How do international systems deal with the threat and use of weapons of war? In this sophisticated yet accessible analysis, a leading strategic analyst takes readers deep into twentieth century history to answer this question. Weapons of mass destruction, and the counter threat of retaliation, have been central concerns in strategic decision- making in World War I, the legacy of World War II, and the Cold War era.Few people can traverse issues of global confl ict with more historical insight than George Quester. His writing is lucid, and his information either new or imperfectly understood in the past. Quester details the ways weapons of war have infl uenced the forging of policies in the twenty-fi rst century. He argues for the retention of appropriate weapons systems, but also for care in when they are used. Priorities exist, but they depend on whether a state is dealing with major powers or rogue states. And off ensive weapons may well become an option in response to non-state terrorist groups or for that matter state-sponsored terrorist acts.When aggression has already occurred, the world is less likely to regard military response as a violation of the peace. Quester cites Clausewitz's adage that the aggressor is always willing to exploit the world's preference for peace. The rise of the human rights movement adds more complexities to preemptive war and prevention, since the line between civilian and military casualties becomes increasingly blurred. The risks may be great, the choices are few--but the needs of military policy making remain high on the agenda. As a result, the concerns discussed here will be on the global political agenda for years to come.

This book seeks to analyse the Bush Doctrine’s controversial preemption/prevention policy and its willingness to place the nuclear option to the fore of US security strategy. Additionally, it will evaluate the first two years of the Obama administration and its attempts "adjust" and refine US nuclear strategy – if at all.

The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) rightly identified the proliferation, privatization, and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorist groups and rogue states as the critical nontraditional threat of the 21st century.1 However, the NSS argues that in the 21st century, technology has advanced and become so readily available that we "must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries."2 This reconceptualization of preemption defines the core question--What military strategy is appropriate for using force "to act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed"?3 We argue preemption is ill-suited for disrupting the converged threat of terrorists and rogue states pursuing WMD. Instead, we propose that a forcible counterproliferation (FCP) strategy is most effective for fighting in the "gray zone." Using the 2002 NSS and the problems associated with justifying the preemptive use of force in Iraq as starting points, we examine three questions: 1) How has the threat environment changed since the end of the Cold War? 2) If there is a new threat environment, what is the appropriate military strategy for that threat? 3) How can the United States justify a new strategy to domestic critics and gain international support? In this paper we define the convergent threat as the threshold where there is substantial evidence of a link between terrorists and rogue states pursuing WMD. Once the linkages have been made, the convergent threat becomes a converged threat. We posit the gray zone as the hazy area on the conceptual threat continuum between classically defined imminent threat and our convergent threat. Available military strategies do not address this zone very well. To determine the most effective military strategy for using force in the gray zone, we evaluate four strategies: self-defense, preemption, prevention and forcible counterproliferation. We conclude that FCP, unlike prevention, potentially initiates action against a converged threat early enough to provide an acceptable likelihood of success, while allowing other instruments of power sufficient opportunity to defuse the situation. Further, FCP manages risk and uncertainty and is the most effective strategy for harmonizing operations in the current international framework. In summary, success of FCP pivots on the administration's ability to affect four critical requirements: 1) garner international and domestic support for the strategy, 2) change international norms to allow force against converged threats, 3) adopt three sets of trigger points to ascertain when a nation has abrogated its sovereignty, thereby broaching the possibility of applying force under an FCP strategy, and 4) achieve international consensus regarding the criteria for abrogated sovereignty which would then legitimize military intervention against uncooperative states. We conclude by offering a comprehensive set of recommendations. First, the National Security Council must update the NSS by including the concept of converged threat and the strategy of FCP. Second, the Administration should build international and domestic receptivity to FCP. Finally, the Department of Defense should resource the strategy of forcible counterproliferation through a variety of programs, explained in detail in the paper, which both support and challenge the assumptions of Transformation.

This comprehensive survey of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) rivalries places the Bush Doctrine of preemption in historical context, arguing that instability fueled by first-strike incentives is an inherent byproduct of WMD proliferation.

Despite its portrayal as a bold departure, the Bush Doctrine was not the "new" or "revolutionary" policy instrument that many at the time portended. This work seeks to argue that while it was clear that the Bush Doctrine certainly qualified as a preventive war policy, it is apparent that the adoption of this strategy did not mark a total break with American tradition or earlier Administrations. Warren seeks to dispel arguments pertaining to the supposed "radical" nature of the Bush Doctrine – based on comparisons with previous National Security Strategies and previous Administrations’ penchant for prevention. However, the work also highlights that what was new and bold about the Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy of 2002, was its willingness to embrace reinvigorating a nuclear option that could ultimately be used in the context of preventive war. While Obama has struck bold rhetorical notes and promises in relation to limiting the role of nuclear weapons, he has stopped short of changing the status quo on critical issues that have lingered since the Cold War – such as tactical nuclear weapons and keeping missiles on alert. This book’s final section examines the extent to which Obama has attempted to ‘adjust’ the nuclear option with the recent release of the congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Offering new insights into the Bush doctrine and providing a comprehensive analysis of the current status of the US nuclear weapons strategy, this volume will be of great interest to scholars and students of American foreign policy, security studies and international relations.

If RMA (revolution in military affairs) was the acronym and concept of choice in the U.S. defense community in the 1990s, so preemption has threatened to supercede it in the 2000s. The trouble is that officials and many analysts have confused preemption, which is not controversial, with prevention, which is. In this monograph, Dr. Colin S. Gray draws a sharp distinction between preemption and prevention, and explains that the political, military, moral, and strategic arguments have really all been about the latter, not the former. Dr. Gray provides definitions, reviews the history of the preventive war option, and considers the merit, or lack thereof, in the principal charges laid against the concept when it is proclaimed to be policy. Dr. Gray concludes that there is a place for preventive war in U.S. strategy, but that it is an option that should be exercised only very occasionally. However, there are times when only force seems likely to resolve a maturing danger.