoral politics now penetrated other institutional and governmental relationships? This book argues it has in respect of the prime ministerial advisory system. The prime minister has become a president in the eyes of the electorate but remains a prime minister according to the constitution. To bridge this gap between their political and constitutional positions prime ministers have been forced to stretch the constitutional rules about advice, and presidentialize their advisory systems.

This book examines the advisory systems of four prime ministers: Harold Wilson 1964-70 and 1974-76; Edward Heath 1970-74; James Callaghan 1976-90, and argues that the presidentialization of electoral politics has prompted a presidentialization of the premiership in respect of advice.

The Presidentialization of Politics shows that the politics of democratic societies is moving towards a presidentialized working mode, even in the absence of formal institutional changes. These developments can be explained by a combination of long-term structural changes in modern politics and societies' contingent factors which fluctuate over time. While these contingent, short-term factors relate to the personalities of office holders, the overall political agenda, and the majority situation in parliament, there are several structural factors which are relatively uniform across modern nations. First, the internationalization of modern politics (which is particularly pronounced within the European Union) has led to an 'executive bias' of the political process which has strengthened the role of political top elites vis-à-vis their parliamentary groups and/or their parties. Their predominance has been amplified further by the vastly expanded steering capacities of state machineries which have severely reduced the scope of effective parliamentary control. At the same time, the declining stability of political alignments has increased the proportion of citizens whose voting decisions are not constrained by long-standing party loyalties. In conjunction with the mediatization of politics, this has increased the capacity of political leaders to by-pass their party machines and to appeal directly to voters. As a result, three interrelated processes have led to a political process increasingly moulded by the inherent logic of presidentialism: increasing leadership power and autonomy within the political executive; increasing leadership power and autonomy within political parties; and increasingly leadership-centred electoral processes. The book presents evidence for this process of presidentialization for 14 modern democracies (including the US and Canada). While there are substantial cross-national differences, the overall thesis holds: modern democracies are increasingly following a presidential logic of governance through which leadership is becoming more central and more powerful, but also increasingly dependent on successful immediate appeal to the mass public. Implications for democratic theory are considered.

Political executives have been at the centre of public and scholarly attention long before the inception of modern political science. In the contemporary world, political executives have come to dominate the political stage in many democratic and autocratic regimes. The Oxford Handbook of Political Executives marks the definitive reference work in this field. Edited and written by a team of word-class scholars, it combines substantive stocktaking with setting new agendas for the next generation of political executive research.

Personalisation is the most relevant political phenomenon of our time. After the decline of structural and ideological foundations of Western democracies, a radical shift from collective to individual actors and institutions has occurred in several political systems. On the one hand, political leaders have gained centrality on the democratic scene as a consequence of both a more direct, sometimes plebiscitary, relationship with citizens, and a more direct control of the executive administration. On the other hand, a process of fragmentation occurs at the mass level, where electoral volatility has strongly increased and the spread of social media enables each citizen to express their convictions in the self-referential autonomy of the digital networks. Monocratic Government: The Impact of Personalisation on Democratic Regimes analyses the consequences of personalisation of political leaders on democratic government by asking whether it is possible to keep together demos and kratos in a post-particratic context. It explores topics such as governmental decrees, Trump-governance, and includes an analysis of the coronavirus outbreak. Offering comparative insights and exploring how political leaders govern in the United States, France, Germany, Italy, and Hungary, this volume brings into focus the study of political personalisation in relation to some of the key trends – and crises – in modern politics.

This book provides a framework for analyzing the impact of the separation of powers on party politics. Conventional political science wisdom assumes that democracy is impossible without political parties, because parties fulfil all the key functions of democratic governance. They nominate candidates, coordinate campaigns, aggregate interests, formulate and implement policy, and manage government power. When scholars first asserted the essential connection between parties and democracy, most of the world's democracies were parliamentary. Yet by the dawn of the twenty-first century, most democracies had directly elected presidents. David J. Samuels and Matthew S. Shugart provide a theoretical framework for analyzing variation in the relationships among presidents, parties, and prime ministers across the world's democracies, revealing the important ways that the separation of powers alters party organization and behavior - thereby changing the nature of democratic representation and accountability.

This book offers a systematic inquiry into how, why, and with what consequences media affects governments and the standing of prime ministers. It aims at an understanding of how media has caused institutional effects in government, as well as at advancing a unified theory of government communication. The author develops a logic of centralization and applies it to one case, Sweden. Government communication has been institutionalized, tightened and centralized with the prime minister and has changed irreversibly. Analysis of how the government communication system has evolved, mainly in its institutional structures, suggests that the shift to centralization arose more out of necessity than choice. For prime ministers most of this is about finding ways to ensure that the entire government respond to media uniformly. As governments face a set of functional demands from media, different kinds of media, uniformity has been a paramount objective. Nevertheless, this development involves shifting dynamics of intra-executive relations and a shift of power away from ministries to the prime minister’s office; the apex of political power. The prime minister has been empowered at the expense of ministers through the concentration of power and resources to the executive centre. That is partly because of media, which reinforces political hierarchies. That and the centralized control of government news in turn raises further questions about democratic governance and the nature of modern-day governing.